

CovertAction Quarterly

WINTER 1999

NUMBER 66

\$5.95/\$8.95 Canada

CAQ

More **Bucks** for the **Bang**

**Tomahawks,
Technology,
and Terror**

**The Balkanization of the Congo?
Interview with Laurent Kabila**

**Algerian Massacres:
Who's to Blame?**

**Pan Am 103:
Ten Years Later**



CovertAction Quarterly was founded twenty years ago to document U.S. intelligence activities at home and abroad. Our research on these and other vital issues is controversial; therefore, we now open our pages to readers with a new Letters section. Write us. If you do not wish your name printed with your letter, let us know.

Dear CovertAction:

The entire issue of CovertAction Fall 1998 is excellent! And depressing. It makes me think of Marcuse's repressive tolerance. U.S. state terrorism is well known and growing.

"Seeing Yugoslavia Through a Dark Glass" is the best answer to the question of what concretely should be done to alter the media (both mainstream and alternative) images of Yugoslavia, or better, how to oppose the dominant ideological bias that imposes black and white interpretations of "goods" and "bads" in Yugoslavia. A short history of Yugoslavia without simplifications is unavoidable (double Serb-Yugoslav identity, appropriation of the name of the territory by Shkipetars and Muslims, regional inequalities, economic and debt crisis, chronology of nationalisms, etc.).

Another ingredient is international context: globalization exposed as U.S. multinational capital hegemony (nation states obsolete everywhere except U.S. and Germany, transfer of Nazi identity and guilt on Serbs instead of attempt at reconciliation, weakening of U.N. and strengthening of NATO, NGOs' search for compliant defenders of transnational interests presented as civil rights' defense, privatization of the left).

Vera Vratusa-Zunjic
Faculty of Philosophy
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

Diana Johnstone's coverage of ex-Yugoslavia [CovertAction Number 65, Fall 1998] is a welcomed balance to the fare we've been getting.

I suspect that Sean Gervasi's warning about a Balkan Vietnam [CovertAction Quarterly, Numbers 43, Winter 1992-93 and 55, Winter 1995-96] could prove to be correct. One of the main obstacles I see is that the so-called outside peacekeepers are anything but objective sideliners.

NATO attacks are still on the agenda if Belgrade doesn't fulfill the agreement. Strange. What conditions must the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) fulfill, if any? Germany had been supporting the Albanian separatists because it had given up hope that demonstrations in Belgrade would topple Milosevic. Joint German-Albanian maneuvers were held in the Fall of '96, again in '98, etc.

It had been a known fact for some time that the U.S.A. and Germany had been

building Albania up as a base of stability, placing their bets on that great democrat, Berisha. William Perry (former Secretary of Defense) was there in '96 giving away some \$100 million in hi-tech military equipment. It's a fact that the USA maintains spy and military facilities there. Back then, the RND (German CIA) and MAD (military intelligence) began supplying Albania with the latest in weapons (some produced in Singapore and shipped directly) as well as military and intelligence training, in violation of German law.

Auslands-Journal, a good TV news program, interviewed a KLA representative who admitted that the goal was a future Albania made up of Kosovo, Albania, one-third of Macedonia and Montenegro each, plus a large part of northern Greece and parts of Serbia. A KLA speaker said, "We have enough weapons to last until independence."

I can imagine that NATO is concentrating on forming a strong southern flank extending all the way from Albania, Croatia to Turkey to the Mideast. This is also known as "peacekeeping."

Other reports told of border area camps where instructors from Germany, the USA, Pakistan, Chechnya and Croatia were training KLA recruiters in classical terrorism, supported by the usual drug and arms dealing, the centers of which can be traced to Germany, Switzerland and Denmark.

R.T.G., Wehrheim, Germany

The other night, after the election, I began to research Jeb Bush and the Bush family. I found a fantastic article entitled "The Family That Preys Together" by Jack Colburn in CovertAction (Number 41, Summer 1992). It is so important to get that information out, as the new political season begins. This family is not finished with us, yet most of the U.S. citizenry looks upon them as a moral guide! Please help!!

S.K., Denton, Oregon

I must critique [an article] in CovertAction #64, Spring 1998. After reading the excellent first article on the unilateral forced starvation and emasculation of the Iraqi population by the U.S., I was immediately appalled by the subsequent article [about Iraq] by a British professor Paul Rogers, "Near War,

Real Fear." It seems to me that Mr. Rogers doesn't see much of a problem with the rich nations' weapons of mass destruction, those who brought about the annihilation of this technology in the first place and profit from it, and the United States in particular. This is outrageous hypocrisy! How concerned the U.S. is with U.N. procedure! [What of] Thomas Pickering's thug-like tactics in 1991 or of Madeleine Albright's current arrogant dictates.

We have Mr. Rogers concerned about the "plunging morale among U.S. Air Force units" in Saudi Arabia. Would that Mr. Rogers could express the same degree of concern for the morale of thousands of Iraqi survivors whose family members were mercilessly slaughtered in their homes and neighborhoods by the U.S. attacks and the civilians who continue to be deliberately starved and deprived of medicine due to the policy of U.S. oligarchs.

Just received your 20th anniversary issue. I'm overwhelmed at how excellent it is! It ranks as one of your best and most important.

L.S., Connecticut

I have to hand it to you—you folks break the stories sometimes years before anybody else. Case in point: Operation Condor and Pinochet. I read about it in '94 in CovertAction [No. 50, Fall 1994]. Keep up the great work!

S.J., Berkeley, California

Thank god for the CIA. Sometimes I need to have good laugh so I surf the web for nonsense like yours according to mom and the boys and girls on your staff. (Incidentally, how many of your writers are draft dodgers scum like prez. Clinton?), the U.S.A. is responsible for all social, economic and political ills of every subgroup American in the country and the world. I wonder how many trees were chopped down to publish this drivel, and how many chemicals were refined to build this screen its printed on the net on? the sixties are dead, and America is having the wool removed from its eyes as to the true intentions of people like yourselves: you will bitch about any and everything but do nothing when it's your turn to put your ass on the line.

Anonymous e-mail message

CovertAction Quarterly: Issue Number 66, Winter 1999. Chris Agee, William Blum, Anne Gallivan, Bill Montross, Dolores Neuman, Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Michele Stoddard, Louis Wolf, Michael Yellin. Cover pages designed by Michael John Carley. Front cover is composed of two Department of Defense photographs: a test launch of a Navy missile and the view of a missile launch against Iraq from a command post. Back cover is a photo of Krajina Serbs driven out of Croatia in August 1995, on what was called in Federal Yugoslavia the "Road of Brotherhood and Unity," running like a backbone from Ljubljana to Zagreb, to Belgrade to Skopje. Credit: Veritas, a refugee organization in Belgrade.

For more information, check out our new web site at www.covertaction.org, or e-mail us at our new e-mail address: info@covertaction.org.

Published quarterly by Covert Action Publications, Inc., 1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, a District of Columbia Non-profit Corporation. Copyright © 1999. All rights reserved. Indexed by Alternative Press Index, University Microfilms; ISBN 1067-7232. Printed in the U.S. Subscriptions: \$22/year in U.S.; \$25 in Canada and Mexico; \$35 all other areas. For back issues and other items, see pages 66 and 67.

T/SOC/4/1/59

CovertAction Quarterly

Contents

Winter 1999


Number 66



NATO & Beyond: The Wars of the Future

by Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap.....4

What now defines the unique nature of the U.S. role in policing the world is its evolving unilateralism.



Tomahawk Missiles, Raytheon, and Campaign Money

by Lee Su Hin.....8

Military experts were stunned by the number of Tomahawks used in recent U.S. attacks—their precision has always been questioned.



Sudan: Diversionary Bombing

by Richard Becker, Sara Flounders, and John Parker.....12

Claiming threats to national security, Clinton bombed an African pharmaceutical factory which made only basic medicines.

More Bucks for the Bang

by Greg Speeter.....20

At the height of the Cold War, the Pentagon got \$2 for every \$1 spent on aid to cities. Today it gets \$4 for every \$1 of aid to cities.



PanAm 103: More Disinformation?

by William Blum.....24

In charging two Libyan airport workers (3 years after the fact), the U.S. gained Gulf War support from two Middle East states.



Conflict in Congo: Interview with President Kabila

by Elombe Brath and Samori Marksman.....30

U.S. support and training of Ugandan and Rwandan militaries against Congo has thrown Africa into a major war.



Algeria: Theocracy by Terror?

Interviews by Ellen Ray and Lenora Foerster.....34

Young Algerians sent to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets, then to the Gulf to fight Americans, make a link between the CIA, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia to destabilize progressive Muslim countries.



The Pinochet Principle: Who's Next?

by Michael Ratner.....46

Conservatives and American supremacists are worried that U.S. soldiers, or even Kissinger, could be indicted.

Protecting Friends: The PA Clamps Down Again

by Khalid Amayreh.....49

Since the Wye Agreement, making the CIA umpire in the Israeli game, the Palestinian Authority has increased suppression of Palestinian journalists.



To Use a War

by Diana Johnstone.....50

Holbrooke's zeal for bombing and bombing again is a novel boast for a peacemaker.



Izetbegovich: Islamic Hero of the West

by Diana Johnstone.....58

The Bosnian leader's little-known "Islamic Declaration" to change a multi-ethnic society into an Islamic fundamentalist state.



The Secrets Game

By William Blum.....62

Two progressive activists were set up by the FBI and convicted of espionage against...no one.

NATO AND BEYOND: THE WARS OF THE FUTURE

BY ELLEN RAY AND BILL SCHAAP

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright referred to the August 1998 missile assaults against Sudan and Afghanistan (allegedly in retaliation for the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa two weeks earlier) as "unfortunately, the war of the future."¹ In one sense, she was lamenting the likelihood of various Islamic forces retaliating against American civilian targets.

There is, as Albright understands, another side to these wars, more than guided missiles launched from a thousand miles away, with no danger to U.S. troops. American military strategy calls for "the use of overwhelming force to minimize United States casualties."² But it is not that simple. Former CIA Director Robert Gates was more precise: "[O]ur people and our Government must accept another reality: as potential official American targets are 'hardened,' terrorists will simply turn to non-official targets—businesses, schools, tourists and so on. We can perhaps channel the threat away from the United States Government, but not away from Americans."³ What grand scheme, then, is in place, that may bring these "unfortunate" wars back home, against civilians?

Recent U.S. strategy, to implement the administration's self-appointed role as global policeman, is now defined by its evolving military unilateralism, at home and abroad.

THE PATHOLOGY OF A SINGLE SUPERPOWER

With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the U.S. at last realized its objective to be the world's only superpower. Though Washington—and Wall Street—had always been possessed of a rapacious ambition to control the world's economy (what "globalization" is all about), there is now the conviction in many quarters that it is developing the military capability to do so. The acting Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten Peters, described the development as "learning a new kind of military operations [sic] in a new world."⁴

It is unrealistic simply to wipe out every non-compliant government; and a few are too powerful for such a strategy. So the U.S. had devised a more comprehensive plan, and now, after some 20 years, is approaching its millennial end game.

One critical element has been a redefinition of the "enemy," in order to disguise greed as a dispassionate desire to spread western "democracy." Its complement has been the development of a military strategy for employing that definition to globalize U.S. power.

THE NEW ENEMY

It is commonplace to say that terrorism has replaced communism as the new enemy of western democracy. But this replacement has been selectively applied, geared to the goals of U.S. global hegemony. Washington's characterization of a foreign government can change radically when little or nothing has changed in that country. The Clinton administration's most recent pledge of more



U.S. soldiers show foreign troops from Turkey, Russia, and the Caucasus

billions for defense came as the Pentagon upgraded North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, which they call "rogue" states, as no longer "distant" threats of possible nuclear missile attacks, an official position they had held only a few weeks before.⁵

Of course, when this happens, it ought to raise eyebrows among the citizenry. That it doesn't is often blamed on the average American's notoriously short political memory, but it is really due to the remarkable ability of the media to accept new policies, new "enemies," new "threats," without ever acknowledging their prior, unquestioning acceptance of the old ones.⁶

5. *New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1999, p. A7.

6. Recall that Mobutu became a "dictator" in the press only when his overthrow was imminent; for thirty years, while he brutally raped the Congo, he was our anti-

Ellen Ray and Bill Schaap are co-founders of *CoverAction Quarterly*.

1. *New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1998, p. 21. And see Sudan article in this issue.

2. James Risen, "Pentagon Planners Give New Meaning to 'Over the Top,'" *New York Times*, Sept. 20, 1998, p. 18.

3. Robert M. Gates, "What War Looks Like Now," *New York Times*, Aug. 16, 1998, p. 15.

4. "The Pentagon After the Cold War," *Aerospace America*, Nov. 1998, p. 42.



Staff Sergeant Chris Steffen, U.S. Air Force

isus the "American Way."

Enemies can become friends overnight, too. Recent events in Kosovo demonstrate how quickly and how hypocritically the U.S. government recharacterizes a situation when it suits their needs. The Kosovo Liberation Army was branded a "terrorist organization" in early 1998, but by mid-year U.S. officials, including Richard Holbrooke, were meeting with its leaders, while claiming they were not in favor of Kosovan secession and the resulting inevitability of a "Greater Albania." Holbrooke was uncharacteristically frank: "I think the Serbs should get out of here."⁷

communist ally Mr. President. And the *New York Times* always referred to the "Pinochet government" succeeding the "Marxist Allende regime," even though Allende was elected and Pinochet took power in a coup.
7. Chris Hedges, "U.S. Envoy Meets Kosovo Rebels, Who Reject Truce Call," *New York Times*, June 25, 1998, p. A6.

Ironically, after the CIA financed, armed, and trained Islamic "friends" in Afghanistan, President Clinton now believes that the threat they pose may justify creating a new military command at home to fight terrorism. As we go to press, he is weighing Pentagon advice to establish a commander-in-chief for the defense of the continental U.S., a first in peace time. [More next issue.]

WMD AND NATO

The government and its media spin artists have incited western fears by tarring enemy states like Iraq with the brush of "weapons of mass destruction" so repeatedly that the acronym WMD is now current jargon. Part of the "new vision" for NATO, discussed below, is to focus on WMD as a justification for military strikes anywhere, either as deterrence or as "preemptive retaliation." The campaign around WMD is described as "a microcosm for the new NATO, and for its larger debates and dilemmas."⁸ None of the analyses, however, point out that the U.S. is the only nation that has used all of these weapons—chemical, biological, and nuclear.

The U.S. has employed biological weapons for 200 years, from smallpox in the blankets of Native Americans to spreading plagues in Cuba; from chemical weapons like mustard gas to cripple and kill in World War I to Agent Orange to defoliate Vietnam—and to create a generation of deformed children. It is the only nation that has dropped nuclear bombs, and one that now makes, uses, and sells depleted uranium weapons.

The chemical weapons charges levied against Iraq are fraught with irony. When Iraq was at war with Iran, and the U.S. considered Iran the greater enemy (a view that changed under Israeli pressure), it was facilitating the sale of chemical weapons to Iraq.⁹

The weapons inspectors in Iraq claimed that their inventories of "unaccounted for" WMDs came from boxes of secret Iraqi documents discovered "hidden on a chicken farm near Baghdad,"¹⁰ but there were easier ways to have compiled such inventories—like reviewing the CIA's reports of the secret arms deals it brokered in the 1980s.

TAKING CONTROL

For the U.S., the United Nations has been a double-edged sword. Because of its Security Council veto, it can frustrate actions it opposes, but cannot always force actions it wishes.

Thus the U.S. has fostered—and funded—U.N. tribunals to punish alleged war crimes in Bosnia and in Rwanda, but would never allow such extraterritorial tribunals to investigate crimes against humanity in Indonesia, for example, or in any of its other client states. For this reason, the U.S. refuses to ratify the proposed International Criminal Court and opposes the trial of Augusto Pinochet in Spain.¹¹

Where geographically possible, the military planners have turned increasingly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Secretary Albright described as "our institution of choice."¹² NATO is not "hostage" to U.N. resolutions, one "strategic analyst" said.¹³ A U.S. "official" explained that the U.N. "fig-

8. At the upcoming NATO celebrations in April, the U.S. is to propose a "NATO Center for Weapons of Mass Destruction." Steven Erlanger, "U.S. to Propose NATO Take On Increased Roles," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1998, p. A1.

9. Most notably through Chilean arms dealer Carlos Cardoen. See Art Ben-Menashe, *Profits of War* (New York: Sheridan Square, 1992), *passim*. Cardoen vigorously denied any links to the CIA until his company was indicted in the U.S., when he immediately invoked the CIA-knew-all-about-it defense.

10. William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Germes, Atoms and Poison Gas: The Iraqi Shell Game," *New York Times*, Dec. 20, 1998, p. 5.

11. See "The Pinochet Principle" in this issue, p. 46.

12. Roger Cohen, "NATO Shatters Old Limits in the Name of Preventing Evil," *New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1998, Sec. 4, p. 3.

13. *Ibid.*



The Dark Star, a new high altitude low-observable endurance reconnaissance plane.

Department of Defense

ures in this as far as possible," but that the new definition of NATO is meant to include the possibility of action without U.N. mandate.¹⁴

A *Times* editorial warned against "transforming the alliance into a global strike force against threats to American and European interests."¹⁵ But Secretary Albright reaffirmed that the shift is from collective defense of the NATO members' territory to "the broader concept of the defense of our common interests."¹⁶ This means, in practical terms, the U.S. forcing the NATO imprimatur on military interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign states that are not members of the alliance.¹⁷

Kosovo

The most obvious and illegal expansion of NATO's mandate has been its intervention in Kosovo. As we go to press, NATO is voting whether to authorize airstrikes against the Serbian military. The rationale for the Clinton administration's push for the bombing is described as to "do something" for the sake of "credibility," especially because President Milosevic might "belittle the celebration marking the West's triumph over Communism," planned for Ap-

ril in Washington.¹⁸ He might otherwise, one Pentagon official feared, try to turn the celebration into a "Kosovo summit."¹⁹

After President Milosevic agreed to allow a monitoring ("verifying") team into Kosovo, the U.S. chose career diplomat William Walker to head the mission, under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.²⁰ Walker, when U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, oversaw and condoned some of the most brutal oppression and murder in the Western hemisphere.

THE UNSCOM SCAM

U.S. abuse of the U.N.'s mandate became apparent in the UNSCOM Scam. For some time, United Nations Special Commission inspectors in Iraq had attempted to gain access to President Hussein's homes and similar sites on the unlikely excuse that they could be CBW laboratories or storehouses. The media continually berated Saddam Hussein when he claimed that espionage was involved. Nonetheless, it came as a surprise to some to learn in January that U.S. spies had been operating against Iraq under cover as UNSCOM inspectors. To add insult to injury, Iraq had been forced to pay for the inspectors from its "oil for food" program income.²¹

UNSCOM was always beholden to the United States. From 1991 to 1997, UNSCOM had no U.N. budget, "but existed on

handouts, especially from Washington,"²² like the Hague Tribunal on Yugoslavia. He who pays the piper calls the tune.

ACTING ALONE

The U.S. has increasingly preferred NATO to the U.N. to avoid having its militaristic adventures vetoed. But with some disagreements within NATO as well, the Pentagon has taken to acting alone, or with a compliant ally. The August attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan were examples of totally unilateral military action by the U.S. The recent bombing of Iraq, a joint U.S.-U.K. operation, was taken without consulting either the U.N. or NATO. As one reporter noted, "the global coalition arrayed against [Saddam Hussein] in the gulf war has been badly frayed. The United States and Britain are its only steadfast members."²³

The arrogance of such an action (compounded by the repeated failure of its rationale, the removal of Saddam Hussein, and by the UNSCOM scandal), has generated considerable anger around the world, albeit mostly by people and governments that can do little or nothing about it but voice a "growing resentment."²⁴

However, some of that resentment has clout. Russia, China, and India have all voiced concerns, and the recent air strikes may have prompted Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov's informal proposal for a strategic alliance between the three nations. While visiting India to discuss the initiative at the time of the attacks, he said, "We are very negative about the use of

22. Barbara Crossette, "Reports of Spying Dim Outlook for Inspections," *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1999, p. A8.

23. Tim Weiner, "U.S. Long View on Iraq; Patience in Containing the Ever-Deadlier Hussein," *New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1999, p. 10.

24. Richard N. Haass, the director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, describes the concern as a "growing resentment factor." Serge Schmemmann, "Attacks Breed a Complex Unease About U.S. Goals," *New York Times*, Dec. 20, 1998, p. 21.

14. William Pfaff, "Washington's New Vision for NATO Could Be Divisive," *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 5, 1998.

15. "New Visions for NATO," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1998, p. A24. Alexander Vershbow, the U.S. representative to NATO, immediately responded, in a letter to the editor, that there are "no such proposals." The new strategy, he said, "will not turn the alliance into a global police force, but will affirm NATO's adaptability in tackling new risks, like regional instability, weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism."

16. Steven Erlanger, "U.S. to Propose NATO Take On Increased Roles," *New York Times*, Dec. 7, 1998, p. A12.

17. "The Holbrook-Milosevic agreement on Kosovo in October was accurately described by Richard Holbrook as an unprecedented event. NATO had intervened in an internal conflict inside a sovereign non-NATO state, not to defend its own members but to force that other state to halt repression of a rebellious ethnic minority." *Op. cit.*, n. 14.

18. *New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1999, p. A3.

19. *Ibid.*

20. Walker reminded his audience at a Washington briefing that, while he spoke on behalf of the OSCE and the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), he was still "a serving career [U.S.] Foreign Service Officer." Department of State release, Jan. 8, 1999.

21. The revelations, which first appeared in the *Washington Post* and the *Boston Globe*, and then belatedly in the *New York Times*, caused a "furore." Tim Weiner, "U.S. Used U.N. Team to Place Spy Device in Iraq, Aides Say," *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1999, p. A1. An unnamed "senior intelligence official" quoted in the *Times* said that the news "should not shock people." An also unnamed U.N. official said it would be "naive" to have thought otherwise.

force bypassing the Security Council.²⁵ France and Canada also withdrew support. To the consternation of the Americans, France, has formally ended its support for the embargo on Iraq, forcing a reexamination of sanctions and the tightly restricted "oil for food" program.²⁶

The "Parallel NATO"

Notwithstanding resentment and opposition, Washington is forging ahead with complex, ambitious, and risky plans, if not to supplant, at least to rival NATO, whenever it balks at American cowboy operations. The program is already well entrenched in Eastern Europe, where the Pentagon has bilateral military programs in 13 countries. Plans to expand into the Caucasus and former Soviet Asia are in the works.²⁷

The result "is an informal alliance that parallels NATO, but is more acutely reliant on its American benefactor."²⁸ Another consequence of this operation is that "the Pentagon is eclipsing the State Department as the most visible agent of U.S. foreign policy."²⁹

Funding for some of the programs has an Orwellian flair. The U.S. European Command in Stuttgart runs a program called the Joint Contact Team Program, which was, according to the *Washington Post*, "initially paid for from a discretionary fund held by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To work within congressional prohibitions of training foreign troops, the visits by U.S. military experts are called 'exchanges' and the experts are called 'contact teams' rather than trainers."³⁰

One of the convenient side effects of the operation is the astonishing expansion of U.S. arms sales to the region. Eastern Europe "has become the largest recipient of U.S.-funded military equipment transfers after the Middle East." Some Eastern Europeans are justifiably concerned about "whether the United States is fueling a regional arms race."³¹

Another sobering aspect of the Pentagon's preeminence is its growing collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency. "Ever since the Persian Gulf war, when military commanders and CIA officials became convinced of the need for closer co-

ordination between their services, planning for covert missions has been conducted jointly."³²

The New Balkanization

The western powers, having successfully re-Balkanized the Balkans, find this Nineteenth Century tactic to their liking. Indications are that there is a serious and far-flung effort under way to Balkanize Africa, redrawing its borders. Three of the largest nations on that continent, Congo, Angola, and Sudan, face violent struggles to divide their territories. In Angola and Sudan, the rebellions, supported quite actively by the U.S., have gone on for years. The move to divide the Congo, however, began only after the recent overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko, the greedy dictator whom the U.S. had installed and kept in power for more than 30 years.

Learning from the breakups both of the Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, or more to the point, having long planned for such eventualities, the U.S. recognizes that it is easier to dominate a region when the governmental units are small. Already the media parrots are taking the cue, after years of silence on the subject. A recent, perhaps prophetic, piece in the *New York Times*, makes the point:

The borders of African nations, set up arbitrarily by the Europeans who colonized the continent a century ago, are supposed to be inviolable. Yet Congo is now split in two, perhaps for good.³³

32. *Op. cit.*, n. 2.

33. Ian Fisher with Norimitsu Onishi, "Congo's Struggle May Unleash Broad Strife to Redraw Africa," *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1999, p. A1.

Although the Organization of African Unity enshrined the colonial borders in its 1963 charter, and has generally seen them respected for 35 years, the western powers now purport to blame themselves for having imposed these unnatural divisions upon the hapless Africans.³⁴ This, of course, encourages Balkanization and eases the path to further domination.

In some cases, U.S. strategy is more convoluted and Machiavellian. In the Sudan, for example, it has long been evident that the U.S. wants to keep the rebels sufficiently viable to avoid defeat, but not strong enough to pose a serious threat of the government's overthrow. "Peace," an "official" is quoted as saying, "does not necessarily suit American interests.... 'An unstable Sudan amounts to a stable Egypt.'"³⁵

The Consequences

Perhaps we act alone because we have to act alone. Former CIA Director Robert Gates hinted about future wars when he wrote:


Another unacknowledged and unpleasant reality is that a more militant approach toward terrorism would, in virtually all cases, require us to act violently and alone. No other power will join us on a crusade against terrorism.³⁶

But, the terrorists having been created, the crusade goes on. ■

34. Typical is Howard French's long article, "The African Question: Who Is to Blame?" *New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1999, p. B7. The subhead reads, "The Finger Points to the West, And Congo Is a Harsh Example."

35. James C. McKinley, Jr., "Sudan's Calamity: Only the Starving Favor Peace," *New York Times*, July 23, 1998.

36. *Op. cit.*, n. 3.



National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) secret imaging radar spacecraft used against Iraq.

25. BBC World Service, Dec. 21, 1998.

26. Barbara Crosette, "France, in Break With U.S., Urges End to Iraq Embargo," *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1999, p. A6.

27. Dana Priest, "U.S. Military Builds Alliances Across Europe," *Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 1998, p. A1.

28. *Ibid.*, p. A28.

29. *Ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.*

TOMAHAWK MISSILES, RAYTHEON, CAMPAIGN MONEY

What You Need to Know!

BY LEE SIU HIN

During the November U.S.-Iraq crisis in the Gulf, on the other side of the earth, a joint U.S.-U.K. team quietly conducted a series of missile tests. On November 18, 1998, a British attack submarine, *HMS Splendid*, fired a Tomahawk cruise missile with a 1,000-pound explosive warhead from 500 miles off the southern California coast. It traveled several hundred miles into a test target building on San Clemente Island, just 75 miles south of Los Angeles.¹ Following two similar tests earlier that month, firing non-explosive-warhead Tomahawks from the

based British Consul-General Paul Dimond. He was impressed by the results: "The success of this test is a significant moment in the U.S.-U.K. global security partnership," he said. "This new capability will enable the U.K. to be an even more effective partner with the United States and NATO in support of international diplomacy."²

Since the start of the current Iraqi crisis, in January 1998, hundreds of Tomahawk missiles had been traveling on U.S. war ships deployed either in the Gulf, the Indian Ocean, or the Mediterranean.


The August attack on Afghanistan, at least two Tomahawks malfunctioned and dropped into southern Pakistan, killing several people. In the December attacks on Iraq, some Tomahawks hit civilian targets in Iraq and some flew off course into Iran, injuring and killing several people. Ironically, of course, the attacks did not achieve their alleged goals, to kill Osama bin Laden and President Saddam Hussein and cripple their forces.

Besides killing innocent civilians with limited military success, how much did the U.S. military spend to punish Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq? According to initial estimates, bombing bin Laden's "hideouts" on August 20 cost America at least \$100 million. Operation "Desert Fox" in Iraq has cost, at least \$1 billion since December 16; and since the 1991 Gulf War, an average of \$50 billion per year has been spent maintaining the Gulf deployment and keeping the Iraqi president in line, according to Associated Press reporter Laura Myers.³

The August 20 missile attacks in Sudan and Afghanistan, as well as the December missile attacks on Iraq, involved huge amounts of money, manpower, and resources. The assaults were part of a larger web involving campaign donations, international military sales, U.S. military contracts, and the U.S. military build-up in the Middle East. The attacks were also meant to pave the way for the little-known multi-billion dollar National Missile Defense System—a revised version of the Reagan administration "Star Wars" program.

Many people are now familiar with Tomahawk and Patriot missiles, due to the Gulf War and the August and November attacks. Not many know, however, that the manufacturer of these weapons is the Raytheon Company, based in Lexington, Massachusetts, one of the biggest military contractors, with billions of dollars in annual sales.

3. Laura Myers, "Annual U.S. Gulf Costs Said At 50B," AP, Nov. 17, 1998. See also, Laura Myers, "U.S. Gulf Force Still Strong," AP, Nov. 15, 1998; Suzanne M. Schafer, "U.S. Gulf Force Still Substantial," AP, Nov. 7, 1998.



U.S. Navy

Firing of a Tomahawk missile against Iraq.

Splendid to a U.S. Navy test range at China Lake, California, the exercise marked a joint effort to build a U.K. version of the Tomahawk missiles.

Among the guests who witnessed the November 18 test was the Los Angeles-

When the U.S. launched nearly a hundred Tomahawk missiles against Sudan and Afghanistan on August 20, and 300-plus Tomahawks against Iraq in December, many military experts were stunned by the numbers, since the Tomahawk's effectiveness had always been questioned. During

Lee Siu Hin is a free-lance foreign correspondent, who has worked with Pacific Radio in Los Angeles.
1. Associated Press (AP), Nov. 18, 1998.

2. *Ibid.*



Peter deJong / AP

Explosion over Baghdad, on the night of December 17, 1998.

THE RAYTHEON CONNECTION

According to a recent leading aerospace publication, *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, the U.S. fired 79 cruise missiles at up to seven targets, primarily a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum, Sudan, and what they claimed were bin Laden's headquarters, training, and support areas south of Kabul, Afghanistan. The number of missiles reportedly used increased from 70 in classified briefs the day after the raids to 79 in later reports, with 66 fired into Afghanistan and 13 into Sudan.⁴

At about \$750,000 each, the land-based Tomahawk cruise missile is more expensive than a conventional bomb delivered by manned aircraft. According to retired U.S. Navy Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, with regular maintenance costs and other expenses, the costs for the missile attacks on August 20 could be nearly \$115 million of taxpayers' money. "It's a lot of money, far more than sending B-52s," he added.⁵ The rationale for using Tomahawk missiles for the attacks—to put no American aircrews at risk of death or capture—has raised serious questions in the military community; it is often hard to judge exactly how effective missiles are with no close-range eyewitnesses.

After the August 20 missile attacks, some former Persian Gulf war command-

ers said they were astounded by the number of Tomahawks used in the attacks. It is "a helluva lot of missiles," a former Operation Desert Storm planner said, adding that during Desert Storm, they would never have dreamed of putting more than 8 or 12 Tomahawks on one target. In fact, commanders were ordered early in the Gulf War to stop shooting the missiles because of the expense.⁶ So why did the U.S. military this time rush to burn over \$100 million in one night in August, when there

6. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Aug. 31, 1998, p. 32.

were other alternatives, such as political negotiation or raising the matter in the U.N. Security Council?

For the last several years, Raytheon's Tomahawk missile has become one of America's favorite weapons in foreign conflicts. In the last several U.S.-involved international crises, the Tomahawk has become a wild card for the military.

During the Kosovo crisis this past September and October, the U.S. deployed (but did not fire) unspecified numbers of Tomahawks on warships in the Mediterranean.*During the Iraqi arms inspection crisis in November 1998, the Pentagon deployed 250 to 300 Tomahawks aboard Navy ships and submarines plying the Persian Gulf. Although there are fewer ships in the region now than there were during the heat of the January-February Iraqi arms inspection crisis, the Pentagon has doubled the number of missiles—more than were used during the Gulf War. According to an unidentified official,⁷ these Tomahawk missiles, and 50 or so combat aircraft aboard the aircraft carrier *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, could enable the U.S. to launch an attack against Iraq without having to spend days or weeks trying to secure permission from the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and several other Middle East states were reluctant to do so that time. In fact, this was exactly what happened later in December, when the U.S., with U.K. backing, launched hundreds of missiles against Iraq from the Indian Ocean, bypassing Arab states, the U.N., and even NATO.

7. AP, Nov. 7, 1998.



Peter deJong / AP

An Iraqi child amid ruins of residential area destroyed by the U.S. air strikes.

4. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Aug. 31, 1998, p. 30.

5. Author's interview with Admiral Carroll, September 1998. He said although the price tag of the missile is around \$750,000, there is an average additional \$400,000 per missile for personnel, transportation, and maintenance costs. With 79 missiles used, he estimated total cost for the air strikes as at least \$91 million.

WEAPONS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The new U.S. military strategy is: focus on quality rather than quantity, and arm with new-generation 21st Century conventional and tactical weapons to prepare for what the Pentagon calls "fighting two wars at the same time."

Such weapons projects include:

1. Lockheed-Martin's next generation YF-22 advanced tactical fighters for the Air Force, called by one military expert "the ace of aces in 21st century warfare." With an estimated cost of \$159 million per plane, the 442 planes will cost approximately \$70.1 billion. In the fiscal 1999 defense bill, Congress passed \$1.6 billion to pay Lockheed-Martin for the YF-22's continued development.

2. Boeing's F/A-18 E/F, the Navy's top fighter-bomber, for which Congress approved \$204 million in 1998 and requested \$3.28 billion (30 planes' worth) for fiscal 1999. The Navy plans to place 1,000 F/A-18 E/Fs in the next century, with an estimated cost of \$81 billion. This doesn't even include the other model, F/A-18 C/D: 1,062 aircraft with a total estimated cost of \$42.7 billion.

3. 3,000 Air Force/Navy Joint Strike Fighters, built by a coalition of aerospace companies, primarily Boeing and Lockheed-Martin-British Aerospace teams. With planned service entry in 2008, it will be the future standard fighter for the U.S., at a projected \$72 million per unit, or \$219 billion total.

4. A new CVN-77 Nuclear Aircraft Carrier built by Newport News Shipbuilding, with an estimated total cost of \$6.5

billion, to be launched next century. In addition, a new \$1.5 billion helicopter carrier which the Navy did not request but Congress "approved."

5. The National Missile Defense System (NMD), coordinated by the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMD). It's an anti-missile defense system including NMD, Navy Theater Wide system, Air Force Airborne Laser system and Army Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD), with a combination of satellites, radar and missiles. Sounds familiar? It should—it's a copycat version of the 1980s "Star Wars" program.

Nobody really knows how much it will cost to build the overall system, but initial estimates are around \$500 billion. So far it has cost about \$4 billion per year for the research alone, and the Pentagon is requesting \$4 billion of BMD funding for the 1999 budget. Despite heavy criticism from anti-nuclear activists, and even the Pentagon's own "independent" panel, who called the project a "rush to failure" because of flight test misses in Lockheed-Martin's THAAD and other components of this project, and despite almost \$50 billion in waste, the Department of Defense still will not drop the project. Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed-Martin and Northrop-Grumman are all currently fighting tooth-and-nail for the contracts. So far, the Boeing facility in Anaheim, California, has won \$1.5 billion from the Pentagon for related research and development. In addition, Congress quietly slipped an additional \$1 billion of "emergency funds" into next year's already approved BMD budget of \$3.5 billion, and restored \$293.4 million for Lockheed-Martin to continue developing THAAD.

The publicity around these new weapons helped Raytheon's sales and it has certainly helped the company recover from its recent financial troubles. According to their recent report, Raytheon's 1998 3rd-quarter profits dropped 95 percent from the same time in 1997, and the company announced the elimination of 14,000 jobs over the next two years.⁸ However, since autumn, especially after the August air strikes, Raytheon has been getting many new contracts worth billions of dollars; in addition, its 1998 campaign contributions appear to have helped its sales as well.

THE CAMPAIGN MONEY CONNECTION

Have big corporate campaign donations like those from Raytheon to both the Republican and Democratic Parties influenced U.S. decisions about military spending?

During the period May to November 1998, financially troubled Raytheon received multi-billion dollar contracts from the U.S. military as well as from foreign countries. Raytheon also substantially increased its campaign donations during that time.

According to *Aviation Week & Space Technology*,⁹ not long before the air at-

tack, Raytheon was chosen by the Navy to build the next generation Block 4 "Tactical Tomahawk," due to be operational in 2003. The current 2,700 Block 3 Tomahawks—probably used in the August 20 attacks—are to be retired soon, because Raytheon and the Navy believe that it will be cheaper to build 1,353 new Block 4 Tomahawks than to improve the old ones.

On June 3, the Naval Air Systems Command's cruise missiles office awarded Raytheon \$23.1 million for the Block 4 Tomahawk's engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) project. The entire development project will cost \$275 million, ending in 2001. According to the plan, the missiles will then be built between 2002 and 2007. With an estimated cost of \$574,000 per missile, plus other related expenses, the total development and production costs will be about \$1.1 billion. That is in addition to the \$95 million for improvements on Raytheon's Patriot Missile system, passed by the House of Representatives on March 31.

According to the initial estimates of the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and the independent watchdog of federal campaign money, FEC Info,¹⁰ Raytheon and its

subsidiaries gave \$625,579 in soft money and individual contributions during the 1995-1996 election cycle, and \$330,192 in the first six months of the 1997-1998 cycle, with \$3,380,000 for lobbyists. In addition, according to the Center for Public Integrity,¹¹ Raytheon is one of the most generous defense donors to members of Congress: House majority leader Dick Armey, for instance, received \$48,201. Furthermore, according to the Federal Election Commission, Raytheon donated \$138,700 in soft money to both the Democratic and Republican national campaign committees during this period.

Within six weeks after the August 20th attacks, Raytheon received several more big military contracts worth up to \$4.1 billion,¹² including:

September 14: the Air Force awarded a \$56.4 million contract to Raytheon Systems Co., a unit of Raytheon, for the upgrade of 1,950 Maverick missiles;

September 16: the government approved the sale of nearly 7,000 Raytheon missiles, bombs and related accelerators plus thousands of training bombs costing \$2 billion. (This sale was made to the Unit-

8. Based on news wires and Raytheon PR materials.

9. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, Aug. 31, 1998, p. 35.

10. Documents provided by FEC Info, Washington, D.C.

11. Documents provided by Center for Public Integrity, Washington, D.C.

12. *AP*, Nov. 7, 1998.

ed Arab Emirates, a small Gulf state of 2.3 million people.);

Early October: Raytheon was selected by Greece to provide more than \$1.1 billion for Patriot missile defense systems, \$145 million for an upgrade to Hawk Air Defense Systems, and more than \$200 million for T6-A trainer aircraft—a total of \$1.5 billion.

Between the November Iraq crisis and the U.S.-U.K. attacks in December, Raytheon received several lucrative contracts from the military, primarily from the Navy, including:

Raytheon received \$78.4 million from the Navy for fiscal 1999 transmitter groups and K-99 fire control systems for DDG-51 class destroyers under the AEGIS ship-building program.

As a member of the Avondale Alliance, Raytheon anticipates receiving approximately \$50 million for ship integration work on the LPD-18, the second ship in the LPD-17 series.

In early January 1999, Raytheon received approximately \$422.5 million for three MK-2 ship self-defense systems. These implement an evolutionary development of improved ship self-defense capabilities against high-speed, low-flying anti-ship cruise missiles.

As part of a joint venture with Lockheed-Martin, Raytheon will share on a 60/40 basis an approximate \$376.6 million contract awarded recently for the purchase of the third year full-rate production of the JAVELIN weapon system.

Raytheon chairman William H. Swanson announced in December that it is expected to have more than \$18 billion in contracts, both military and civilian, for 1998. As a result, Raytheon's stock rebounded from its recent low to a near 52-week high by late December 1998.

Raytheon is not alone. Boeing, Lockheed-Martin, and Northrop-Grumman are all eyeing the annual \$270 billion U.S. defense spending bills, plus billions of dollars in foreign military markets. They are all quietly competing with each other for a bigger share of the "weapons of the 21st century."

This includes the largely unknown U.S. National Missile Defense System (NMD), a mini-version of Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars," with a price tag in the hundreds of billions of dollars. All of these corporations are building the weapons for the U.S. to dominate the world militarily in the next century.

THE MILITARY CONNECTION

There is another aspect of the U.S. treatment of Iraq and the August 20 air strikes that has been overlooked: the legitimacy of



Nurses tending a bombing victim in a Baghdad hospital, early in the morning of December 17, 1998.

its continuous military presence in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Not surprisingly, after the October Kosovo crisis in former Yugoslavia, in November the U.S. and Iraq suddenly went back to crisis mode again.

In January, after the air strikes, the Pentagon has been considering sending a Patriot missile battery to Turkey, in response to the Turkish government's request for additional protection against possible Iraqi Scud missile attacks. This request came after a series of U.S. attacks on Iraq's missile defense system in the northern "no-fly zone." The allied planes are based in Incirlik Air Base in south-central Turkey. Pentagon spokesman Michael Doubleday would not say whether Washington intended to comply with the request. "We are interested in being as supportive as we can to any of our coalition partners who are involved in this operation," he said.¹³

Since the 1980s, the U.S. military has found a series of scapegoats to justify its intervention in the region: first Iran, then Iraq, then Somalia, next Sudan and

bin Laden, and now Saddam Hussein again.

The end of the Cold War did not scale down U.S. military muscle building; on the contrary, it led to further military buildup and accelerated development of the most advanced weapons systems. With the Soviet Union gone and Russian power significantly diminished, the U.S. wants to achieve its long-term goal: domination of the world. In the short term, the U.S. still needs to create imaginary enemies such as Iraq, North Korea, China, Sudan, Serbia, to legitimize the U.S. military buildup, as well as the continued military presence in the region. This includes several next-generation war plane projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter, the B-2 Bomber, and the YF-22 for the Navy and Air Force—initial estimates put them at no less than \$400 billion over the next 20 years, to be built up to 6,000 units; several new aircraft carriers; and possibly the \$500 billion NMD system. With a series of U.S. military threats and air strikes around the globe, against "terrorists" and "military dictators," this will certainly be a good excuse for the policy makers to justify spending more and more money on weapons for the years to come. ■

13. Robert Burns, "U.S. to Help Turkey With Weapons," AP, Jan. 15, 1999.

SUDAN: DIVERSIONARY BOMBING

BY RICHARD BECKER, SARA FLOUNDERS, AND JOHN PARKER

On August 20, 1998, without warning, U.S. military forces launched 16 Tomahawk cruise missiles that slammed into Khartoum, Sudan, demolishing the El Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries plant, which had provided over 50 percent of Sudan's medicine, including 90 percent of the most critically needed drugs. The attack killed one and wounded many others, some critically.

More significantly, the bombing will inexorably cause the suffering and death of tens of thousands of innocent people all over Africa, many of them children, by depriving them of basic medicines against malaria, tuberculosis, and other easily curable diseases.

Secretary Albright's statement (at right) was most revealing.¹ The missile attack on a pharmaceutical plant may well be an example of future U.S. wars. The attack involved a military strike against the most vital, life-sustaining facility in the Sudan. The bombing was justified by wild, unsubstantiated charges of weapons of mass destruction. It followed years of sanctions that have cut development of basic infrastructure and even the purchase of needed medicines. It is part of a policy that includes U.S. bans on loans and trade, the funding of a 'contra' army to destabilize the Sudanese government, and the demonization of its leadership as "terrorists."

THE RATIONALE

The Clinton administration's rationale for the bombing of Khartoum (and the simultaneous attack on a remote region of Afghanistan) was simple: A few weeks earlier, the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, had been bombed. Those bombings had been coordinated by Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden was

the real owner of the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant. And El Shifa was a secret chemical weapons factory. Simple, yes, but while the first statement was true—the embassies had indeed been bombed—the connection to bin Laden has not, to this day, been proved, and the characterization of the El Shifa plant is an outright lie.

The *New York Times* put it more diplomatically: "American officials continue to say they struck a facility that produces a key ingredient for a deadly nerve agent. But their descriptions of the plant as a highly secretive, tightly secured military-industrial site, their initial statement that the plant produced no commercial prod-

"This is unfortunately the war of the future."

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

ucts, and their statements that the exiled Saudi millionaire, Osama bin Laden, directly financed the plant, do not appear to be factual."²

Immediately after the bombings had been announced, President Clinton described the plant as an "imminent threat...to our national security." National security adviser Sandy Berger stated, "Let me be very clear about this... This was a plant that was producing chemical-warfare-related weapons, and we have physical evidence of that fact."³ The chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Henry Shelton, said that the "intelligence community is confident that this facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents."⁴

At a briefing hours after the attack, a "senior intelligence official" said, "We have no evidence—or have seen no products,

commercial products that are sold out of this facility."⁵

Washington claimed this strike was simply part of its policy to stop the spread of "weapons of mass destruction"—chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, a policy that is, at best, selectively enforced. The Israeli regime, for example, has developed a major chemical weapons industry without incurring Washington's wrath. (See sidebar on page 17.)

BACKTRACKING

The coverage of the bombing was replete with media self-censorship. Criticism of the bombing suggested that it was an effort by the Clinton administration to divert attention from the Monica Lewinsky scandal. While that may be true, what was absolutely absent from the extensive media coverage was any discussion or debate on the implication of destroying more than half the medicine in a desperately poor country. And the "irrefutable evidence" crumbled before reporters' eyes.

Within a month, U.S. officials were admitting they had no solid evidence the plant produced anything but pharmaceuticals. "As an American citizen, I am not convinced of the evidence," said one administration official, "who says the United States may have made a mistake."⁶

The shocking suggestion, "whether questionable intelligence had prompted the United States to blow up the wrong building,"⁷ appeared one day before the scheduled return from Sudan of a six-member team, organized by the International Action Center and led by former Attorney General Ramsey Clark. The team had investigated the plant's ruins on a September 18-21 trip and scheduled a September 22 news conference.

After combing through the plant itself, official U.N. and U.S. government documents, U.S. manufacturers' letters, and reports from U.S. government agencies, in

Richard Becker, Sara Flounders, and John Parker, from the International Action Center in New York City, were members of a delegation led by Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark that traveled to the El Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan shortly after the U.S. bombing. The delegation gathered evidence refuting Washington's claim that the plant produced chemical weapons.

1. *New York Times*, Aug. 23, 1998, p. 1.

2. *New York Times*, Aug. 20, 1998, p. A1.

3. Quoted in Seymour M. Hersh, *The Missiles of August*, *The New Yorker*, Oct. 12, 1998, p. 34.

4. Department of Defense news briefing, Aug. 20, 1998.

5. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, pp. A1, A4.

6. *New York Times*, Sept. 21, 1998, pp. A1, A8.

7. *Ibid.*



Sara Flounders

One month after U.S. bombing, thousands of young Sudanese women demonstrate against the CIA.

addition to various official and unofficial meetings with Sudanese citizens and government representatives, the delegation concluded that the plant was solely a medicine factory whose bombing falls under the definition of a "war crime"; and, further, the bombing was an attempt to intensify the destabilizing effect on Sudan of existing U.S. sanctions and U.S.-armed rebels there in order to destroy Sudan's independence.

Administration officials openly questioned the U.S. government's explanations. "One said: 'The decision to target El Shifa continues a tradition of operating on inadequate intelligence about Sudan.' That pattern of policies shaped by questionable intelligence reports about Sudan, these skeptical officials say, is at least three years old."⁸

Hours after the missile launch, senior national security advisers described El Shifa as a secret chemical weapons factory financed by bin Laden. But a month after the attack, those same officials conceded that they had no evidence directly linking

Mr. bin Laden to the factory at the time the President ordered the strike. "We were not accurate," a senior administration official said. "That was a mistake."⁹

Even an after-the-fact justification was questionable. Although the intelligence officials did not know who owned the plant at the time of the attack, they now say its nominal owner, Salih Idris, is a front man for Mr. bin Laden. But a lawyer for Mr. Idris, an adviser to Saudi Arabia's largest bank, says Mr. Idris has never met Mr. bin Laden.¹⁰

THE "PHYSICAL EVIDENCE"

Not only is the connection of bin Laden to the plant questionable, the "evidence" that the plant produced chemical weapons, the sole basis for its having been targeted, is fatally flawed.

The "physical evidence" that Sandy Berger referred to was later "revealed" to the press, which was "told that a CIA operative had obtained a soil sample outside the El Shifa plant which contained Empta,

a key ingredient in the production of the nerve gas [VX]."¹¹ For one thing, the presence of Empta at a given location obviously does not necessarily imply its production at that location. More to the point, the presence of the chemical does not necessarily involve the production of chemical weapons at all.


One producer of Empta is the Aldrich Chemical Co., in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a subsidiary of Sigma-Aldrich Corp. Its web site says Aldrich is "a global company dedicated to producing products that contribute to the quality of life." It mentions its "quality products at competitive prices, unsurpassed service and the convenience of one-stop-shopping."

In a phone interview two days after the attack, Clint Lane of the technical support and sales staff at Aldrich said that the chemical is produced for laboratory research and could be studied for various purposes. "It's not an ingredient for a nerve gas," Lane added; "It could be the result of a decomposition of nerve gas but it could also be a decomposition of a pesticide."

8. *Ibid.*, p. A8.

9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*

11. Hersh, *op. cit.*, n. 3, pp. 34-35.



Sara Flounders

Street scene, Khartoum. The U.S. assault destroyed the basic pediatric medicine these children will need.

And, according to Seymour Hersh's investigations, the accidental presence of Empta in the soil outside a chemical weapons production facility is highly unlikely. An international weapons inspector he interviewed "pointed out that the chemical was unlikely to have been found, unaltered, in the ground, as the CIA had told journalists, for the simple reason that it is highly reactive and, once in the earth, would react with other chemicals and begin to break down.... Given Empta's reactive nature, the inspector said, the possibility of isolating it from a sample taken from the soil outside El Shifa didn't seem credible. 'No way it came out of a smokestack or in the effluent,' he said. 'The only way this material could be in the ground is if somebody had emptied a flask, and then taken a sample. That's credible.'"¹²

Moreover, as the *New York Times* suggested, the identification of the chemical was more than shaly:

Several chemical-weapons experts outside the government say the single soil

sample, if it was not carefully preserved and quickly tested, could have misidentified the key ingredient. They said Empta is chemically similar to several commercially available pesticides and herbicides, including the commercially available weed killer called Round-Up.¹³

EL SHIFA

What seems most incredible are the claims by U.S. officials that they knew nothing about the plant. It was, in fact, promoted and treasured by the Sudanese government as the "pride of Africa." The plant opened, in June 1997, with fanfare, in the presence of heads of state, foreign ministers, and ambassadors. It was visited by international guests including the president of the Republic of Niger, the World Health Organization's director for the Mediterranean Region, the British and German ambassadors to Khartoum, students of pharmacology, including Sudanese school children, pharmacists from Switzerland, Britain, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.¹⁴

In fact, the plant had received United Nations authorization to provide badly needed medicine to Iraq, a contract of which the U.S. government was surely aware. Indeed, given U.S. involvement for years in Sudan's internal affairs, and its high-tech intelligence, it is hard to imagine how U.S. officials could not have known just what the El Shifa plant was, despite all its protestations to the contrary.

The International Action Committee delegation was the first human rights organization to visit the site after the bombing.¹⁵ In addition to extensive tours of the bomb site, the group visited hospitals, a university, a displaced persons' camp, communities and marketplaces, and met with doctors, health officials, the Min-

istry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Sudan, Aug. 1998, p. 7.

15. The delegation was composed of former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark; Dr. Sapphire Ahmed, of Harlem Hospital in New York City, who had previously worked with refugees in Sudan; Dr. Mohammed Hiasque of Chicago, with American Muslims for Global Peace and Justice, who was also past president of the Islamic Medical Association; Sara Flounders and John Parker from the IAC in New York; and Richard Becker from the IAC in San Francisco.

13. *Op. cit.*, n. 2, p. A4.

14. *The American Bombardment of El Shifa Pharmaceutical*,

12. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

isters of Health, Information, and Justice, and President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

As the delegation approached the "heavily guarded" "secret facility" in Khartoum North, we began seeing large "El Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant" signs with directional arrows at least a mile from the plant gate. We toured the site with video and still cameras, for about three hours, and were allowed to go anywhere on the grounds, even into areas that probably posed a safety risk, like structurally unsound buildings. All that was visible was machinery that looked new, jutting out of the rubble of near-totally destroyed buildings.

"El Shifa was really a sophisticated packaging plant," said delegation member Dr. Mohammed Haque. "It did not even use raw materials, but instead imported and repackaged processed materials. The loss of the plant is a real tragedy for them." Sudanese health officials provided detailed documentation of the plant's history, its machinery and equipment, and the products it packaged, such as tablets, capsules and syrups. As Dr. K.H. Shibeka, director of the pharmaceutical industry department, said: "This was a packaging facility. It didn't even have equipment to synthesize milk into cheese, much less make nerve gas."

Scattered throughout the wreckage of the plant were thousands upon thousands of blister packs of antibiotics, empty glass bottles and plastic containers filled with veterinary medicines. Names on packages included Amoxonil, Shifatyph, Sifazole and many others, but nothing other than medicine.

American plant designer Henry R. Jobe, British technical manager Tom Carnaffin, who supervised construction from 1992-96, and Jordanian engineer Mohammed Abdul Waheed, who supervised plant production in 1997, have all testified that it would have been impossible for this plant to have produced chemical weapons. Italian plant supplier Dino Romanetti, who said he had full access to the plant during visits in February and May 1998, said it was "absolutely incredible" to claim that the plant could have produced such weaponry.¹⁶

International media representatives began arriving on the scene the day after

the missile attack. Some of them, like the reporters from the *London Observer*, spent the night. They were joined by many Sudanese from surrounding neighborhoods in Khartoum. In the August 23 *Observer*, under the headline "The 'secret' chemical factory that no one tried to hide," David Hirst wrote, "There is no sign amid the wreckage of anything sinister...there is no sign of anyone trying to hide anything either. Access is easy. Much of Khartoum seems to have come to take a look." A retired chemical engineer, John S. Cornell, in a letter to the editor of *USA Today*, noted, "Nowhere in the video shown have I seen wreckage of even small-scale chemicals processing equipment."¹⁷

OOPS, DID WE JUST BOMB A CANDY FACTORY?

Whether the El Shifa Chemical factory is a noble medicine factory or an evil chemical weapons plant, one thing is certain: During the missile attack on the plant, some undisciplined Tomahawk missiles mistakenly hit a famous family-owned Sudanese candy factory next door. According to *Newsday*, Sudanese businessman Mustafa S. Ismail, who owns the candy factory and now lives in Orange County, California, is suing the U.S. government over the damage to his factory. "This is a sweets [candy] factory, and I am sure the U.S. government knows that," he said. The blast completely wrecked the candy factory, and one of his night-shift guards was killed. Ismail said he hopes the government can produce proof that his neighbors were indeed producing chemical weapons. But even if it does, Ismail said he'll still pursue legal action.

—Lee Siu Hin

MEETING CRITICAL HEALTH NEEDS

The plant was privately owned and partly financed by the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade Association.¹⁸ It was extremely important to the Sudan: It had raised the country's self-sufficiency in medicine from about 3 percent to over 50

percent.¹⁹ It produced 90 percent of the drugs used to treat the Sudan's seven leading causes of death; malaria and tuberculosis are at the top of the list.²⁰ El Shifa produced virtually all of the country's veterinary medicine. The Sudan has very large herds of camels, cattle, sheep, and goats which are vital to the economy and food supply. The herds are susceptible to treatable infestations of parasites and diseases.²¹ In addition, the plant was an important exporter of human and veterinary medicines to other African and Middle Eastern countries, and was authorized earlier this year by the United Nations Sanctions Committee to ship medical supplies to Iraq, under the "Oil for Food" program.²²

What made El Shifa so vital was that it enabled the Sudan to obtain medicines at low cost. "The pharmaceuticals produced in El Shifa were sold at prices which averaged about 20 percent of the prices of the same products on the international market," said Ramsey Clark. "With government subsidy, 15 percent of the production was distributed free to the poor. Few in the Sudan can afford the high costs of foreign pharmaceutical products. We found that El Shifa was the single facility in all the Sudan that was most important in the provision of medicines to protect the lives and health of the people. Its destruction, far beyond the direct injuries from the missile attack, will have disastrous results, costing thousands of lives and injuring many more for want of needed medication, unless replacement drugs are found immediately."²³

WHAT IS GOING ON?

Sudan, with the largest territory of any African country, a population of approximately 32 million, and an average annual income of \$310 a year,²⁴ has been devastated by this attack, and meeting the even more pressing need for medicine is virtually out of reach.

19. This is El Shifa Pharmaceuticals Industries, Co., Federal Ministry of Health of the Republic of the Sudan, Aug. 1998, p. 5.

20. Interview, Khartoum, Sept. 20, with Minister of Health Mahadi Baha Nimir.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Op. cit.*, n. 19, pp. 48-50.

23. Press conference, New York City, Sept. 22, 1998.

24. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Sudan: A Country Study* (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 4th ed. 1992), pp. xv, xvi, xxvi.

16. *Op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 17-19; *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1998, p. A4; *Wall Street Journal*, Aug. 28, 1998, p. 8.

17. "Public needs evidence of chemical production," *USA Today*, Aug. 28, 1998.

18. *Op. cit.*, n. 14, p. 12.

What is really going on? Is it possible that in spite of this country's poverty, Sudan's military might threaten the U.S. or perhaps Sudan's neighbors? According to the Library of Congress country study, Sudan's "Naval forces, under army command, had some functioning river patrol boats but little or no capacity to patrol Red Sea coast. Much of armed forces equipment nonoperational because of poor maintenance and lack of spare parts."²⁵ With a military budget estimated by the U.S. in 1989 at \$610 million dollars, constituting only 7.2 percent of the gross national product,²⁶ claims of Sudan's potential for international terror seem farfetched.

Indeed, given the lack of evidence that Sudan's famous pharmaceutical plant manufactured chemical weapons, one might have hoped that the Clinton administration would welcome further U.N. investigation to prove its allegations. Yet in spite of the Sudanese government's numerous calls on the U.N. Security Council for an independent investigation to put the U.S. allegations to rest (and similar calls by many nations and individuals, including former President Jimmy Carter), the U.S. has blocked any such investigation. The then U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson said, "We don't think an inves-

tigation is needed. We don't think anything needs to be put to rest."²⁷ His deputy, Peter Burleigh, put it this way: "I don't see what the purpose of a fact-finding study would be. We have credible information that fully justified the strike we made on that one facility in Khartoum."²⁸

Ever since Sudan opposed the 1991 U.S.-led war against Iraq, U.S. policy has aimed at destabilizing the Sudan government. Washington has helped finance a secessionist civil war against the Khartoum government and imposed economic sanctions on Sudan. The missile attack came soon after Sudan took steps to access a 300-million-barrel reservoir of crude oil in the country's South. There is a clear relationship between U.S. oil policy and U.S. government hostility toward Sudan.

U.S. officials portray Sudan as an inflexible adversary refusing all former attempts at dialogue. Yet the *New York Times* article questioning the rationale for the attack also admitted the absurdity of these claims. It reported that, at the request of the U.S., Sudan had expelled Osama bin Laden and 100 of his operatives and their dependents. And Sudan, lest we forget, was the nation that arrested Carlos the Jackal and extradited him to France. In

February 1997, "the Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, sent President Clinton a personal letter. It offered, among other things, to allow United States intelligence, law-enforcement and counter-terrorism personnel to enter the Sudan, and to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism. The United States never replied to that letter... A senior Sudanese official made a similar offer directly to the F.B.I. six months ago; send a counter-terrorism team to the Sudan, and we will help in any way we can, it said. The F.B.I. wrote back in June, declining the opportunity."²⁹

On the whole, U.S. intelligence regarding Sudan had incomprehensible gaps. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen admitted on September 2, two weeks after the strike, that the U.S. was "unaware" that the El Shifa plant manufactured medicines; but, he said, that was "irrelevant" to the decision to destroy it.³⁰ As recently as January 1998, the CIA had formally withdrawn more than 100 of its intelligence reports on Sudan, after concluding that its source was a fabricator.³¹

29. *Op. cit.*, n. 6, p. A8. The IAC delegation saw copies of Sudanese government letters sent to the U.S. months before the bombing pleading for dialogue and cooperation. The letters, as the *Times* reported, went unanswered.
30. *New York Times*, Sept. 3, 1998, p. A6.
31. *Op. cit.*, n. 6, p. A1.

25. *Ibid.*, p. xx.
26. *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

27. "No International Probe Needed for Sudan Bombing," *Agence France Presse*, Aug. 30, 1998.
28. *New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1998, p. A1.

Combat media lies & disinformation

Excellent resources for schools, libraries or community groups.

NEW VIDEOS

Eyewitness SUDAN

A powerful expose of the August 1998 U.S. bombing of a small factory that provided more than half the medicine for Sudan. The smoking ruins and dashed hopes of Sudanese doctors are skillfully juxtaposed to footage of Clinton, Albright and Berger's charges. This investigative documentary connects the years of sanctions and U.S. funding of a contra-army to the cruise missiles sent against an impoverished African country. VHS 28 mins.

LET IRAQ LIVE

Award-winning filmmaker Gloria La Riva documents on a human level how sanctions kill. It includes the incredible journey

of 84 people who risked fines and prison to take millions of dollars of medicine to the Iraqi people—civil disobedience on an international scale. VHS 28 mins.

Videos: \$20, individuals, \$50 institutions

NEW BOOKS

CHALLENGE TO GENOCIDE


Essays and detailed reports on the devastating effects of economic sanctions on Iraq since the Gulf War. Features "Fire and Ice," a chapter on the history of the U.S. war against Iraq by former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark. 1998, 264 pp., photos, index, resource lists. \$12.95



NATO IN THE BALKANS Voices of Opposition

The dangerous expansion of NATO is linked to Washington's role in the break up of Yugoslavia, the secret deals behind the U.S. imposed Dayton Accords and the global implications of a U.S. controlled War Crimes Tribunal. Includes selections from Ramsey Clark, Sean Gervasi, Sara Flounders, Dick Becker, Nadja Teisch, Thomas Deichmann. 1998 224 pp., index, \$15.95

To order: Pre-paid orders only. Bulk orders 20 or more items available at 50% off. U.S. orders include \$4. shipping. Outside the U.S. \$10. for first item, each additional item add \$1.



Send orders to: International Action Center, 39 W. 14 St., #206, NY, NY 10011

www.iacenter.org 212-633-6646

U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Some years after Sudanese independence in 1956, the U.S. began to get deeply involved in the country. According to Andrew and Leslie Cockburn's *Dangerous Liaison*, collaboration between the CIA and Israeli intelligence to support a secessionist movement in the Sudan can be traced back to at least 1968.³² And when the present government, which came to power in 1989, refused to support the bombing of Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War, Washington's attitude towards Khartoum grew sharply hostile.

In 1990, President Bush's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen, had praised the new regime. He remarked how, in comparison to the former government, it had done particularly better in relieving the suffering of victims of the civil war. He recommended political and economic support, tied to humanitarian aid.³³ But that changed 180 degrees when, in 1991, Sudan opposed the Gulf War. And in mid-1992, as Sudanese forces regained much of the territory that had been controlled by rebels, the U.S. media began to report "ethnic cleansing" and other human rights violations, and, within days, the U.S. Congress voted sanctions against Sudan.³⁴

Over the years since then, the U.S. has maintained a campaign to destabilize Sudan. On November 10, 1996, the *Washington Post* reported that the U.S. would send \$20 million in military equipment to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, even though these three countries were embroiled in the bloody war in southern Sudan. The paper said its congressional sources doubted the aid would be kept from rebel forces fighting the Sudanese government.³⁵ Shortly thereafter, *Africa Confidential* reported, "It is clear the aid is for Sudan's armed opposition" and added that U.S. special forces were on "open-ended deployment" with the rebels.³⁶ The day after the missile strike, the *New York Times* brought up the issue again:

The Clinton administration denies it supports the rebels directly, but it acknowledges giving military aid, not including weapons, to the neighboring countries of Uganda, Eritrea, and Ethiopia, which have in

ISRAEL'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS: A DOUBLE STANDARD

Is the U.S. government so concerned about the existence of chemical weapons? If so, why has it contributed to the development and distribution of chemical weapons to Israel, a policy which, according to an article in the London *Sunday Times* (October 4, 1998), is responsible for an assassination attempt in Palestine and an environmentally hazardous accident in Amsterdam in 1992.

According to the article, Israel's F-16s are now equipped to carry chemical and biological weapons manufactured at a secret biological institute in the Tel Aviv suburb Nes Ziona. Dutch authorities recently confirmed that an El Al plane that crashed in Amsterdam in 1992 was carrying 42 gallons of a chemical used to make sarin nerve gas, the gas that wreaked havoc in Tokyo in 1995. Its destination was this secret plant in Israel.

"The Israeli plant," the article stated, "manufactures not only chemical and biological weapons for use in bombs, but more unusual arms as well. It supplied the poison for a bizarre attempt last year on the life of Khaled Meshal, a leader of the Hamas Islamic fundamentalist group.... Israel has accused Egypt, Libya, Syria and Iran of developing chemical and biological weapons, but has never acknowledged its own programs to develop weapons of mass destruction."

An unnamed biologist, a former

high-ranking Israeli intelligence officer, was quoted: "There is hardly a single known or unknown form of chemical or biological weapon... which is not manufactured at the institute."

"The institute," the article notes, "is one of the most secretive in Israel. Founded in 1952 as a single building hidden in an orange grove, it now sprawls over several acres. It is surrounded by a 6-foot-high concrete wall topped with sensors that reveal the exact location of any intruder but is erased from local and aerial survey maps."

According to a London *Times* report (October 2, 1998), the Israeli government confirmed that the chemical, DMMP, used in the manufacture of sarin gas, was on the plane, along with two other sarin ingredients. There was enough on board, reportedly to produce 594 pounds of sarin. The DMMP, in fact, came from a Pennsylvania company, Solkatrik Chemicals, Inc.

Of course, Washington does not threaten to bomb Nes Ziona, even though Israel will not allow inspection of its facilities, even though Israel has never ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and even though Israel's military has the ability to deliver the weapons that could be produced there. The threats and the bombs are reserved for Sudan and Iraq, whose people now lack basic necessities to sustain the lives of the majority of their population.

turn funneled arms, radios, and other equipment to the rebels.

American officials have also made it plain that the United States supports the rebellion's goals. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright even met with the main rebel leader, John Garang, last December during a visit to Uganda.³⁷

The involvement with Garang is compelling. In 1997 the Sudanese government signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with six of the seven rebel groups, all but the one led by Garang, the Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM). This agreement confirms the federal nature of the government, accepts a referendum for

self determination for the south, and offers amnesty to rebel groups that enter a political dialogue. Garang, the Sudanese insist, remains the "sole obstacle to peace."³⁸

The irony is that while the U.S., since 1991, has attacked Sudan's human rights record, saying civilians are targeted in the war and slavery is practiced by the government, it is the SPLM that has been found to practice such gross abuses.

Even according to John Prendergast, the director of East African Affairs at the National Security Council, the SPLM "has attained possession of adequate means of coercion and has terrorized the southern population into passive compliance. The predominant instruments of the move-

32. Andrew Cockburn and Leslie Cockburn, *Dangerous Liaison* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991).

33. "Series of Strikes Against Sudan," *Sudanow magazine* (Khartoum), Jan. 1998, p. 20.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Washington Post*, Nov. 10, 1996.

36. *Africa Confidential*, Nov. 15, 1996.

37. *New York Times*, Aug. 21, 1998, p. A5.

38. "Tightening the Noose," *op. cit.*, n. 33, p. 13.



Sara Plauders

El Shifa plant, after the bombing.

ment since 1983 have been and still are coercion and corruption. It has not managed to integrate society around any positive values.³⁹ Prendergast's book cites many examples of terrorism by the SPLM, including massacres. Many of these have been documented both by Amnesty International and by the United Nations.⁴⁰ Other horrors include the deliberate shooting down of civilian airliners, the indiscriminate use of land mines, and the kidnapping, torture, and murder of relief workers.⁴¹

The allegations of slave trading are also simplistic. To some extent, both sides have incited the tribal rivalries of those groups at the front, wherever it might at any moment be, and this "in effect renewed the culture of hostage taking, ransoming, and

abduction, which unfortunately continues to this day despite attempts to stop it."⁴² But the charges against the SPLM have been far more comprehensive.

According to Africa Watch, "accounts of hostage-taking and forced labor suggest that the SPLM may be taking captives and civilians in occupied areas that can degenerate into slavery. There are also accounts of the treatment of captives that suggest a situation that has already degenerated into *de facto* slavery."⁴³ Human Rights Watch/Africa documented the SPLM's "use and abuse of boys as young as seven years of age. Thousands of these children were held in SPLM camps in Ethiopia and elsewhere." Human Rights Watch/Africa reported that "the conditions in some of these camps have been described as 'heartrending': no schooling, no hygiene, few caretakers, ragged clothing, disease and little food."⁴⁴

Ironically, it is clear that "humanitarian" aid, the bulk of it from the U.S., is all that has kept the war in southern Sudan alive for nearly a decade. Operation Lifeline Sudan, established in 1989, has pumped two billion dollars into the area, more than \$700,000,000 from the United States. But the aid, many officials now agree, is helping to "perpetuate the fighting."⁴⁵ John Garang recently rejected further peace talk initiatives and announced "The SPLM has decided to continue the war. It is up to the international community to provide humanitarian aid." A senior U.S. diplomat who had served in Sudan (but who asked not to be identified), told the *Times*, "What the hell has the SPLM done to help their people? Nothing."⁴⁶

39. John Prendergast, *Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia* (London: Pluto Press, 1997), p. 37, quoted in David Hoile, *The SPLA: Fit to Govern?* (London: British-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 1998), p. 16.

40. See Amnesty International Report 1994 (London: Amnesty International, 1994), p. 275; and see *Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan*, U.N. Special Rapporteur Gaspar Binn, E/CN.4/1998/62, Feb. 20, 1996.

41. See, e.g., "The Tears of Orphans: No Future Without Human Rights (London: Amnesty International, 1995); op. cit., n. 40; Denying "The Honor of Living": Sudan A Human Rights Disaster (London: Africa Watch, 1989); and *Sudan: The Ravages of War: Political Killings and Humanitarian Disaster* (London: Amnesty International, 1993), AI Index: AFR 54/29/93, Sept. 29, 1993.


42. Hoile, op. cit., n. 39, p. 30.

43. Denying "The Honor of Living", op. cit., n. 41, p. 162.

44. *Children of Sudan: Slaves, Street Children, and Child Soldiers* (New York: Human Rights Watch/Africa, 1995), p. 75.

45. Raymond Bonner, "Aid for Sudan's Hungry Keeps War Well Fed," *New York Times*, Oct. 11, 1998, p. 20.

46. *Ibid.*



THE IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

U.N. sanctions were imposed on Sudan based on charges as flimsy as the charge that Sudan was producing Empta gas at a pharmaceutical plant. The U.S. claimed that Sudan was involved in the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt when he was on a state visit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in June of 1995. It was claimed that these unsuccessful assassins, who were supposedly Egyptian, had traveled through the Sudan and then fled to Afghanistan. Sudan denied any involvement. Nevertheless, based on U.S. pressure in the Security Council, U.N. sanctions were imposed. As part of its destabilization campaign, the U.S. has imposed its own sanctions on Sudan for many years, tightening them in November 1997.

The impact of sanctions on Sudan is likely to be even more disruptive, because of poverty and underdevelopment, than that of those imposed on Iraq.⁴⁷ In the

47. The devastating impact on the Iraqi civilian population of U.S. and U.N. sanctions has been extensively documented by United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, the WHO, and the FAO. Iraq is a modern, developing country with a large number of highly trained doctors, scientists, and engineers. Yet according to numerous medical and nutritional reports, the sanctions have caused the death of over one and a half million Iraqis.

Sudan the cut off of trade has included even basic medicines that have no conceivable military uses. The IAC delegation was shown the letter (reprinted at left) from the Eli Lilly company, in which it informed the Sudanese Central Medical Supplies company that the United States Treasury Department refused to allow it to sell insulin to Sudan. Similar denials of sutures to close wounds and of hemophilia medicine were also forced by the U.S.

OIL POLICY AND THE SUDAN

As the intense and longstanding dispute over oil pipelines through the Caucasus demonstrates, the U.S. has always fought hard for the passage of oil through friendly nations, even when the cost of delivery is higher.⁴⁸ A pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to the Black Sea would be cheapest, but the Clinton administration has supported a more expensive pipeline taking the oil instead into Turkey, a NATO country friendlier to U.S. (and Israeli) government interests. The U.S. also believes it is important to maintain ownership of the oil and avoid governments likely to nationalize their own resources. In Nigeria, for example, 60 percent of the oil is foreign owned by companies like Royal/Dutch Shell and Mobil, and the U.S. enjoys its relationship there, especially under the present leadership which is more willing to allow further exploitation by foreign oil interests.

These oil pacts based upon colonial relationships are what U.S. interests are building toward, even in Sudan. In 1984, after a decade of exploration, Chevron discovered two fields in southern Sudan containing an estimated 300 million barrels of oil.⁴⁹ The company then began construction of a 940-mile pipeline costing \$1 billion. The Chevron group included Royal Dutch/Shell and Total of France. But the Chevron consortium began to pull out of the deal after attacks from rebel forces left four of its employees dead.

Now, according to a report published just nine days before the U.S. missile attack,⁵⁰ Sudan had moved ahead in development of its oil fields. With Malaysian, Canadian, British, Argentinean, and German companies investing as part of the consortium developing Sudan's oil, Khartoum expects to generate income from 150,000 barrels per day and soon do its

SUDAN'S DEMANDS

Sudan's government has made the following demands upon the international community regarding the criminal U.S. attack (from "The American Bombardment of El Shifa Pharmaceutical," Documents Compiled by the Ministry of Culture and Information, the Republic of the Sudan, August 1998, pp. 22-23):

"[Sudan] calls upon the international community to condemn the American aggression which represents a flagrant violation of the Sudan's sovereignty and the international laws and customs, especially that the aggression did not depend on legal or scientific bases, but on the contrary the attack has been launched on the basis of deceptive and untrue information....

"Calls upon the United Nations to adopt measures for revealing the facts regarding the heinous American aggression on the Sudan by sending a fact-finding mission to investigate the American allegations as well as the nature of the destroyed factory and its production.

"Demands an official, public apology from the United States for its crime on Sudan.

"Demands a fair and adequate compensation from the United States for the harmed parties, including the factories' owners and individuals."

own refining. Even relief from a \$300 million annual energy bill could help Sudan end the civil war. As Riek Machar, a former SPLM commander now working with the government, explained, "If in the interim period we manage to use this oil to redress imbalances and create confidence, maybe the south would then vote for unity. The south would have made an economic leap forward and some of their fears would have eroded."⁵¹

The Canadian company that is part of the consortium announced plans for investing \$300 million in Sudan just three days before the attack. Shares in the

company, Talisman Energy Inc., lost one-third of their value in the week following the raid. "Cruise missile blasts," the *Toronto Globe and Mail* reported, "were the last thing investors wanted to hear."⁵² In addition, SPLM leader John Garang has already threatened to target the oil fields, warning the companies to pull out their staff.⁵³

If Garang were to take over the government of Sudan, of course, everything would be different.

NOT EVEN AN APOLOGY

It has been months since the attack on the El Shifa plant and the Clinton administration has still not even apologized. No evidence of chemical weapons manufacture has ever materialized; virtually no one believes the cover story. The factory was completely destroyed. Damage was estimated at \$100 million. More than 300 employees, with 3,000 dependents, were rendered jobless.⁵⁴ The aggression has devastated a basic element of the Sudanese economy and set back Sudan's policy aimed at realizing the international slogan of "Health for All" by the year 2000, especially since thousands will die from lack of needed medicine.

But the people of Sudan are strong, determined, and hardworking. In spite of poverty and U.S. sanctions blocking food and medicine from Sudan, the people are full of determination. A rally of thousands of young women and men denouncing the U.S. bombing, one month after the attack, showed this spirit of resistance. Despite U.S. support, the rebel war will end, and Sudan will be able to apply its resources to the benefit of its people. That the United States willfully draws out this conflict is shameful. ■

52. *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), Oct. 9, 1998, p. B25.

53. Voice of Sudan (SPLA) broadcast, Nov. 1, 1998, as reported by the BBC Worldwide Monitoring Service.

54. *Op. cit.*, n. 14, pp. 20-21.

TELL US IF YOU MOVE, PLEASE!

To Our Subscribers:

If you move, you must let us know. *CovertAction Quarterly* is sent bulk-rate directly from our printer, and since the Post Office forwards only first-class mail—heaving the rest into the trash—you will never get your copy, and we both lose it forever.

So, please help us keep your subscription intact by notifying us before you move. You can reach us by phone, e-mail, or post.

48. See, e.g., Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway, "Vast Kazakh Field Stir U.S.-Russian Rivalry; Pipelines Are Key to American Exports," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1998, p. A1.

49. *Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 1, 1984.

50. *Financial Times* (London), Aug. 11, 1998, p. 4.

51. *Ibid.*, June 11, 1998, p. 4.

MORE BUCKS FOR THE BANG

BY GREG SPEETER

A sixteen-year-old girl was killed in Brooklyn, New York, in January, 1998, when a brick fell from the top of an elementary school and fractured her skull. A few days later, a wall fell from a New York City vocational high school and crashed to the sidewalk. City officials acknowledged that repairs had been delayed because the needs of dozens of other schools were considered more pressing.¹

Crumbling school infrastructure threatens students not just in New York City. According to a recent study by the Government Accounting Office, one of every three school buildings in the country needs extensive repair or replacement, at a total cost of \$112 billion.²

In the summer of 1997, half a year before the New York incidents, Congress was asked to spend \$5 billion over several years to help address this national school infrastructure crisis. Congress refused. This fall, Congress again was asked to spend \$1 billion to begin to address this security problem, and voted not to do so.

Yet in the past two years, we've spent tens of billions of dollars to begin to purchase a new generation of jet fighters—as many as 4,400 of them—that are designed to fight an enemy that no longer exists, will provide little technological advantage over already existing fighters, and replace existing fighters that would maintain U.S. air superiority for the next 18 years. The total cost of these new fighters? Two hundred seventy-two billion dollars, nearly two and a half times what it would cost to rebuild our public schools.³

With our military threats "so remote they are difficult to discern,"⁴ the federal

government has managed to turn public policy on its head: Instead of providing a military that sacrifices to save those in need, it is sacrificing those in need in order to keep Pentagon coffers, military contractors' bank accounts, and the pockets of key members of Congress stuffed to the brim.

CONSIDER THIS:

- This fall, Congress gave the Pentagon an extra \$1 billion for research and development of "Star Wars" on top of the year's \$3.5 billion request, even though the director of the Pentagon's ballistic missile defense program said, "There really is nothing we can do with that money we haven't already addressed."⁵ Yet it cut almost half a billion dollars from the Social Services Block Grant that provides states with money for daycare, meals for low-income seniors, foster care, and drug prevention.
- In the past four years, Congress has given the Pentagon almost \$30 billion more than it has asked for, while cutting back on or substantially under-funding job training, environmental, housing and health programs.⁶

- In 1980, at the height of the Cold War, the U.S. spent two dollars on the Pentagon for every dollar it spent on aid to cities. Today, almost a decade after the end of the Cold War, the Pentagon gets four dollars for every dollar we spend on aid to cities.⁷ (See Chart 1.)
- Commitments to programs other than the Pentagon will be threatened even more when the federal budget is released beginning this winter, as the Pentagon is expected to ask for \$110 billion more in each of the next six years.⁸

HALF TO THE PENTAGON, HALF TO EVERYONE ELSE

To understand what is at stake, it is important to see just how enormous the Pentagon budget is in relationship to everything else, and how changes in federal budget policies this year will pit the Pentagon against a number of community-based programs.

Coalition for Human Needs, Washington, D.C., Nov. 30, 1998.

7. *Are You Winning Or Losing? How Federal Choices Affect You and Your Community* (Northampton, Mass.: National Priorities Project, Mar. 1998), p. 14.

8. James Kirfield, "The Hollow Force Myth," *National Journal* (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 12, 1998, p. 200. *New York Times*, Jan. 2, 1999, p. 1.

5. Fred Kaplan, "Pentagon gets \$1 billion it has no use for," *Boston Globe*, Oct. 24, 1998, p. 1.
6. Discussion with Stuart Campbell, Executive Director.

Greg Speeter is the founder and executive director of the National Priorities Project, based in Northampton, Massachusetts; 17 New South St., Northampton, MA 01060; 413-584-9556, www.natprior.org.

1. Jacques Steinberg, "Brooklyn High School was Inspected 5 Days Before 10 Tons of Bricks Fell," *New York Times*, Jan. 23, 1998.

2. U.S. General Accounting Office, *School Facilities: America's Schools Report Differing Conditions* (GAO/HEHS-96-103), Washington, D.C., June 1996, table L3.

3. See Federation of American Scientists website at: www.fas.org/pub/gen/mawg/mabb98/dd04sc.htm.

4. Former Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, speaking to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1992, quoted in *In Search of Security* (Northampton, Mass.: National Priorities Project, 1994), p. 4.

Pentagon Wins, Communities Lose:

Pentagon vs. Aid to States and Cities 1980-1997




Chart 1

Source: Budget of the U.S. Government, Historical Tables


The Pentagon and all non-entitlement federal domestic programs are lumped together into a part of the federal budget called "discretionary spending." As Chart 2 indicates, about half the discretionary budget pays for the Pentagon, meaning we spend as much on the Pentagon as we do on the combined spending of job training, all education, housing development, the environment, Space and NASA, scientific research, the State and Commerce and Justice Departments, and dozens of other programs combined.⁹

In recent years, Congress has set overall limits on how much can be spent on both military and social spending, and built a "fire wall" to prevent either side from taking money from the other. But this year, beginning with the new budget, that wall is scheduled to come down. Congress will set a cap on how large the discretionary pie will be, and then let the Pentagon and all other programs fight it out among themselves for their slices of the pie. Some programs, such as transportation and crime prevention, have a lot of support, and Congress has already made commitments to keep certain budget items in place. This means that unless the overall budget cap is raised this year, programs that address the needs of children and seniors, housing, education, the poor, and the environment will be cut again to pay for Pentagon increases.¹⁰

The Pentagon has already begun its lobbying for those increases by claiming it has been cut to the bone, and could become hollow without an infusion of \$110 billion in the next six years.

In fact, as Chart 1 shows, the Pentagon budget has been cut back since the Reagan build-up. But during that period, the Cold War ended. In spite of that, the current \$271 billion Pentagon budget stands at 83% of Cold War averages, even though the Warsaw Pact fell apart, and Russia's military budget is about a quarter of what it was during the 1970s and early 1980s. Why are we spending so much money?

In 1993, President Clinton ordered a much-heralded "Bottom-Up Review," a study meant to redefine national military priorities in the post-Cold War era. Without the Soviets, the Pentagon identified several "rogue" Third World countries that were "unlikely to threaten the U.S. directly," but "have shown they are willing to field forces to threaten U.S. interests,



friends, and allies."¹¹ Those countries were Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria. The Bottom-Up Review essentially kept the military budgets at Cold War levels, and justified these levels by envisioning a highly unlikely scenario in which Iraq and North Korea attack their neighbors at the same time. In order to respond to this scenario, the Bottom-Up Review called for troops, weapons, air- and sea-lift capabilities, and bases that provide the U.S. military with the ability to: fight both wars (one on either side of the globe); at virtually the same time; win both wars in a matter of weeks; and succeed without the help (or even participation) of our allies outside the region.

The Review called for procurement of many of the same weapons systems that had been developed in the 1980s to challenge the Soviets: aircraft carrier forces, the same four service branches, the same heavy bomber wings, and air superiority fighter escorts.

Not only was the two-war scenario unlikely, the potential threat was widely overstated. The combined threats of these five countries amounts to one-eighteenth the military budget of the U.S.¹² (See Chart 3.)

Our military policy has not changed much since then. In 1996 Congress established a Quadrennial Review, requiring every new administration to conduct "a comprehensive examination of the military threats our nation faces, the strategy to

thwart them, and the forces needed to implement the strategy." But Clinton's 1997 Quadrennial Review evaded any major changes in mission, structure, or weapons plans, and projected indefinitely annual military budgets of \$250 billion plus. Pentagon officials now want to increase the annual budget by up to \$18 billion a year, buying more weapons to modernize its forces and increasing funding for maintenance and salaries.

Citing new realities brought on by the end of the Cold War, a number of respected military authorities have called for major cuts in the Pentagon budget.¹³ While not all critics would agree on strategic policy, they are all in agreement about this much: to cut weapons systems that are overpriced, duplicate others, have no enemy and/or don't work. Each year the Military Spending Working Group (MSWG), a network of arms control and military policy analysts, identifies a "dirty

13. For instance, Dr. Lawrence Korb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under President Reagan, believes we could cut \$40 billion annually by ending our simultaneous 2-war strategy. Dr. Lawrence Korb, "Our Overstuffed Armed Forces," *Foreign Affairs*, Nov.-Dec. 1995, pp. 32-34; Carl Conetta and Charles Knight of the Project on Defense Alternatives proposed a Pentagon budget \$62 billion less than current levels in a report by the Council on Foreign Relations. They would keep the capacity to fight one major war and one lesser conflict. Carl Conetta and Charles Knight, *Defense Sufficiency and Cooperation: A U.S. Military Posture for the Post-Cold War Era*, Project on Defense Alternatives, Commonwealth Institute, Cambridge, MA, March 1988, pp. 52-54. Former Secretary of Defense McNamara, MIT President emeritus Jerome Weisner, and William Kaufmann, who was the former author of the Department of Defense's annual report, have called for cutting the Pentagon budget to under \$200 billion since the early 1990s. *Op. cit.*, n. 4, p. 9.

9. Information provided by the Council for a Livable World, 122 Maryland Ave., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002.

10. Information provided by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., Nov. 1998.

11. *Op. cit.*, n. 4.

12. Information provided by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Nov. 1998.




Chart 3

dozen" weapons systems they believe are not necessary. If the President and Congress had followed their recommendations for scrapping these weapons systems, they would have saved \$25.8 billion.¹⁴

THE REAL THREATS

It is indeed ironic that the colossal commitments to these military policies and the weapons they call for prevent us from making the commitments necessary to respond to the other very real threats facing our communities.

In fact, many of these threats have increased dramatically over the past 18 years as Washington has chosen to prioritize military spending over social spending. Many Americans had hoped during the late 1980s that a peace dividend might provide resources to focus on these domestic threats. However, as Chart 1 shows, when it came to aid to cities, that did not happen. As a result, the federal government has cut back or reneged on its commitments to acknowledge and address many economic and social problems that we are allowing to become chronic and structural.

There are six major threats to virtually every community in the country, and the declining federal role has made it more difficult to address these issues.

- **Twenty-one percent of our children live in poverty.** What kind of a future, and how strong an economy, can we expect when we allow almost a quarter of our children to go to bed hungry, live in miser-

able housing conditions, be refused health care, and attend deteriorating schools?

Our child poverty rate is three to five times higher than in other western European countries, and has increased dramatically since 1980. Atlanta's child poverty rate is 43 percent; Hartford's, 44 percent; Minneapolis, 34 percent. But it is not just an urban phenomenon. The most dramatic increase since 1980 has been in the suburbs, where it has risen from 11.2 percent to 18.8 percent in the past 18 years.¹⁵

We know that programs such as Headstart, the Women, Infants, and Children Nutrition program (WIC), school lunch programs, Health outreach programs, and, as a last resort, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), help these children, but we either underfund, cut back, or, in the case of AFDC, eliminate the guarantee of help to our children.¹⁶

In all other industrialized countries, adjustments to income and payroll taxes and other forms of government transfers and programs pull most of their children from poverty.¹⁷

- **Our schools are falling further behind other countries.** Crumbling school infrastructure is not the only threat to our students. A report released by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in November 1998, is the latest in a series of studies showing U.S. students lagging behind other industrialized countries. Among the findings: The U.S. high school graduation rate at 72 percent is second worst among 29 nations, above Mexico.¹⁸ Earlier studies have shown the U.S.

to rank twenty-sixth and sixteenth respectively among 41 nations in math and science proficiency.¹⁹

The federal government spends less than 3 percent of our income tax dollars on elementary, secondary, adult, and higher education. Since 1980 it has cut back in total U.S. education spending by one-third, from 9.8 percent to 6.8 percent.²⁰

- **Forty-three million of us have no health insurance.** And the number is predicted to be 50 million by the year 2004.²¹ Virtually every other industrialized country provides universal coverage. We rank the lowest of 15 industrialized countries in infant mortality and low birth weight.²²

For the last four years, the federal government has chosen to abandon any meaningful effort to provide affordable, accessible, and quality health care to all Americans. Instead, it has chosen to propose piecemeal, incremental reforms such as increased regulation of the health insurance industry, which does not address the fundamental problems of affordability or availability.

- **We lack five million affordable housing units.** A little more than 20 years ago, we had more affordable housing units than we had renter families.²³ Today, we have a gap of over five million units. One-third of all renters are unable to afford one-bedroom housing units, and must forgo other necessities such as food, clothing, and health care to afford rent.

No wonder, that the U.S. Conference of Mayors has found the demand for emergency shelter increase six-fold since 1985; 36 percent of the homeless were families with children.²⁴

Perhaps more than any other area, the federal government has dramatically decreased its commitment to housing. Between 1980 and 1997, the annual Housing and Urban Development budget has declined from \$70 billion (in 1997 dollars) to \$23 billion, a cumulative \$784 billion cut between 1980 and 1998.²⁵

1998, p. A1.

19. National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Education Statistics, 1997*, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1997.

20. Op. cit., n. 7, p. 7.

21. U.S. Senator Ted Kennedy, *Meet The Press*, NBC News, Dec. 21, 1997.

22. Children's Defense Fund, *The State of America's Children Yearbook 1997*, Washington, D.C., p. xv.

23. Discussion with the National Low Income Housing Coalition, Washington, D.C., Sept. 1998.

24. U.S. Conference of Mayors, *A Status Report on Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities: 1997*, A 29 City Survey, Washington, D.C., Dec. 1997, appendix 1: "Hunger and Homelessness in America's Cities, a 13-year Comparison of Data."

25. National Priorities Project analysis of Housing and Urban Development Budget, from Budgets of the United States Government, FY1980-FY1999.

14. See www.fas.org/pub/gen/mswg/msbt98/index. Among the points MSWG has made: Cut unwarrantable missile defense programs (\$2.7 billion in savings in 1998); cancel or defer unneeded tactical aircraft modernization programs (\$5.5 billion in savings in 1998); reduce the foreign intelligence budget (\$2.7 billion in savings in 1998). Other MSWG savings include reducing nuclear weapons activity (we spend \$20-30 billion a year maintaining and operating our current level of about 8,000 nuclear weapons, and \$4 billion just on the research, development, testing, and production of nuclear weapons); cancel new attack submarines and aircraft carriers, eliminate the Pentagon's two-war requirement, and cut taxpayer support for global arms transfers.

15. All child poverty data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Washington, D.C., *Current Population Surveys, 1993-1997*.

16. NPP analysis of child anti-poverty programs, in op. cit., n. 7, pp. 4-5, and appendix, p. 7.

17. Lee Rainwater and Timothy Smeeding, *Doing Poorly: The Real Income of American Children in a Comparative Perspective* (Working Paper), Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Aug. 1995, Appendix table A-2.19.

18. Ethan Bronner, "Long a Leader, U.S. Now Lags in High School Graduation Rate," *New York Times*, Nov. 23,

• **Our environment is threatened.**

Polluted air, water, and land threaten us in many ways. Drinking water systems serving more than 50 million Americans violate health regulations and standards, and 40 percent of our nation's waters are still not safe for fishing or swimming.²⁶ Power plants, cars, and trucks emit two-thirds of the total carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, adding up to almost half the global warming gases that are created by people.²⁷ Air pollution causes 15,000 premature deaths every year from increased pulmonary disease.²⁸

In spite of this, the federal government gave up a long time ago on funding for alternative energy and has cut way back on clean water funds. In 1997 Washington funded clean water programs at the lowest amount since the Clean Water Act was passed, allocating only \$3 billion to both clean water and drinking water initiatives, despite an estimated need for \$6 billion in federal contributions. Cumulatively, the EPA budget has been cut by \$71 billion since 1980.²⁹

• **Forty-six percent of the jobs with the most growth pay less than half a livable wage.** Don't look for the jobs in the "new economy" to save us. The National Priorities Project recently released a report on job growth with Jobs with Justice that established a livable wage nationwide of \$32,285. The report found that 46 percent of the jobs with the most growth pay less than half of that wage; that four of the five fastest growing jobs are cashiers, janitors, retail sales clerks, and waiters and waitresses, none of which pay, on average, more than \$15,236 a year. Most of these jobs do not provide benefits and are part-time.³⁰

THE BUDGET "SURPLUS"

Some budget observers feel that the FY 1998 budget surplus—the first in almost 40 years—and the announcement by the Congressional Budget Office this past summer that given current economic trends we will continue to have surpluses well into the future may change the terms of the guns versus butter debate.

26. Clean Water Network, *How to Meet the Goals of the Clean Water Act*, Oct. 1997, p. 2.

27. Clean Air Network, *Lighting Our Homes, Warming Our Planet: Power Plants and Global Climate Change*, Nov. 1997.

28. Environmental Protection Agency website at: www.epa.gov/os/priorities/health.htm.

29. National Priorities Project analysis of Environmental Protection Agency Budget, from Budgets of the United States Government, FY1980-FY1999.

30. Working Hard, Earning Less - *The Sorry of Job Growth in America* (Northampton, Mass.: National Priorities Project, Dec. 1998), pp. 2-3.

About 200 national organizations focused on human needs and community development, organized by Invest in America in Washington, D.C., have recently signed on to a letter to the President asking for more money for social spending. It will be very tempting for Congress and the President to address these conflicting needs by giving some money to the Pentagon, some to social spending, and passing some more tax cuts.

But this is a dangerous strategy. It would give the Pentagon more money when it ought to be getting less, would provide only a token amount of money to the most organized and powerful advocates for social spending (transportation, crime prevention and perhaps education) without addressing the issues of child poverty, housing, and other critical concerns, a process that continues to pit advocates for more social spending against each other for crumbs from the budget pie.

A better strategy would be for many social spending advocacy groups to demand that the Pentagon size its budget downward, so that this nation would have the resources to address critical security needs in our communities. Social spending advocates, their clients, and other allies would have to become familiar with some of the most outrageous weapons systems and Pentagon spending policies, and challenge the funding of weapons systems that are overpriced, duplicate others, are unnecessary, or don't work.

However, just going after weapons systems does not address a larger question that this nation needs to begin to address: *What role should the U.S. play in the international community in the future?* The peace and arms control community must help answer this question. In a recent letter to a number of arms control and peace advocates, Carl Conetta and Charles Knight of the Project on Defense Alternatives make the point that currently, Pentagon architects and a number of elites are re-implementing a strategy of primacy or "world hegemony."³¹ Conetta and Knight believe that most Americans would rather be "first among equals," which would call for a national strategy of military sufficiency and real cooperation with other nations on security matters, rather than hegemony which requires the U.S. to be able to single-handedly outgun all potential rivals. They challenge those in the arms control and peace community to work together to

31. Project on Defense Alternatives, "Defense Budget Discussion Letter," 98:1 (an occasional e-mail newsletter), Nov. 16, 1998.

further articulate this vision and the kind of military spending such a vision would call for.

BRINGING THE ISSUES BACK HOME

The budget debate this winter and spring and the elections in the year 2000 provide us with the opportunity to raise these questions of national security. The public needs to understand what is at stake, and polling shows that the more the public understands about these issues the more the public supports cutting Pentagon spending and reinvesting in our communities.³²

As we enter the next millennium, this country must decide what kind of a nation it wants to be, and assess whether the direction we are heading will get us there. Do we want to become the world's lone super-cop, and continue to use so many of our resources to build the ships and planes and weaponry to intervene in situations around the world?

Grass-roots organizations focused on housing, education, children, health care, neighborhood empowerment, and living-wage jobs must make the connection between their local concerns and our distorted federal priorities. These groups must then find ways to hold their elected federal officials accountable to a definition of national security that means access to affordable housing and health care, clean drinking water, access to the skills to get real jobs, and a future for all our children. ■

32. For instance, a poll just commissioned by the Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities revealed that an overwhelming 71% of American voters believe the U.S. should "lead an effort to abolish nuclear weapons and shift our national budget priorities towards meeting the needs of our kids." Discussion with Business Leaders for Sensible Priorities, Dec. 1998. Polling by Steve Kull at the Program on International Policy Attitudes in Maryland found that when told how the federal spending pie is divided up, 80% of the people favored reducing the military budget, urging cuts averaging a whopping 42%. The same poll found that 78% said they would support reducing America's presence abroad in favor of allies taking some of the responsibilities of their defense. Stephen Kull, *The Foreign Policy Gap: How Policymakers Misread the Public*, University of Maryland Press, 1997.

The National Priorities Project has found that what really helps the public understand these issues is to bring them down to the state, community, and congressional district level, for that is the level that ordinary citizens understand and believe they can do something about. It is also the level that the media like to talk about and that holds Congress accountable.

Our organization has dedicated a website (www.nprior.org) to providing people with easy-to-understand information about city and state needs and federal policies that are tied to those needs. We are now designing discrete congressional district profiles that will not only illustrate this information at the critical congressional district level, but will include information on voting records, campaign contributions and other information necessary to bring about real citizen participation in determining federal policies.



Reconstructed PanAm 103. Three years after the crash, the Libyans were charged, as an afterthought.

AP / Wide World Photos

PAN AM 103 & THE CHARGE AGAINST LIBYA: *Case Closed or More Disinformation?*

BY WILLIAM BLUM

Pan Am Flight 103? Oh yes, Christmas time 1988, those two Libyans did it, but the Libyan leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi has refused to allow them to be tried in an American or British court. He knows they'll be found guilty, and the whole world will condemn him.

William Blum is the author of *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1995), portions of which can be read at http://members.aol.com/blum6/American_holocaust.htm. To purchase, see p. 66.

He does indeed. But not necessarily because the two men are guilty. The acquittal of the Los Angeles police in the Rodney King beating was sufficient confirmation of the Libyan leader's lack of illusions about the workings of the American justice system.¹ The verdict in the O.J. Simpson case may well have reinforced that view, while "The Guilford Four," the "Birmingham Six," and other infamous miscarriage-of-justice cases in

Britain have reportedly imparted to Qaddafi a similar lesson about the U.K.²

Now, with December 21 having marked the tenth anniversary of the tragedy that took two hundred and seventy lives in Lockerbie, Scotland, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Libya have agreed, at least in principle, to try the two Libyan suspects in

2. "God Bless America-A Personal View," paper written by Dr. Jim Swire, spokesman for the bereaved U.K. families of Pan Am 103 victims, Oct. 20, 1995. Copy in author's possession. Swire met with Qaddafi in Libya.

1. The Times (London), May 11, 1992, p. 11.

the Netherlands, before Scottish judges, and under Scottish law.

In actuality, the evidence against the Libyans, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhimah, who worked for Libyan Arab Airlines at the Malta airport, is thin to the point of transparency. There is no forensic evidence to support the charge that they placed a suitcase containing the fatal bomb in an Air Malta plane in Malta, tagging it so it would eventually be transferred to Flight 103 in London. No witnesses, no fingerprints. Nothing to tie them to that particular brown Samsonite suitcase. No past history of terrorism.

Among the reported pieces of evidence casting suspicion on the two Libyans or on the Libyan government is an entry on December 15, 1988, in a diary kept by Fhimah, which, according to the U.S. indictment, says: "Abdel Basset is coming from Zurich with Salvu...take tags from Air Malta." It is all in Arabic except for the misspelled "tags." "Salvu" is not explained.³


However, the indictment further states that "Air Malta...was the handling agent for Libyan Arab Airlines" for flights to and from Malta, "and as such utilized Air Malta luggage tags on luggage destined for Libyan Arab Airline flights." It therefore seems rather unsurprising that Fhimah might have had some normal business reason to be using such tags. More importantly, if he were actually planning a murderous covert operation using the tags, why would he mention them on paper? And then leave the diary in his office where it could be taken?

Another piece of evidence presented by U.S./U.K. investigators, out of which they derived much mileage, is that the type of timing device used in the bomb was sold only to Libya. It was later revealed that, in fact, the investigators were told in 1990 by the Swiss manufacturer that it had also sold the same timers to East German intelligence, which had close contact with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and numerous other "terrorist" groups.⁴

COVERUP

The investigators' failure to disclose this information can best be described by the word "coverup." And in any event, there is no reason to assume that Libya could not have given one of their timers to another party.

Malta became a focus for investigators, even before serious Libyan involvement was presumed, when tests indicated that the suit-



AP / Wide World Photos

Closeup of fragment of circuit board that became "irrefutable evidence" against the Libyans. It was allegedly found in an "inch-by-inch search of 845 square miles in Scotland."

case which contained the bomb also contained several items of clothing manufactured in Malta and supposedly sold in a particular clothing shop on the island. The present U.S./U.K. version of events would have the world believe that al-Megrahi has been identified by the shopkeeper, Tony Gauci, as the purchaser of the clothing. But there is no such evidence. Al-Megrahi has never been presented to Gauci in person, and there has been no report that Gauci has even been shown his photo. Moreover, the Maltese shopkeeper has already made several erroneous "positive" identifications, including one of a CIA asset.⁵

Before the indictment of the two Libyans, the press reported police findings that the clothing had been purchased on November 23.⁶ But the indictment of al-Megrahi states that he made the purchase on December 7. Can this be because the investigators can document his being in Malta on that date but cannot do so for November 23?

The identification of al-Megrahi is even more questionable than the above indicates.⁷ The fact that the investigative authorities do not make clear exactly how al-Megrahi was identified by Gauci is indicative of the weakness of their case.

Furthermore, after the world was assured that these items of clothing were sold only on Malta, it was learned that at least one of the items was actually "sold at dozens of outlets throughout Europe, and it was impossible to trace the purchaser."⁸

Once Malta became a focus due to the clothing, it appears that the next "logical" conclusion for the investigators was that the suitcase containing the bomb and the Maltese clothing was put together there; and thus the suitcase was somehow put aboard Air Malta flight KM180 to Frankfurt without an accompanying passenger, on the first leg in its fateful journey. News reports presenting the latter as a certainty have alternated with reports like

3. Grand Jury indictment, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 1991.

4. *Der Spiegel* (Germany), Apr. 18, 1994, pp. 92-7; *Sunday Times* (London), Dec. 19, 1993, p. 2; *The Times* (London), Dec. 20, 1993, p. 11; *Los Angeles Times*, Dec. 20, 1993.

5. Mark Perry, *Eclipse: The Last Days of the CIA* (New York: Wm. Morrow, 1992), pp. 342-47. See also *Time*, Apr. 27, 1992, p. 27, for another example of the unreliability of the shopkeeper's identification.

6. See, e.g., *Sunday Times*, Nov. 12, 1989, p. 3.

7. See *The Independent* (London), Jan. 24, 1995, p. 3, for more on this matter.

8. *Sunday Times*, Dec. 17, 1989, p. 14. Malta is, in fact, a major manufacturer of clothing, especially denim, sold throughout the world.

the following: The Lockerbie investigating team "discovered [that] the list of luggage checked into the hold against passengers' names on Air Malta KM180 to Frankfurt bore no resemblance to what the passengers had checked in. The Air Malta list was a shambles, one officer said."⁹

Air Malta itself made an exhaustive study of this matter and has categorically denied that there was any unaccompanied baggage on KM180 or that any of the passengers transferred to the Frankfurt to London flight.¹⁰ And a report sent by the FBI from Germany to Washington in October 1989 reveals profound doubts about this thesis. The report concludes: "There remains the possibility that no luggage was transferred from Air Malta 180 to Pan Am 103."¹¹

In January 1995, more than three years after the indictment of the two Libyans, the FBI was still of the same mind. A confidential Bureau report stated: "There is no concrete indication that any piece of luggage was unloaded from Air Malta 180, sent through the luggage routing system at Frankfurt airport, and then loaded on board Pan Am 103." The report added that the baggage records are "misleading" and that the bomb suitcase could have come from another flight or was simply a "rogue bag inserted into the system."¹²

To accept the Malta scenario is to believe that the suitcase itself led the following charmed life: 1) loaded aboard the Air Malta flight to Frankfurt without an accompanying passenger; 2) transferred in Frankfurt to the Pan Am 103A flight to London without an accompanying passenger; 3) transferred in London to the Pan Am 103 flight to New York without an accompanying passenger.

To the magic bullet of the JFK assassination, can we now add the magic suitcase?

Under international airline rules, baggage unaccompanied by passengers should not be allowed onto aircraft without being searched or x-rayed. Actual practice is, of course, more lax, but how could serious professional terrorists count on this laxness occurring three times in a row for the same suitcase? Regular airline passengers would not make such an assumption. Moreover, since the perpetrators in all likelihood wanted to time the explosion to occur over the ocean, adding Malta as an extra step could only add much more uncertainty.

In any event, the Pan Am x-ray operator at Frankfurt on December 21 testified in court that he had been told to look for a radio in such baggage, but found none.¹³

A passenger could conceivably have accompanied the suitcase on the first, and/or second leg, but this would carry with it the sizeable risk of subsequent identification.

We must also ask why Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, writing in her 1993 memoirs about the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986, with which Britain had cooperated, stated: "But the much vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not and could not take place. Qaddafi had not been destroyed but he had been humbled. There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years."¹⁴

Finally, it should be pointed out that even if the two Libyans were involved, there is no reason to assume they knew that the suitcase contained a bomb, and not drugs, or some other contraband.

ALTERNATIVE THEORY

There is, moreover, an alternative scenario, laying the blame on Iran and Syria, which is much better documented and makes a lot more sense, logistically, politically, and technically. Indeed, this was the Original Official Version, delivered with Olympian rectitude by the U.S. government—guaranteed, sworn to, Scouts honor, case closed—until the Gulf War came along and the support of Iran and Syria was needed, and Washington was anxious as well to achieve the release of American hostages held in Lebanon by groups close to Iran. The distinctive scurrying sound of backtracking then became audible in the corridors of the White House. Suddenly—or so it seemed—in October 1990, there was a New Official Version: It was Libya, the Arab state least supportive of the U.S. buildup to the Gulf War and the sanctions imposed against Iraq, that was behind the bombing after all, declared Washington.

The two Libyan airline employees were formally indicted in the U.S. and Scotland on November 14, 1991. "This was a Libyan government operation from start to finish," declared the State Department spokesman.¹⁵ "The Syrians took a bum rap on this," said President Bush.¹⁶ Within the next 20 days, the remaining four American hostages were released along with the most prominent British hostage, Terry Waite.

The Original Official Version accused the PFLP-GC, a 1968 breakaway from a compo-

ent of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), of making the bomb and somehow placing it aboard the flight in Frankfurt. The PFLP-GC was led by Ahmed Jabari, one of the world's leading terrorists, and was headquartered in, financed by, and closely supported by, Syria. The bombing was done at the behest of Iran as revenge for the U.S. shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988, which claimed 290 lives.

The support for this scenario was, and remains, impressive, as this sample indicates:

In April 1989, the FBI—in response to criticism that it was bungling the investigation—leaked to CBS the news that it had tentatively identified the person who unwittingly carried the bomb aboard. His name was Khalid Jaafar, a 21-year-old Lebanese-American. The report said that the bomb had been planted in Jaafar's suitcase by a member of the PFLP-GC, whose name was not revealed.¹⁷

In May, the State Department stated that the CIA was "confident" of the Iran/Syria/PFLP-GC account of events.¹⁸

On September 20, *The Times* of London reported that "Security officials from Britain, the United States, and West Germany are 'totally satisfied' that it was the PFLP-GC" behind the crime.

In December, Scottish investigators announced that they had "hard evidence" of the involvement of the PFLP-GC in the bombing.¹⁹

A National Security Agency (NSA) electronic intercept disclosed that Ali Akbar Mohtashemi, Iranian interior minister, had paid Palestinian terrorists ten million dollars to gain revenge for the downed Iranian airplane.²⁰

Israeli intelligence also intercepted a communication between Mohtashemi and the Iranian Embassy in Beirut "indicating that Iran paid for the Lockerbie bombing."²¹

Even after the Libyans had been indicted, Israeli officials declared that their intelligence

9. *The Independent*, Oct. 30, 1989, p. 2.

10. *The Guardian* (London) July 29, 1995, p. 26.

11. *Time*, Apr. 27, 1992, p. 28.

12. *The Independent*, Jan. 30, 1995, p. 3. The newspaper reported it was a five-page official briefing paper that had been leaked to them. It is possible this is the same 1989 report referred to in note 11. *Time* magazine also said it was a five-page document.

13. Donald Goddard with Lester Coleman, *Trail of the Octopus: Behind the Lockerbie Disaster* (London: Penguin Books, 1994), p. 420.

14. Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993), pp. 446-49.

15. *New York Times*, Nov. 15, 1991, p. 1.

16. *Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 15, 1991, p. 25.

analysts remained convinced that the PFLP-GC bore primary responsibility for the bombing.²²

In 1992, Abu Sharif, a political adviser to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat, stated that the PLO had compiled a secret report which concluded that the bombing of Pan Am 103 was the work of a "Middle Eastern country" other than Libya.²³

In February 1995, a former Scottish Office minister, Alan Stewart, wrote to the British Foreign Secretary and the Lord Advocate, questioning the reliability of the evidence which had led to the accusations against the two Libyans. This move, wrote *The Guardian*, reflected the concern of the Scottish legal profession, reaching into the Crown Office, the equivalent of the office of the Attorney General, that the bombing may not have been the work of Libya, but of Syrians, Palestinians, and Iranians.²⁴

Key Question

A key question in the PFLP-GC version has always been: How did the bomb get aboard the plane in Frankfurt, or at some other point? One widely disseminated explanation was in a report, completed during the summer of 1989 and leaked in the fall, which had been prepared by a New York investigating firm called Interfor. Headed by a former Israeli intelligence agent, Interfor—whose other clients included Fortune 500 companies, the FBI, the IRS, and the Secret Service²⁵—was hired by the law firm representing Pan Am's insurance carrier.

The Interfor report said that in the mid-1980s, a drug and arms smuggling operation was set up in various European cities, with Frankfurt airport as the site of one of the drug routes. The Frankfurt operation was run by Manzer Al-Kassar, a Syrian, the same man from whom Col. Oliver North's shadowy network purchased large quantities of arms for the contras. At the airport, according to the report, a courier would board a flight with checked luggage containing innocent items; after the luggage had passed all security checks, one or another accomplice Turkish baggage handler for Pan Am would substitute an identical suitcase containing contraband; the passenger then picked up this suitcase upon arrival at the destination.

The only courier named by Interfor is Khalid Jaafar, although this may well have derived from the many news reports already citing Jaafar as a prime suspect.

22. *New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1991, p. 14. It should be borne in mind, however, that Israel may have been influenced because of its hostility toward the PFLP-GC.
23. Reuters dispatch, datelined Tunis, Feb. 26, 1992.
24. *The Guardian*, Feb. 24, 1995, p. 7.
25. *National Law Journal* (New York), Sept. 25, 1995, p. A11, from papers filed in a New York court case.

The report spins a web much too complex and lengthy to go into here. The short version is that the CIA in Germany discovered the drug operation at the airport and learned also that Al-Kassar had the contacts to gain the release of American hostages in Lebanon. He had already done the same for French hostages. Thus it was that the CIA and the German *Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA, Federal Criminal Office) allowed the drug operation to continue in hopes of effecting the release of American hostages.

According to the report, this same smuggling ring and its method of switching suitcases at the Frankfurt airport were used to smuggle the fatal bomb aboard Flight 103, under the eyes of the CIA and BKA. Because of several warnings, these same officials had reason to suspect that a bomb might be aboard Flight 103, possibly in the drug suitcase. But the CIA, for various reasons, including not wanting to risk the hostage-release operation, told the BKA to do nothing.

Interfor gave three of the baggage handlers polygraphs, and two of them were judged as being deceitful when denying any involvement in baggage switching. However, neither the U.S., U.K. or German investigators showed any interest in the results, or in questioning the baggage handlers. Instead, the polygrapher, James Keefe, was hauled before a Washington grand jury, and, as he puts it, "they were bent on destroying my credibility—not theirs [the baggage handlers]." To Interfor, this attempt at intimidation was the strongest evidence of a coverup.²⁶

Critics claimed that the report had been inspired by Pan Am's interest in proving that it was impossible for normal airline security to have prevented the loading of the bomb, thus removing the basis for accusing the airline of negligence.

The Interfor report was likely the principal reason Pan Am's attorneys subpoenaed the FBI, CIA, DEA, State Department, National Security Council, and NSA, as well as, reportedly, the Defense Intelligence Agency and FAA, to turn over all documents relating to the crash of 103 or to a drug operation preceding the crash. The government moved to quash the subpoenas on grounds of "national

On February 16, 1990, a group of British relatives of Lockerbie victims went to the American Embassy in London for a meeting with members of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism. After the meeting, Britisher Martin Cadman was chatting with two of the commission members.

One of them said to him:

"Your government and our government know exactly what happened at Lockerbie. But they are not going to tell you." *

*Cadman in *The Maltese Double Cross*. Also see *The Guardian*, July 29, 1995, p. 27.

security" and refused to turn over a single document in open court, although it gave some to a judge to view in private.

The judge later commented that he was "troubled about certain parts" of what he had read, that he did not "know quite what to do because I think some of the material may be significant."²⁷

Drugs Revelation


A year later, on October 30, 1990, NBC News reported that "Pan Am flights from Frankfurt, including 103, had been used a number of times by the DEA as part of its undercover operation to fly informants and suitcases of heroin into Detroit as part of a sting operation to catch dealers in Detroit."

The TV network reported that the DEA was looking into the possibility that a young man who lived in Michigan and regularly visited the Middle East may have unwittingly carried the bomb aboard Flight 103. His name was Khalid Jaafar. "Unidentified law enforcement sources" were cited as saying that Jaafar had been a DEA informant and was involved in a drug-sting operation based out of Cyprus. The DEA was investigating whether the PFLP-GC had tricked Jaafar into carrying a suitcase containing the bomb instead of (or in addition to) the drugs he usually carried.

The report added that "Informants would put [suitcases of heroin on the Pan Am flights apparently without the usual security checks...through an arrangement between the DEA and German authorities."²⁸

27. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

28. Goddard/Coleman, *op. cit.*, n. 13, p. 205; *Washington Times*, Oct. 31, 1990, p. 3; *The Times*, Nov. 1, 1990, p. 3.



Chinologia

Allan Francovich, who has left a great legacy of investigative documentary films.

These revelations were enough to inspire a congressional hearing, held in December 1990, entitled, "Drug Enforcement Administration's Alleged Connection to the Pan Am Flight 103 Disaster."

The chairman of the House committee, Rep. Robert Wise (Dem.-W. Va.), began the hearing by lamenting the fact that the DEA and the Department of Justice had not made any of their field agents who were most knowledgeable about Flight 103 available to testify; that they had not provided requested written information, including the results of the DEA's investigation into the air disaster; and that "the FBI to this date has been totally uncooperative."

The two DEA officials who did testify admitted that the agency had, in fact, run "controlled drug deliveries" through Frankfurt airport with the cooperation of German authorities, using U.S. airlines, but insisted that no such operation had been conducted in December 1988.

The officials denied that the DEA had had any "association with Mr. Jaafar in any way, shape, or form." However, to questions concerning Jaafar's background, family, and his frequent trips to Lebanon, they asked to respond only in closed session. They made the same request in response to several other questions. (NBC News had reported on October 30 that the DEA had told law enforcement officers in Detroit not to talk to the media about Jaafar.)

The hearing ended after only one day, even though Wise had promised a "full-scale" investigation and indicated during the hearing that there would be more to come. What was said in the closed sessions remains closed.²⁹

One of the DEA officials who testified, Stephen Greene, had himself had a reservation on Flight 103, but he canceled because of

29. Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture Subcommittee, Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Dec. 18, 1990, *passim*.

the warnings. He has described standing on the Heathrow tarmac, watching the doomed plane take off.³⁰

There have been many reports of heroin being found in the field around the crash, from "traces" to "a substantial quantity" found in a suitcase.³¹ Two days after the NBC report, however, the *New York Times* quoted a "federal official" saying that "no hard drugs were aboard the aircraft."

The DEA of course knew of its sting operation in Frankfurt two years earlier when the tragedy occurred, but they said nothing, not even to the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, which held hearings in the first months of 1990 in response to the Flight 103 bombing.

THE WHISTLEBLOWERS

Lester Coleman, author and radio talk-show host, who spent several years with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the DEA, beginning in the mid-1980s, has revealed that when he was working with the DEA station in Cyprus, he met Khalid Jaafar several times, that Jaafar was working for the DEA, and that the young man had run two or three controlled deliveries of heroin into Detroit.³²

Because Coleman did not keep what he knew to himself, but repeated his story in an affidavit for Pan Am's action against the U.S. government, and then co-authored a highly revealing book, he was hounded for several years, across continents, and severely punished by various institutions of that same government, including being imprisoned on phony charges to damage his credibility. His tale reads like something out of *Les Misérables* with the U.S. government as Inspector Javert.

At one point, a federal judge warned Coleman: "If you attack the government on the radio, I will take that very, very seriously."³³

Several other individuals who have raised questions about a U.S. government role in the Pan Am 103 disaster have also paid a heavy price, including Juval Aviv, the head of Interfor. His office suffered a series of break-ins; the FBI visited his clients; his polygrapher was harassed, as mentioned; and a contrived commercial fraud charge was brought against him. Even though Aviv eventually was cleared in court, it was a long, expensive, and painful ordeal.³⁴

30. The film, *The Maltese Double Cross* (see below).

31. *Sunday Times*, Apr. 16, 1989 (cited); Johnston, *op. cit.*, n. 17, p. 79 (substantial). *The Maltese Double Cross* mentions other reports of drugs found by a Scottish policeman and by a mountain rescue man.

32. Goddard/Coleman, pp. 40-43.

33. Goddard/Coleman, *passim*, and conversations with Coleman by the author in 1998. Coleman was eventually obliged to plead guilty to a contrived perjury charge in order to be released from detention while seriously ill.

34. Article by John Ashton, *The Mail on Sunday* (Lon-

There was also Allan Francovich, who made a documentary film, *The Maltese Double Cross*, which presents Jaafar as an unwitting bomb carrier with ties to the DEA and the CIA. Showings of the film in Britain were canceled under threat of lawsuits, and venues burglarized or attacked with arson. When Channel 4 agreed to show the film, the Scottish Crown Office and the U.S. Embassy in London sent press packs to the media, labeling the film "blatant propaganda," and attacking some of the film's interviewees, including Coleman and Aviv.³⁵ Additionally, Francovich said he had learned that five CIA operatives had been sent to London and Cyprus to discredit the film while it was being made, that his office phones were tapped, and staff cars sabotaged, and that one of his researchers narrowly escaped an attempt to force his vehicle into the path of an oncoming truck.³⁶

Lockerbie investigators went so far as to ask the FBI to investigate the film. The Bureau later issued a highly derogatory opinion of it.³⁷

The film's detractors made much of the fact that the film was initially funded jointly by a U.K. company (two-thirds) and a Libyan government investment concern (one-third). Francovich said that he was fully aware of this and had taken pains to negotiate a guarantee of independence from any interference.

On April 17, 1997, Allan Francovich suddenly died of a heart attack at age 56, upon arrival at Houston Airport.³⁸ His film has had almost no showings in the United States.³⁹

ABU TALB

The DEA sting operation and Interfor's baggage-handler hypothesis both predicate the bomb suitcase being placed aboard the plane without going through the normal security checks. In either case, it eliminates the need for the questionable triple-flight unaccompanied-baggage scenario. It does not eliminate the matter of the clothing purchased in Malta, but we do not need the Libyans for that.

Mohammed Abu Talb fits that and perhaps other pieces of the puzzle. The Palestinian had close ties to PFLP-GC cells in

Germany which were making Toshiba radio-cassette bombs, similar, if not identical, to what was used to bring down Flight 103. In October 1988, two months before Lockerbie, the German police staged several raids against these cells, uncovering all but one of their five known bombs. In May 1989, Talb was arrested in Sweden, where he lived, and was later convicted of taking part in several bombings of the offices of American airline companies in Scandinavia. In his Swedish apartment, police found large quantities of clothing made in Malta.

Police investigation of Talb disclosed that during October 1988 he had been to Cyprus and Malta, at least once in the company of Hafez Dalkamoni, the leader of the German PFLP-GC, who was arrested in the raid. The men met with group members who lived in Malta. Talb was also in Malta on November 23, which was originally reported as the date of the clothing purchase before the indictment of the Libyans, as mentioned earlier.

After his arrest, Talb told investigators that between October and December 1988 he had retrieved and passed to another person a bomb that had been hidden in a building used by the PFLP-GC in Germany. Officials declined to identify the person to whom Talb said he had passed the bomb. A month later, however, he recanted his confession.

Additionally, Talb was reported to possess a brown Samsonite suitcase, and to have circled December 21 in a diary seized in his Swedish flat. After the raid upon his flat, his wife was allegedly heard to telephone Palestinian friends and say: "Get rid of the clothes."

In December 1989, Scottish police, in papers filed with Swedish legal officials, made Talb the only publicly identified suspect "in the murder or participation in the murder of 270 people."⁴⁰ Since that time, the world has scarcely heard of Abu Talb, who was sentenced to life in prison in Sweden, but never charged with anything to do with Lockerbie.

In Allan Francovich's film, members of Khalid Jaafar's family—which long had ties to the drug trade in Lebanon's notorious Bekaa Valley—are interviewed. In either halting English or translated Arabic, or paraphrased by the film's narrator, they drop many bits of information, but they are difficult to put together into a coherent whole. Among the bits: Khalid had told his parents that he had met Talb in Sweden and had been given Maltese clothing; someone had given Khalid a tape recorder, or put one into his bag; he was told

to go to Germany to friends of Ahmed Jabril who would help him earn some money; he arrived in Germany with two kilos of heroin; "He didn't know it was a bomb. They gave him the drugs to take to Germany. He didn't know who wants to die?"

It cannot be stated with certainty what happened at Frankfurt airport on that fateful day, if, as seems most likely, that is the place where the bomb was placed into the system. Either Jaafar, the DEA courier, arrived with his suitcase of heroin and bomb and was escorted through security by the proper authorities, or this was a day he was a courier for Manzer al-Kassar, and the baggage handlers did their usual switch.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Contrary to what American officials and the media have stated on numerous occasions, the 1992 U.N. resolutions do not demand that Libya turn the two men over to the United States or Scotland. No specific venue is mentioned.⁴¹

In 1992, Qaddafi declared that if the U.S. could demand that al-Megrahi and Fhimah be turned over for trial, he could ask for the surrender of the American airmen who bombed two Libyan cities, killing 37 people, including his daughter.

The United States refuses to accede to the request of Costa Rica for the extradition of John Hull, an American who was a major player in Iran-Contra, and who is wanted in Costa Rica for drug trafficking and other crimes. Similar requests from Cuba over the years for the terrorists harbored by the U.S. in Washington and Miami have also been ignored.

It is surprising that Qaddafi has agreed to subject the two Libyans to a Scottish judge and Scottish law, without a jury. Even though it would take place in the Netherlands, there is no reason to assume that the Scottish judges would be any less biased than in Scotland. To return home after acquitting the men could not be a pleasant thing to face.

At the same time, it is unlikely that any U.S. or British official really believes that Libya played a significant role, if any. And for that reason, they probably do not actually want to see the trial of the two men take place.⁴² Not only would the paucity of their evidence be exposed for all the world to see, but they might be obliged to reveal information they'd rather not see the light of day, perhaps touching upon the role played by one or more U.S. intelligence agencies. ■

41. U.N. Resolution 731, Jan. 21, 1992, and Resolution 748, Mar. 31, 1992.

42. See *The Guardian*, June 8, 1995, p. 1, "Clinton ends fight to try Lockerbie suspects"; and *The Times*, Sept. 20, 1997, p. 9, "Britain gives up fight over Lockerbie."

don), June 9, 1996; *Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 18, 1995, p. 1, and Dec. 18, 1996, p. B2.

35. Ashton, *op. cit.*, n. 34, and *Financial Times* (London), May 12, 1995, p. 8.


36. *The Guardian*, Apr. 23, 1994, p. 5.

37. *Sunday Times*, May 7, 1995.

38. Francovich's former wife told the author that he had not had any symptoms of a heart problem before. However, the author also spoke to Dr. Cyril Wecht, of JFK "conspiracy" fame, who performed an autopsy on Francovich. Wecht stated that he found no reason to suspect foul play.

39. It was shown once in San Francisco, and once, privately, in the offices of United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, for a number of African ambassadors.

40. Material on Abu Talb from the following sources, all dates 1989: *New York Times*, Oct. 31, Dec. 1, Dec. 24; *Sunday Times*, Nov. 12; *The Times*, Dec. 21.



Congo President Laurent Kabila with U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan at 1997 OAU Summit in Harare, Zimbabwe.

UN/DPI Milton Grant

Conflict in the Congo:

An Interview with President Laurent Kabila

by Elombe Brath and Samori Marksman

In early May 1997, when it became apparent to western observers that the broad coalition of rebel forces in Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) headed by veteran freedom fighter, Laurent Kabila, would eventually topple the Mobutu kleptocracy and establish "a popular government, linking all sectors of our society," the *Financial Times*, the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and others in the corporate media slowly began to criticize the "excesses" of the CIA-installed Mobutu regime, in power since 1965. But at the same time they began a relentless campaign against Kabila and the rebel coalition.

The *Wall Street Journal* spoke of Kabila as an "ideological throw-back" to the politics of the 1960s. It decried his relationship with Che

Guevara, who had gone to the Congo in the early 1960s to work with a progressive coalition (including Kabila) to support the Patrice Lumumba forces and to oust another CIA-installed regime, which had been installed in the diamond-rich region of Katanga. The *Journal* warned that "western interests" would now be in jeopardy under Kabila.

For thirteen months, Kabila sought to consolidate a broad coalition to democratize and develop the Congo. But by August 1998, two neighboring states, Rwanda and Uganda, aligned with ethnic forces inside the Congo, invaded several towns and cities. Both invading countries charged Kabila with "corruption" and human rights violations,

and with being "undemocratic." Both Rwanda and Uganda are governed by de facto military regimes. Both governments are hosts to U.S. military training facilities and U.S. military personnel.

The Congo has been regarded by leading scientists and economists as one of the most mineral-rich countries in the world. It contains roughly 70 percent of the world's cobalt. More than half of the U.S. military's cobalt comes from the Congo. It is the second largest producer of diamonds in the world and is known for large deposits of gold, manganese, and copper. The Congo's peculiar type of high-grade uranium was used by the U.S. to make the atom bombs that were dropped on Japan in WWII. And the U.S. dominates mining in that area even today.

The current conflict in the Congo directly involves, on one side: the governments of Rwanda and Uganda; former Mobutu soldiers; a small number of Congolese dissidents, including western-inspired in-

tellectuals; members of two ethnic groups that are indigenous to Rwanda; and UNITA, a CIA-created contra organization, set up in 1964 to work with the CIA and the then South African apartheid regime to overthrow the government of Angola. And on the other side: the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo; and the governments of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Chad, and Angola.

While much diplomatic and other forms of support have come to Kabila's government from Cuba, Libya, Nigeria, and many other countries, it remains unclear from where Rwanda and Uganda, two tiny and extremely poor countries, are receiving the massive military resources they are consuming.

The following interview was conducted with President Laurent Kabila in November 1998 by **Elombe Brath**, veteran activist and radio producer on African issues, and **Samori Marksman**, director of programming at WBAI, Pacifica Radio in New York City.

Elombe Brath: Mr. President, we want you to be able to talk directly to the people here, to tell them of the situation in the Congo as it is today.

President Laurent Kabila: The situation in Congo is a war situation. The Congo has been aggressed in the north by Uganda and Rwanda as well as Burundi. As of October 30, there were 15,000 Ugandan and 19,000 Rwandan troops on Congo soil. They are disrupting our democratization process. They are killing and looting everywhere, particularly in the mining areas such as Kisangani and Kivu. All production is at a standstill.

The people of Congo, who are the victims, are mobilizing against this open aggression. The aggressors have benefited by the complicity of big powers who have decided not to tell them to pull out from the Congo so that we could begin again the reconstruction of that area, so that peace could be brought back to the area of the Great Lakes region.

Samori Marksman: President Kabila, could you discuss the nature of the forces from outside the Congo, besides Rwanda and Uganda, which are directly involved in the Congo itself?

Kabila: When Uganda and Rwanda started the invasion, no rebellion existed inside the Congo. The real position here is that after the 2nd of August attempted coup in Kinshasa was defeated, they came up with the story of a revolt. Three weeks after they realized that they were not going to defeat the popular government in Kinshasa, they came up with this story of rebels. Of course, they have got accomplices from the Congo itself. But in the course of the conflict we saw the so-called rebels getting people from European cities; from the former Mobutu army. They also got refugees from Tanzania, Uganda, and elsewhere. So these critics, who call them-

selves "democratic forces," are supported by Uganda and Rwanda. They wanted to impose on the Congo a group of leaders which was not elected by the people. Uganda and Rwanda leadership, especially Mr. Museveni and Mr. Kagame, think that the Congo is not mature enough to be the master of its own destiny and that the Congolese should be given to the puppets of those two countries. This is a key ques-

"Our allies and friends are here to assist and preserve the sovereignty and independence of the Congo. They should not be asked to go at the same time that the aggressors, who do not have the right to be here, stay."

tion. They want the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to accept and negotiate with their puppets and discuss internal matters on behalf of these invaders.

The forces we requested have come in to stop aggression against the Democratic Republic of Congo, these are the legitimate governments of these countries (Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, etc.). They are not concerned about pulling out, because they were called in to stop aggression. We will ask our friends and our allies to leave the country when the situation in the Congo has been normalized. But this cannot be

taken as one of the conditions for peace, as has been called for by the European governments.

Our allies and friends are here to assist and preserve the sovereignty and independence of the Congo. They should not be asked to go at the same time as the aggressors, who do not have the right to be here in the Congo in the first place, stay. This is the situation.

Brath: The western press has been trying to link the Army of the Democratic Republic of Congo with the Interahamwe [the militias of Rwandan origins that participated in the genocide against fellow Rwandans in Rwanda]. Those who have now invaded the Congo said that they came into the country to try to cleanse that area of armed groups. I recall that when I was in the Congo in 1997, we noticed that you had worked to integrate the Banyamulenge and even Rwandans into the government, including the then Foreign Minister Kahara. Please explain the situation with the Interahamwe, and also, why you felt that the people whom you had helped turned against you.

Kabila: The first point is the Interahamwe. Additionally, a huge percentage of the population fled from Rwanda into the Congo.

One of the things that was agreed between me and Kagame just before the overthrow of Mobutu was that the revolutionary people of the Congo would split up and expel from power the Mobutu regime and also deny any base of activities by which the Interahamwe might attack Rwanda. On the other hand, Rwanda had agreed to give free passage to the Congo-

lese Liberation Movement for our activities in our own country to overthrow the Mobutu regime. That is what we did.

So it was an interesting agreement on both sides to keep alive the Kigali regime of Kagame. And we did benefit from the free passage. We were working together. We were solving this problem called Banyamulenge, that is, the Tutsi immigrants that were living in the same part of Zaire (now Congo), especially in Kivu in the south and in the north. We had integrated those young men, who had been discriminated against before we came into power. And after we took power, we even gave to some of them key positions in the government for the first time in the history of this country. That Kahara is a traitor, absolutely. He was a member of my cabinet, as well as many other Tutsis, and even some Rwandans were officers of our Army, controlling the general staff of the Army, all the brigades and the area where Interahamwe and the former Rwandan Army was most active.

So we did what we had agreed with those gentlemen leaders from Rwanda and Uganda. And what they have since come up with is that the leaders of Rwanda, and especially Uganda, keep sending signals as if the Congo is a small colony, they feel that they have to do what it is necessary for my country. We started disagreeing when they killed thousands of Hutus in the western part of our country, in the equatorial region.

That was the certain point of disagreement between us, because we said we could not continue supporting the massacre of the Hutu people on our own soil, and we decided Rwanda would have to pull out. That is what we did. They are not satisfied to wait, and then the coup attempt came in August 1998 followed by the invasion, which is still going on now.

Marksman: This chronology is very important. When did the massacre of the Hutus occur, how close was it to the attempted coup of August?

Kabila: The massacre of Hutus occurred in 1997 in the Kisangani area, and the areas of what we call here the equatorial region. This was carried out by Rwandan troops based there because it was the area we had given them as a military area.

Several months after they carried out the massacre, the traditional Congolese chief, who witnessed it, and who even participated in transporting bodies, putting the bodies into sacks, came to my office and informed me. That was in July 1998. I was apprised of what they had done without the knowledge of the Congolese gov-

ernment. And we were still on friendly terms at that time. So I did protest it. And, I said it's not possible, we can't accept that kind of thing on our soil. Many of the traditional chiefs came into the delegation here bringing in more proof. We sent people from my office of the Justice Minister; the Interior Minister was sent to the site of the massacre, and proof was there. We expressed our dislike for this kind of tradition of violence and blood. We see that all the time and we put a stop right here in the Congo. So that this was the beginning of the accusation by Kagame and Museveni of Kabila being a dictator and that Kabila did not like Tutsis. Those are false accusations.

Those people were pulled out on the 28th of July, the coup started on the 2nd of August of this year. So it was due to the situation that they feared, that they were no longer controlling our government. And so that's why they resorted to that coup.

Brath: There's another critical point, President Kabila, in the chronology. Many Latin American papers reported that you went to Cuba on July 23rd. And, it was after you returned to the Congo that you told James Kabally that you wanted him to leave, but you told the rest of the Rwandan troops that you wanted them to go back to their country. You had already started to talk to Zimbabwe about retraining the Congolese Army. And many of us here who study the way the U.S. works, because we're well aware of the connection between both Rwanda and Uganda with the United States military forces, we feel that it was because they saw you as coming together with Fidel Castro and Cuba for support, that they were given the signal to move against you. Do you agree with this assessment?

Kabila: Yes, this is true. It is admitted also by some that this is one of the reasons. I know that when I was in Cuba, I was told of the tremendous tension inside the Congolese Army during my absence. They called me at my office, saying that something was very wrong. That's why I came back; it was to take control of the situation. Had we not arrived on time, the situation would have been very complicated on the 2nd, when the coup d'état was attempted. We sent our ministers and security officers to Kagame to tell them that everybody had to go. And that we must have an open agreement. We all hoped that the new program would show them what they should and should not do. They had been doing everything which the Congolese could judge wrong: killing people to steal cars; killing people just to occupy villas; killing people just to steal from the bank and

other institutions; killing and raping women.

So many things were very wrong, and the population was completely opposed to the presence of Tutsis because of their behavior. And I could not continue to put my own people under the pressure of the occupation of so-called friends. I decided they had to go. That's what we did. And, Kagame himself said that yes, he accepts that those people should go back home. Many of the Tutsis whom we even included in our government were only interested in seeking control over the Congo. As you know, this Congo has over 50 million people, and the Tutsis are less than 200,000—less than 200,000—and they're mostly illegal. So, they wanted to control the entire government despite what they have been getting from us. We are very, very important compared to their own population. So I think all those factors came together when the Rwandans and the Ugandans claimed that they're losing control of the Congo. Absolutely, we don't understand why the United States of America was still supporting those gentlemen, training the military; and even now the U.S. is still in Uganda and Rwanda. You are the ones who know. You are policing Africa—by you, I mean the policies of your government, not you as individuals.

Those three countries, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, are not democratic ones. They are minority rulers, repressing the majority of their countries. They are seeking to get rid of every Hutu. This is wrong.

Brath: President Kabila, one thing that is of great interest is your government's push for elections in your country. It is not getting much attention here, even when people like Nelson Mandela said you were doing a good job there. But Thabo Mbeki, the Deputy President of South Africa, also said that you are not quite ready for an election—because the electoral infrastructure simply does not exist, and that pushing ahead this early could be detrimental. How do you see this? Why do the western media critics continue to attack you over the holding of elections?

Kabila: The democratization program of our government is very clear. We were organizing what we call here the Constituent Assembly. And, then it was intended that the people from the territory, 300 of them from all over the country would constitute the Constituent Assembly, after being elected from the best there. And the Constituent Assembly would have been the transition Parliament after the election. All of our program was to satisfy the people of the Congo. I believe that these three

countries were afraid that the Congo would really become an authentically democratic country—with a large territory and vast resources—and would be very strong. They are Rwandans; they're Burundians and Ugandans, which are not democratic countries. So, this should be taken as a key point of their consensus for the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Those people who knew that this is what we were doing at that time come up with the war against us. You should know that the aggressors have prepared their propaganda for over several months before they started war against us. You may remember that we called a solidarity and development conference in the area. We called many African leaders of international organizations as one of the ways of finding a solution to the tension in the Great Lakes region. They sabotaged this solidarity conference. The aggressors didn't want those things to happen.

But although M'beki and Mandela made those remarks, they were misled basically by the propaganda of Museveni about what had been planned. And, he [Museveni] has a way of presenting himself as a master of the region. What they say is they know what Kabila will do and all the other leaders of the country.

Marksman: There is much discussion now about whether or not Angola will continue to support the Democratic Republic of Congo, whether Zimbabwe will continue to support the Congo, or whether pressure would be brought by the U.N. or the U.S. How do you view these questions?

Kabila: In Angola, UNITA [the CIA-backed Union for the Total Independence of Angola] has been the factor of destabilization of Angola and other countries in this area for a quarter of a century. It is known worldwide that Savimbi was getting support from the beginning until now from the United States of America, against the will of the people of the country. It is Savimbi who was defeated in Angola in the democratic elections in 1994. That is known.

And the results are known. They tried to destroy the legal government elected by the people of Angola. Now UNITA is fully in complicity with the Rwandan troops that are in northeastern Congo. There are plenty of UNITA people in the local hotels, in the same way as the military personnel from the United States. You go over there and then come up to Ugamba, you will see that there are plenty of UNITA's people in that area with their English speaking friends.



Embassy of Congo

President Laurent Desiré Kabila, who struggles to hold the Congo together.

And even today in Kisangani with Ugandan troops, everything is being called by the United States.

When they say that Angola will withdraw from the Congo, that is propaganda. I think the government of Angola is very clear. What some of those spreading the rumors of Angola wanting to pull out of the Congo don't know is that Angola is very well committed to the friendship and brotherhood with the people of Congo. And they know that the Congo is the victim of aggression. They can't pull out under these circumstances.

Why should they do so, even with many pressures from those big countries, especially the United States going around asking them to pull out, instead of condemning the invasion. There are U.S. embassies in the aggressor nations. Why doesn't the United States tell the aggressors who have violated the Charter of the United Nations to pull out? But the wealth that is in the Congo explains why they keep occupying our country. They have to go.

So, Angola is resolved. And what they are saying about Angola is that the absolute pressure is being used to force Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to pull out so that the aggressors can get a chance to overthrow the government of the Congolese Democratic Republic. That's what it is. Angola with the Democratic Republic of Congo and others, they should strive together. We are on the same frontiers and there is no way of regulating the one to fool the other. Our friendship is very strong. And so is the imagination of our brothers running Angola.

Brath: President Kabila what would you like to see the people of the United States to do to help the people of the Congo?

Kabila: I think the people of Congo would like to see the United States of America, which is a big country, a big power, to be a country protecting a weak one against the injustice of those who seek to present themselves as strong militarists bent on occupying other countries. ■



AP / Wide World Photos

The killing goes on. Bomb explodes in August 1998 in an Algiers marketplace, killing 17.

ALGERIA: THEOCRACY BY TERROR?

In October 1998, **Ellen Ray**, co-founder of *CovertAction Quarterly*, and **Lenora Foerstel**, North American coordinator of Women for Mutual Security, traveled to Paris to interview three Algerian members of the *Parti Algérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme* (PADS) and, separately, Rahim Talbi, a reporter for *Le Matin*, the largest French-language daily in Algiers, who, with his wife, had recently left Algeria after receiving numerous death threats.

The objective was to look into the longstanding campaign of terrorism in Algeria and those responsible for it, in particular the identity of the various forces involved, whether Islamic fundamentalist groups or factions within the ruling coalition or the army, and how western governments and media define the problem.

The western press recognizes that virtually all the terrorism has been committed by fundamentalist groups, attempting to change, by force, the Algerian government from a secular state to an Islamic fundamentalist one. But the same media, with

near unanimity, backed by human rights groups and Islamic exiles in London, floats the theory that the Algerian government has either tacitly approved much of the violence by not protecting victimized villagers or vigorously pursuing the perpetrators, or even secretly participated in it. Much of the left press (including an article in *CovertAction Quarterly* last year, positing that there is a "myth of an Islamic menace") has agreed. Indeed, when conservative journalist Roger Kaplan recently challenged this view and the alleged factual bases for it in the *Atlantic Monthly*,² he was attacked in *In These Times*.³ The argument that prevails in the media, however, strengthens

1. Farhan Haq, "Death and Silence in 'Useless Algeria,'" *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 65 (Spring 1998), p. 24, at p. 25.

2. Roger Kaplan, "The Libel of Moral Equivalence," *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug. 1998, p. 18.

3. Elie Chouli, "The Killing Fields: Who's Behind the Massacres in Algeria," in *In These Times*, Jan. 10, 1999, p. 12. The critique of Kaplan's piece was both confused and contradictory. On the one hand, it criticized the Algerian government for not sufficiently supporting the besieged villagers during the height of the massacres, while on the other hand, it criticized the government for then deciding to arm the villagers for self-defense.

the armed Islamist movement's savage bid for a theocracy by equating the perpetrators of horrendous violence (as many as 160,000 deaths since 1982) with the military's attempts to crack down and eradicate it.

Ray and Foerstel began the interview with the PADS members by asking about the background of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the political party that nearly came to power in 1992. Outlawed by President Mohamed Boudiaf (see sidebar on page 42) that same year, two of its leaders, Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, remain in jail, while its armed wings, the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS) and the better known Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) have engaged in a terrorist campaign that reached its height in 1994 to 1996 and remains a serious problem. (In December 1998 and January 1999 there was a resurgence of terrorist activity west of Algiers, during Ramadan, when more than 150 people were slaughtered.)

One of its leaders, Anwar Haddam, was arrested in late

1996 in Washington, D.C., by immigration authorities, when his application for political asylum was denied. While in jail, in December 1996, a suit charging him with crimes against humanity and war crimes was brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights, on behalf of the Algerian Assembly of Democratic Women.

The government of President Liamine Zeroual, elected in 1995, now includes seven appointed cabinet ministers from the "legal" or "moderate" fundamentalist party, the *Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix* (MSP), led by Mahfoud Nahnah. The MSP was never a part of FIS, but shares its theocratic goals. The State Department, which supported these appointments, has been actively encouraging the development of a coalition government in Algeria, urging the governing National Democratic Union to cede greater participation to the fundamentalist parties.

When, as here, the United States government appears to favor fundamentalists, a closer look is not out of order.

ALGERIAN DEATH COUNT

Statistics regarding casualties in the Algerian conflict vary wildly; there is not even agreement on a time frame. Supporters of the fundamentalists and other critics of the government take the position that there was virtually no violence until the abrogation of the elections in January 1992. Their opponents point to incidents of terrorism and assassination from the mid-1980s, peaking in the demonstrations of 1988. In any event, most of the reported figures are limited to the period from 1992.

The Associated Press recently reported that "Some 75,000 people have been killed in the insurgency."¹ A recent article in *In These Times* referred to "at least 80,000 lives" lost in the civil war.² Roger Kaplan's piece in *Atlantic Monthly* last fall noted that "reliable estimates placed the number of people killed in Algeria since 1992 at 60,000 to 100,000."³ Another news service stated in early 1997 that the conflict "has killed about 60,000 people since December of 1991."⁴ And the Algerian journalist interviewed in this issue, Rahim Talbi, estimates the overall total at 160,000.

On the other hand, the U.S.

Department of State cautiously reported in 1997 that "Since 1992, at least 1,500 people have died in Algerian violence."⁵ "At least" appears to be an understatement. Unquestioned reports of discrete incidents of terrorism in rural villages, attacks on schools and busses, and assassinations themselves well exceed the State Department figures.

And the figures alone do not convey the incredible brutality of the attacks in the countryside, of the rampant rape, mutilation, and torture, of the throat-slashings and decapitations. As one report noted, the GIA "spare neither babies nor the elderly."⁶

Assassinations in Algiers, while not on the scale of the massacres in the countryside, have escalated since mid-1992, when FIS launched a retribution murder campaign, beginning with the shooting of President Boudiaf. In August, an attack in the airport caused nine deaths. By year's end and with increasing frequency in 1993, the assassinations focused on widening circles: public figures associated with the government, soldiers and policemen; intellectuals, writers, journalists, human rights activists, women's rights activists, women in

general, trade unionists, school teachers, school children, Catholic nuns, Catholic priests, foreigners. By early 1994, the armed bands were stopping busses and killing travellers indiscriminately.

In 1995, the terror moved increasingly out of the cities into the villages and the less-policed neighborhoods (usually poor outskirts) of the major cities. Algerian newspapers, citing security sources, began reporting between one hundred and five hundred violent deaths per week. This situation persisted through 1996, abated somewhat in 1997, until the summer, when a series of spectacular attacks on villages and suburbs near Algiers, from the summer through the month of Ramadan (December-January) resulted in thousands of deaths.

In 1998, there was another increase in massacres in the mountains east of Algiers.

1. "Dozens Reported Killed in Algeria," Associated Press, Jan. 6, 1999.

2. Elie Chalaïa, "The Killing Fields: Who's Behind the Massacres in Algeria," *In These Times*, Jan. 10, 1999.

3. Roger Kaplan, "The Label of Moral Equivalence," *Atlantic Monthly*, Aug. 1998, p. 18.

4. Steve Macko, "Algerian Terrorist Groups," *Emergency Net News Service*, Mar. 6, 1997.

5. *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Department of State Publication 10321.

6. *Op. cit.*, n. 4.

THE PADS INTERVIEW:

Q: Tell us about the FIS, how did it begin, what does it represent, how does it fit into the history of Algeria.

A: You should understand that the most important thing in such a historical question is the issue of economics.

First of all, the leaders of FIS represent the *compradors*⁴ in a bourgeois society. They are concerned only with commerce and trade, classic *comprador* concerns. Ever since independence in 1962, and even before, the reactionary bourgeoisie has used religion to block social progress within the country. They have hidden behind religion in Algeria, knowing that the Algerian people are Muslim people who believe in their religion.

Algeria was a French colony for 130 years. The national struggle was a hard one from the very beginning. The conquest was made in fire and blood; there was a suppression of indigenous culture, including religion. So the resistance struggle took many forms, including defense of the mosques and of Algerian identity. There were great struggles over land, because the land of the Algerian peasants was taken not only by the French, but also by other foreign settlers. Most of the country's grain, for example, was exported for the profit of outsiders. So there was a struggle to recapture the wealth of the country.

In all this, there was the beginning of a young working class in Algeria that organized and began to fight for social rights, around 1920. These progressive forces became a component of the resistance struggle in Algeria, at a time when the world saw not only the capitalist system, but another, socialist, system. The progressive forces contributed not only to the armed struggle, but also to the social struggle, through modern methods like strikes and elections. The fight for liberation is also a fight for social justice and progress.

But there were always reactionary forces among the Algerians, which never liked the idea of Algeria orienting itself in the direction of progressive forces. There was a class of Algerian feudal landholders who collaborated with the French. But after the independence war, when the colonialists left, this feudal class lost their land [in the nationalizations under the Ben Bella and Boumedienne governments].

Even during the war, there was a struggle within the Army of National Liberation of the FLN [National Liberation Front]. There were reactionary forces in favor of national liberation, but opposed to a progressive orientation for Algeria. But Algeria was torn from France by the struggle of the poor people, of the peasants, of the small bourgeoisie. Their role was critical, because the feudal reactionary class was very small; it was the struggle of these less favored classes that actually won Algeria's independence.

After independence, the battle was over the direction Algeria would take. And although there were surely zig-zags, a generally progressive path was taken, and the reactionary forces opposed this. Immediately after independence in 1962, they began to regroup around religion. In 1963, an organization was formed called Spiritual Values, which brought together the reactionaries under the banner of Islam. As early as 1964 they were proposing fundamentalist laws, such as one to ban girls from sports and gym classes in school.

Q: Was such a law passed?

A: No, it wasn't passed; it was too soon for that. They only proposed it, because they wanted to use religion to deceive the people to protect their own bourgeois, feudal interests. It took some time to prepare the feudal, reactionary forces. Feudal society was converting itself into an import-export society.

4. *Comprador*, a Portuguese word meaning "buyer," originally referred to indigenous agents at Portuguese trading posts on the China coast. By extension, the term has come to refer to a social class deemed to be subservient to foreign interests, not concerned with the development of the national economy. Generally contrasted with the national bourgeoisie.



1962 Mass Rally: Union of Algerian Workers (UGT). Banners read: Stop the Socialist Revolution.

Nevertheless, it should be stressed that the country made great progress in the whole period from independence in 1962 up until 1980. A large industrial infrastructure was constructed, thanks to the national bourgeoisie; the country was industrialized. Public health was introduced. Seven million children go to school now, with a national population of 22 million; under French colonialism, only 250,000 children had gone to school out of a population then of about nine million. There were social advances for workers; the standard of living improved; there was a more normal society.

But things did change during this balancing act period. The government of Boumedienne was preoccupied with building the economy, and, for example, they turned education over to the Muslims. In 1971, the university abolished the student union. The minister of



AP / Wide World Photos

ad: Stop the Bloodshed; Agrarian Reform - Profit to the Workers;

education was replaced by an Islamist, as well as the minister of information. He was an eloquent person, and the ideological field was given over to him. This was all part of Boumédiène's double game.

Up until the mid-1970s, Algeria had a Napoleonic Code, with certain civil liberties. There was a sort of legal vacuum in the early period, and by default the Code continued into the 1970s. When the Islamists came into the government, they attempted to restrict the rights of women, who then relied on the Code, which had not yet been abrogated. The women defended Boumédiène. He had done bad things, but he wasn't in the government alone; there were other people. He was a patriot, trying to improve the economy of the country. He had his prejudices. He was prejudiced against the communists, against the working class, but he wanted to advance

the country, and he did advance the country's economy and gave it stature in the world. Algeria mediated disputes in the Arab world.

When Boumédiène took power in 1965, overthrowing Ben Bella in a coup, we communists were put in jail, because we opposed coups d'état on principle. But that didn't prevent all progressive measures. We were realistic enough to understand what stage we were in, and that he was making some progress. But all that progress was put in question after Chadli [Benjedid] came to power in 1980. Things changed completely after the death of Boumédiène at the end of 1978. Before then the government was against the left, but it was also against the right. It did a balancing act. But after Chadli, it became totally reactionary.

The government began immediately to undo the earlier progress. It de-nationalized the big state industries, and chopped them into fragments, to open them up to private capital, especially France. Chadli's second prime minister, Abdelhamid Brahimi, who is now teaching Islamic economics in London, was given the job of privatizing. This was possible because it was a single-party regime, with no opposition. After Chadli came in, to have any leadership role in a union you had to be a member of the ruling party, the FLN. There were limits put on trade unions, but Islamic forces could develop and organize freely. Before there had been a balance, but now the limits were on the left but not on the right. The Islamists could flourish, and they did.

Q: Could they become members of trade unions?

A: Yes, they were in the FLN. But they also created a series of their own organizations, often by starting to build mosques. It was very interesting. An Islamic association would come to build a mosque, but never finish it, because a finished mosque would go under the authority of the minister of culture. So they would keep the mosque unfinished to keep control of it, and use it for their propaganda. Meanwhile, the government was challenging all the gains of the workers, and the workers were getting poorer.

The government also helped send young Algerians to Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia paid for the tickets; they'd go to Mecca and then to Afghanistan. The Islamic organization recognized that their crack troops would be trained in Afghanistan. And here you have the link between the CIA and Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, to destabilize all the progressive Muslim countries.

Opposition associations began to form. In 1984, the first armed groups were formed. One of their leaders was Mafoud Nahnah. He had been arrested by Boumédiène, but had been released by Chadli. And he helped that movement. And where is he now, Nahnah? He is the leader of an Islamic party which is participating in the government, through a coalition Islamic party, with seven ministers in the government now. And he's been to the States several times. He said recently that we should be grateful to all of the Algerians who went to fight in Afghanistan.

So the Islamic movement strengthened itself from 1984 to 1988. And the Chadli government let them develop, because they were a counter to the progressive forces. In 1986, when the oil prices fell, subsidies for both economic development and for food had to be reduced. There were internal social difficulties, beyond the outside pressures from the imperialist world that doesn't want progressive development in Algeria.

That is when there was a revolt by young, unemployed men. The Islamists didn't create these forces, but they used them. There were big strikes of factory employees around Algiers, a crackdown by the Chadli government against the communists, and arrests of communists on the eve of the student revolt.

There were two things happening, the strikes and the young people's revolt. By arresting the communists on the eve of this struggle, they were prevented from helping to stop the Islamists from taking over. And it was at that point that the various Islamic organizations organized the FIS.



Newspaper announces FIS plurality in 1991 before cancellation of second round of elections. Note special FIS parking sign.

THE RISE OF THE FIS

Q: So, in 1989, the FIS was organized?

A: Yes, after the uprisings, when the Islamists had a free hand, because much of the left was impotent. And it's then that they got together, despite the fact that they have a lot of differences among themselves about the interpretation of Muslim law.

Q: How many organizations are in the FIS?

A: I can't say exactly. There are several groups now. But right away, by 1989, they began to exercise terror on people. There were municipal elections in Algeria in 1990, and the FIS won many city councils. The banners carried by the FIS said, "When you go to the ballot box, remember that you have God watching you and you will be remembered on judgment day." This was their political banner. For religious young people, this can be a form of terror—Allah will get you if you don't vote for us.

This was psychological terror, but real terrorism began well before the national elections of late 1991 and early 1992 that were

annulled and canceled. Not afterwards, but before. Even before the municipal elections, they attacked a barracks in the southern part of the country and killed young soldiers. They burned a woman and her children in another region because she was accused of having loose morals. It was already terrible before the legislative elections. A student was stabbed at a university center.

And six months before the national elections, in June 1991, FIS called a strike, not a workers strike but a political strike, a fundamentalist strike, in Algiers, trying to take power six months before the elections. The workers did not support the strike, and it failed. This was all between the time the party was formed in 1989 and the cancellation of the 1991-1992 legislative election, which is alleged to be the event that forced the FIS into terror.

There was a sense of physical pressure leading up to the elections, and large numbers of FIS people came to the voting offices, watching voters. They won about 25 percent of the votes cast, but only 40 percent of the people voted. A million voters never got their voter cards, because in the various municipal-

ties where the Islamists had previously been elected, they didn't give out voter cards. A million voters never got their cards.

Q: How did the FIS change after the aborted elections?

A: The shortest and most accurate answer is that it didn't change. It has been a terrorist party since its foundation. They always had arms in the mosques, and they always said they would take power by any means possible.

The Islamists implanted themselves in the countryside. The FIS came in with guns and demanded something from the peasants to support their cause, and took it with force. Under such pressure, the peasants began to organize to defend themselves, to arm themselves, later with the help of the government. So you have the self-defense of the peasants against the Islamists who are more or less holding them up, demanding their support. That's the situation we have now, and how the massacres fit in. Today, there are leaders of FIS who say they are peaceful people and don't have anything to do with GIA, but there isn't one GIA who hasn't been in FIS.

Q: Explain about the GIA?

A: That is the Armed Islamic Groups. That's the official name of the terrorist organization, but they all came from the FIS.

Q: Did the FIS have outside support?

A: You would never have heard of the FIS if it was not for their outside support. Even before 1991, they had a lot of money; they were financed by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies. And from the west. For example, before the elections, there was a meeting in Khartoum between them and the French secret service, because all the western powers were expecting them to take power. And when the elections were stopped, and Chadli resigned, [French President François] Mitterand broke relations with the Algerian government. Their leaders were then welcomed in England, in Germany, in the United States. The U.S. has never hidden the fact that it had relations with them. The imperialist powers supported them and at the same time fought between themselves. The French wanted to keep the interests they had in Algeria, and the Americans wanted to replace them.

After the strange assassination of Boudiaf in 1992 [see following interview and sidebar], the government was no longer homogeneous, but mixed. Since 1994 or 1995, the centrists, the dominant wing, began to give up Algeria's interests and let the imperialists dictate their policy. This is the centrist wing around President Liamine Zeroual. There is also a wing ready to make an alliance with the Islamists, and a modernist wing with a democratic, western facade. The centrist wing is the strongest and plays both sides of the street.

But all of them represent the interests of the *comprador* bourgeoisie within the state administration, and are getting rich thanks to the state apparatus. They get their money from commissions on foreign deals. So the conflict of interests between the administration bourgeoisie and the *comprador* bourgeoisie is just for the share of the spoils.

The centrists are trying to make alliances with the Islamists while keeping the essential power to themselves, keeping a tight rein on anything progressive and not letting progressives organize. There was a law passed on political parties that made it financially impossible to organize. You have to have a congress with at least 400 delegates representing 25 districts of the country to have a political party. Only the rich can have their own political party.

There has also been a change in the American position. Earlier, the Americans openly supported the FIS; now they support the government, but without going against the FIS being in the government either. That's because the government has fulfilled all the requirements of the International Monetary Fund, guaranteeing rights for foreign capital. And also the terrible massacres committed by the Islamists and the indignation they generate prevents the U.S. from openly supporting the Islamists. So, today, the Americans have good relations with the government, because the government is doing what they wanted it to—having an alliance with the Islamists.

Of course they say they're against the terrorism, but they never say who's behind it, which is the Islamists. And there has been a lot of change in the country on that question too. The FIS people said they were for justice and against corruption and for the people, but over time people have seen what they've done, and they've become very isolated within the population. This is why the GIA commits certain massacres; some of them are in places where they once were supported by the people. They are a sort of vengeance against people who had supported them and then turned away from them. The FIS has never condemned terrorism. After the resignation of Zeroual,⁵ the FIS publicly called for peace in Algeria, but did not ask the Islamist terrorist groups to stop fighting or to turn in their arms. So it's just demagoguery; they say they want peace because they know the people want peace.

Q: Tell us about the role of the military in the violence.

A: The Algerian army is not implicated in the massacres. They have no interest in doing that. It is true that they have been repressive, and sometimes they go too far. Sometimes, if

one of their people, or one of the special policemen has been killed, there will be a repressive operation, and people who are suspected of being Islamists will pay.

The proof that the atrocious massacres are not by the army but by the Islamists is that every time there are survivors, the survivors can identify the killers. They recognize them because they're people from the region. It's not a secret, it's known. Also, every time there's a massacre, the newspaper of the GIA, which is in London, recognizes that they are behind it.

In any event, the western powers are increasing their support for the Algerian government because that government, under pressure from the Islamists, is coming around to all the western positions. So now the west favors an accommodation with the Islamists, to bring them into a coalition in a greater way. The government has already taken positions that very much favor western governments, and there are already seven Islamist ministers in the government.

WOMEN IN ALGERIA

Q: Tell us something about women in Algeria. We know there are groups opposed to the government, but women are also victims of the terrorism.

A: There are many women's organizations in Algeria. They are all opposed to the Family Code⁶ and to the Islamists. But they don't have the same positions on economic problems. Up to now, the organizations have not been able to form a federation. Each organization wants its own region. But they have been able to participate in actions. They demonstrated in 1991 against the second round of the elections.

Young girls have been raped by Islamists and made pregnant, and Algerian society doesn't accept that. So women's associations try to help them in these extremely difficult situations. There is a women's house that's trying to build up several centers to take this on.

Only seven percent of the female population works for a salary in Algeria. That doesn't count the peasants of course, who work very hard, but not as paid work. So these groups try to form little work training units. They also try to bring to court certain cases like rape. But even in the case of the woman who was burnt to death, the suit that was brought was dismissed; it never amounted to anything.

The main struggle is to annul, to rescind the Family Code. But also to fight the degrading social conditions. More than 40 percent of girls do not go to school after the age of 12. The IMF conditions have raised the cost of going to school, and the families can't pay for

school equipment, and of course the girls are yanked out of school first.

Also, family planning is virtually impossible; they can't afford it. It's usually women doctors who try to do help, but it's financially impossible. Health conditions are very bad. Public health has declined, because, for example, basic things like milk subsidies have been withdrawn, thanks to the good old IMF. So children aren't well fed; the subsidies had amounted to more than half the price of basic food commodities, like cereals, flour, milk, the basic things, oil, sugar, all of those basic things. This was very important for the poor population, but now their prices have more than doubled.

These small groups of women try to attack all of these monstrous problems in whatever ways they can. Thousands of women have been assassinated. Sometimes it gets attention, especially in the cities, but what isn't noticed is all the women in the villages who have been killed.

Many teachers have been killed. In 1994, the Islamists forbade children to go to school, any schools, all schools.

Q: Everyone?

A: Yes. There was intimidation, assassinations, bombs in the schools, forcing teachers to leave. But children and their teachers go to



AP / Wide World Photos

Under watchful eye of husband, Algerian woman votes, 1990.

5. In September 1998, President Zeroual announced that he would step down after the April 1999 elections.

6. Passed in 1984, under Chadli.

school anyway. The population resisted; despite all of this intimidation, there is a resistance by the population.

The women who are assassinated are not necessarily militants, or playing a social role. It can be because the Islamists don't like someone's behavior, or because another let her son join the army; there are all kinds of reasons that women get assassinated. The first one who was assassinated was a secretary in a commissariat. And then there was a high school girl who refused to put on a *chador*. This started around 1991, with the rise of the FIS. The FIS was complaining that women weren't fulfilling their customary role. But it has changed since then. Now in Algiers, there are a lot fewer women dressed the way the Islamists want. More women have overcome their fear. They wear bathing suits to the beach. The Islamists haven't got all the women covered up the way they wanted because there's been a resistance.

ORGANIZED OPPOSITION

Q: What about the organized opposition?

A: In Algeria, those who say they're in opposition to the government are what we call representatives of the modernist bour-

geoisie. They're against fundamentalism. But they agree with the government's social-economic orientations. One of the best known abroad is the RCD. They visit the States. This is the modernist bourgeoisie opposition. There's another one, led by a former prime minister, the National Republican Alliance, that's against the fundamentalists, but which agrees with the IMF. Another party is the Party of Mohammed, which is not fundamentalist like FIS, but wants an agreement with the Islamists.

Q: What about the labor movement?

A: The labor unions are manipulated by the government; the leaders of the main trade union are linked to the government. They do everything to block protest and struggle on the part of the workers. They've taken the Algerian trade unions back into the International Federation of Free Trade Unions. They've received the leaders of AFL-CIO. They made statements against the IMF but that was just for show. They've paralyzed the labor movement, which potentially could be the main form of opposition to both the government and the Islamists. There is a lot of potential here, but the government has it controlled.

There is an important difference between us,

the communists, and the bourgeois opposition to the Islamists. We try to tell them that it's impossible to uproot the Islamists, which they want to do, without attacking the social problems. That's a very important point. You have to see what the IMF has done to this country.

A vast number of businesses have been shut down. Hundreds of thousands of workers have been fired. Unemployment is officially at 30 percent. You can't possibly solve Algeria's problems if that situation gets worse. A person without any hope will listen to the fundamentalists, obviously: If they die, they go straight to God. Many are deceived by this. It's clear you can't possibly get rid of fundamentalism without attacking that, because if you just repress it, it will turn right back to fundamentalism.

Q: You mean deal with the economic issues?

A: Right. When the western powers say they're against terrorism, but pursue a policy that pillages a country's resources and ruins it, they're just fostering terrorism. They say they're bringing reform, but all the reforms make things worse. There's just a huge gap between the leaders and the rest of the population.



Stark contrast: Women in *chadors* and western dress two years before fundamentalist FIS commune warning women to adhere to dress code or face assassination.

ALGERIAN JOURNALIST DISCUSSES MASSACRES

Ray and Foerstel also interviewed **Rahim Talbi**, who had been a reporter specializing in security issues for the largest French-language newspaper in Algeria, *Le Matin*, with a circulation of 150,000. Its editorial positions are critical of the government and especially of the Islamic fundamentalists. It has been most affected by the violence.

Q: How many journalists from *Le Matin* have been assassinated?

A: Five, including the director of the publication, **Said Mekbel**. The security services discovered and disarmed two car bombs, but a third one exploded, on February 11, 1996, causing a lot of damage. The paper has to keep changing its offices. We journalists can't stay at our homes because most of us live in working class neighborhoods that are very dangerous and unprotected. So we have regrouped in hotels called security sites, where all the journalists live.

COVERING THE MASSACRES

Q: You specialized in security issues. What did that cover?

A: I covered massacres, bombings, assassinations; I visited places that had been targeted for massacres. In particular, I covered the follow-up operations carried out on the spot by the security forces and the army against the terrorists.

Q: Tell us about this. Is it true that the Algerian government security forces use these opportunities to assassinate their opponents?

A: Truly, I have gone to all the places where there were massacres. And I ask that question every time to the survivors. And the survivors, people who saw their mother or father or brother killed in front of their eyes, they all say they know the assassins. They are people who lived in the same village, the same neighborhoods, people who belonged to FIS when FIS was legal, who left to join the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA), and who come back later to assassinate.

There is no need for any international commission to find out who committed these massacres. The assassins are well known. These are people who, when there was no state presence or control in the area, organized the Islamic groups in these neighborhoods or villages. They were fed and supported by locals. And then when the state regained control they left, and other local people were armed by the state. Then the Islamists come back to take revenge.

What people don't realize is that Algeria doesn't have a regular army. It has a conscript army, where all the young men of the country go into military service for two years. It's unthinkable that you could send conscripts like these, during their two years of military service, to massacre the population like that.

Q: You know that in the U.S., the media support the notion that the government and the FIS are equally responsible for the terrorism.

A: You can make that argument only in the sense that from 1992 to 1997 there was simply no state presence in many areas. The state was absent, it just wasn't doing anything. In isolated areas, in the mountains and so on, there was no presence of government forces so people had to give in to the armed Islamic groups because there was nobody else to defend them. So they have some responsibility, but you can't equate the Islamic barbarism with the absence of the state.

For a long time, those people in those isolated areas refused to take up arms to defend themselves. At first they said those people in the armed groups are our friends and we haven't anything to be afraid of. It was only after massive massacres that some of the villages took up arms and began to organize patriot groups or self-defense groups. A lot of people say the violence in Algeria began after the electoral process was stopped in 1992, when the FIS had a large majority. But the Islamic violence existed long before the creation of the Islamic groups. In 1982, a democratic student was assassinated inside the university by an Islamist group which was called at the time the Muslim Brotherhood. That organization, it's well known, was created in Egypt. Two years later, in 1984, another Islamist group armed itself, a group led by the present leader of the Algerian Hamas group [not the Palestinian Hamas] **Mahfoud Nahnah**, who has visited the U.S. frequently. This party has some 50 members in the national assembly today, and seven cabinet ministers. They also control quite a number of municipal governments.

Back in 1984, they became guerrillas, in the mountains, took up arms, and caused a lot of damage then. They were condemned and captured and freed again. And in 1989, all these groups of the Muslim Brothers began to pass directly to armed rebellion. I remember very well in 1989 a widow with seven daughters who lived in the south, in the Sahara; she and

her children were all burned alive in their house, on the pretext that the woman was a prostitute. For Islamists that's a perfect reason-moral order.

In 1989, the fundamentalist leaders at the time got together to create an Islamist party. And the government was in complicity, because the Algerian constitution banned political parties on religious or regional grounds. But the government approved the formation of the FIS on religious grounds. The FIS was created in 1989, and the next year, 1990, it won 80 percent of the municipal governments in Algeria. And strengthened by that victory, they began to set up a very powerful armed organization.

Q: Why did the Algerian government allow it to be created?

A: Because the government itself is close to the Islamists. There was a compromise made between the government and the Islamists to face up to the progressive forces. This was the **Chadli** government. He was still president then. He came into power after the death of **Boumédiène** in 1978, and he was still in power then.

In 1991 in Algeria, there was a great shortage of construction materials. People wondered why, and a few years later it was discovered that the materials had been diverted to the construction of underground bunkers. This was done in the mountains next to villages, by the Islamist municipal governments. Also the Islamist leaders got students in Islamic studies, archaeology students, to collect all the maps of the territory, on the pretext of working on their theses. These were maps of the underground conduits for sewers and that sort of thing. Later it was realized that they were being used for military purposes.

THE GROWTH OF VIOLENCE

Q: Tell us something about the attacks.

A: In 1990, they attacked a court. Three young policemen were killed in the shootout. In November of the same year, a large Islamist group attacked **Dema** barracks, in the south of the country. And dozens of young conscripts were slaughtered and mutilated. That was the high point of violence in that period. The number two man in FIS is still in prison, serving a 12-year sentence for giving guidance and support to those fundamentalists, helping them get active. He gave them a lot of money, money that had been collected in the mosques by supposedly charitable organizations. One of them planned the

THE ASSASSINATION OF MOHAMED BOUDIAF

On Monday, June 29, 1992, at Annaba, in eastern Algeria, the President of the High Committee of State, a sort of joint presidency, Mohamed Boudiaf, 73, was assassinated. Boudiaf, considered the father of the Algerian Revolution, was giving a televised speech, and the killing was watched in disbelief by thousands of Algerians. Forty-two other people were wounded in the shootout.

Boudiaf led the revolution against the French. Yet in 1963, one year after independence, he was condemned to death by the presi-

dent, Ben Bella. Things were complicated then; Boudiaf spent a few years in prison and then managed to escape and take refuge in Morocco. Twenty-nine years later, in January 1992, he was brought home and proclaimed head of state. Chadli had resigned, and there was a sort of committee sharing power, a gap in the presidency. So they brought in this historical exile, this elder statesman, and made him head of state, just like that.

The first thing he did was to ban the FIS. And he was the first person who dared attack the political-economic mafia that runs the country. In other words, they brought in an honest man, and the people were happy with this.

With the tragic death of this historic figure, Algeria began to sink into chaos; a new cycle of violence began. The hope that had just begun to revive on Boudiaf's return, evaporated.

Who profits from the crime? Who ordered it? Islamic fundamentalists? The political-financial mafia of the FLN, for many years Algeria's only party? The Algerian people were anxious to know the truth.

Who was behind the murder of their "father"? The blame was put on a certain Boumarafi, the officer in charge of the President's security and bodyguards. According to his confession, he acted alone. A "lone gunman," of course, would avoid implicating any of the political clans that share and compete for power in Algeria.

An "independent" commission was set up by the government to investigate; after a few months they announced, "The President was really and truly assassinated by Boumarafi, and he acted alone! Out of conviction." He's still in prison, this Lee Harvey Oswald.

The report was considered an insult by the Algerian people. A way of assassinating their President a second time, a man who had preferred to live in exile rather than see his country ruined. Just recently, Boudiaf's widow made a public statement charging that he had been killed by a clan within the government.

Why was he considered so very troublesome? As soon as Boudiaf returned to Algiers, in January 1992, he threw himself heart and soul into the effort to put the country back on track. He attacked corruption and profiteering. He openly opposed the establishment of an Islamic state, which the fundamentalists sought to impose. He wanted a democratic republic, a modern and secular state.

Boudiaf aroused enormous attention and interest. His most fervent admirers were the young people who, in the era of the one party state, had suffered from unemployment and despair. "I reach out my hand to you. Together let us build a state that will meet your aspirations," he often said to young Algerians.

From January to June 1992, when Boudiaf ran the country, Algeria experienced a real break with the old system. The Islamists, who had been given advantages by the outgoing president, Chadli Benjedid, felt threatened. The demagogic and populist discourse they had used to gain two-thirds of the municipal governments during the June 1990 local elections didn't work anymore. People were not listening.

Boudiaf died without achieving his objectives, to give dignity back to his people, to bring the country out of its crisis, and to avoid the danger of Islamist fundamentalism.

Since his death, the country has been overtaken by blind violence. The death count rises steadily; children, women, men, thousands are atrociously massacred by armed Islamist groups. Journalists have been a special target. Some sixty of them have been assassinated, for condemning and denouncing the practices of the armed Islamist groups.

Despite the danger that stalks them daily, they continue to do their job, providing objective information. Some have chosen to go into exile, or have been forced to do so, but the majority continue to resist. They want to carry on the fight, even though the profession once considered "noble" can signify death in Algeria.



Mohamed Boudiaf, sworn in as President, January 1992.

AP Wide World Photos

Rahim Talbi

Algiers airport attack in August 1992, when eight people were killed and hundreds injured. He was tried and executed. Before being executed he called on former Afghan fighters, Algerian Islamists who had been trained in Afghanistan, to rise up. That was the beginning of a powerful Islamist armed group. A few months after the birth of these armed groups, they attacked a police brigade; six young policemen were killed in a working class neighborhood. At first, police were targeted for their weapons. After having gathered a lot of weapons, the groups began targeting intellectuals, notably journalists. Seventy journalists have been killed since the beginning of this violence. They attacked the intellectuals because, for them, the intellectuals constituted a danger, a force against setting up an Islamic state.

In late 1995, early 1996, those groups were dismantled in the cities and towns, and had to go into the mountains. In the presidential elections of November 16, 1995, the elections rejected by the GIA, they threatened to kill every citizen who went to vote. But the population defeated them, because they did go to vote. They elected a president who wasn't Islamist, Zeroual.

In revenge for that, the GIA began massacres on a large scale. In the center of the country, the region that's most affected by their presence, there has been a reaction by the citizens; they've taken arms to defend themselves in the framework of patriot groups or self-defense groups. At present the GIA have moved towards the west of the country, a more favorable region, because of the mountains; it's hard for the security forces to work in that region. And recently those groups in the west have attacked villages in Algeria and then taken refuge across the border in Morocco, where they can't be pursued.

Q: Why is that?

A: The border between the two countries has been closed. The Algerian authorities decided to close the border in 1994 because all the weapons collected by the Armed Islamic Groups in Europe were transported to Algeria by way of Morocco. The Moroccan authorities are accomplices, because they don't mind at all that there is a civil war in Algeria—because of the Western Sahara, obviously. Algeria had supported the Saharawi. But closing the border also makes it more difficult for Algeria to support the Polisario Liberation Army.

Q: Where in Europe do the GIA get arms?



Thousands of women rally in Algiers against fundamentalists' assassination of two government cabinet ministers, 1993.

A: Switzerland, Belgium, France, Germany. Germany has the most Islamist refugees. And also, don't forget Great Britain, which is very important. We're not talking about those governments; the GIA is doing this privately. All you need to get weapons is money. There are very powerful networks in those countries which collect weapons and smuggle them in from Spain to Morocco to Algeria. But during the last two years, most of those support groups have been dismantled by western security services. The western governments have realized that this is a threat to them too.

Q: When you said that in 1990 there was a compromise between the Chadli government and the Islamists against the left, who would that left be?

A: The progressive forces. At that time it was the Algerian Communist Party, which has become the Democratic and Social Party [PADS], the former Communist Party. And all the democrats, especially in Kabylie, where there are many workers and which has always been considered the most democratic part of the country. Also among the progressive forces there are, in addition to the former Communist Party and the people in Kabylie, the women, and



Self-defense patriot guards mountain town after fundamentalists slashed throats of seven fellow villagers, December 1998.

AP / Wide World Photos

many French-speaking professionals with French educations.

Q: Can you tell us some more about the fundamentalists who were sent to Afghanistan to train. Do you know how many went, the numbers?

A: In 1988, 1989, Islamic organizations which were supposedly organizing trips to Mecca, sent young Algerians to Afghanistan. Well before that, there were volunteers who went there to fight the communist enemy, which is the enemy of God, right? Recently, I heard that 3,700 young Algerians had been counted in Pakistan in 1988 and 1989. The Algerian Embassy in Pakistan got this figure of Al-

gerians who went through Pakistan to Afghanistan in those two years. These were in an organized network, but there were about two thousand more volunteers who went on their own in that period. In 1991, with the Gulf War, a lot of Islamist Algerians went to Iraq to fight the Americans, but they ended up in Afghanistan. They didn't come back to Algeria. Then there are others who went to Afghanistan by way of Europe. So there have been all together more than 5,000 Algerians who have fought in Afghanistan. And these are the most dangerous and the toughest.

Q: And how many of those have returned?

A: There aren't any exact figures. Perhaps half. Estimates are that about half have come back directly into the mountain guerrilla forces. They're the most ferocious. The Algerian government has officially rejected any suggestion of an international investigation in the field, on the ground there. But on-the-spot international investigations have been carried out.

Q: What do you mean?

A: The American ambassador in Algiers has gone to the sites of massacres. He had direct contact with the populations affected by terrorism. He asked the same questions that an international commission would ask. For example, who was

killed; who did the killing; what did the army do while this was going on; why didn't the army intervene on time; do you know the killers? All those questions have been directly asked by the embassy in the villages. The translators were not Algerians but people who work for the embassy, Americans, in order to avoid any manipulation of the survivors. The British ambassador did the same thing. Western intellectuals have gone there. They've all been to the sites of the massacres and asked the same questions.

That's an investigation, even if it isn't a commission of inquiry. It's a question of principle for the Algerian government, of national sovereignty. And considering a formal investigation to be an interference in the internal affairs of Algeria. In the beginning, it was people linked to the killers themselves who were calling for the investigation.

Q: The killers wanted an investigation?

A: It was Islamists who were linked to them, their foreign connections. It is clear that the demand for an outside investigation came from them. For instance, the first to call for it was an international Islamic fundamentalist organization with its headquarters in Britain. It includes all of the fundamentalist movements and is supported by Islamist countries, notably Iran and the Sudan. Their demand for this inquiry was their way of covering up the GIA. It was a way to make them look innocent. That's why not only the Algerian government, but a lot of opposition parties too, rejected the international investigation.

At the beginning, the international community posed the same question: who is killing whom?

The international community didn't know; was it the army or the Islamists? So then the embassies made their own investigations and changed their position when they got the results that I mentioned. When they found out it was the Islamists, they decided it was a political movement with which they would have to negotiate.

Q: Even after they saw that they were the ones who were doing the massacres?

A: Yes. The fundamentalists present themselves as a political movement, as revolutionaries, who have to be dealt with. Their goal is still the same, to improve their image, to make themselves seem innocent.

RESISTANCE

Q: You said the people, the villagers, began to defend themselves, but are there any leaders or parties now rising up in

response to the Islamic forces?

A: Women's organizations, civil societies have arisen. The unions, the intellectuals, journalists, but not a political party.

Q: They're arming themselves?

A: No, the arming is in these isolated villages, these isolated areas. It's not that dangerous everywhere, but even in some sections of Algiers where there have been massacres people get together and organize. They may not be armed, but they will have people on watch at night, who can give the alarm, that sort of thing, local defense organizations to watch out for things. When we are living in Algiers, we sacrifice our family lives, we don't go home at all.

Q: Do you get any government protection?

A: Not at all. None of the journalists who cover security questions has ever had any kind of protection. For example, when I go to a village to cover a massacre, to look into a story, I run the risk of running across a phoney roadblock. Terrorists dress up as police and stop you, and if you're a journalist, you're in big trouble.

That's the first risk. And even in the villages where there have been massacres, journalists often aren't allowed in. The government also tries to play down as much as possible the number of people killed, not to give an image of civil war in Algeria. So when I go to a village to cover a massacre, I don't say I'm a journalist who's come to cover the story. I say I have relatives here, I've come to see my relatives. That's the only way we can get to the sites of massacres.

Q: Is there a figure of how many people have been killed since 1988, 1989, all together?

A: The figures are approximate, because the army never admits its own losses. They want to keep up morale in the troops. It's probably near 160,000, since 1982.

In recent years there is a clan or faction within the army and the government that has undertaken negotiations with armed Islamist groups. And those groups have supposedly signed a truce. So today those murderers of yesterday are actually protected.

We were against any negotiations with the Islamists. For us, you had to wipe them out, they had to be wiped out. And now that they're back in civilian life, beginning to come back into civilian life, that constitutes an enormous danger for us; that is what moves us to leave the country. It's by no means easy to leave one's country and one's job and one's family. My wife and I

have been here in Paris for three months, and we have no job, no place to live, we're not sure where we're going to sleep tonight. And there are a lot of people in this situation.

Q: Did you have trouble with the French, getting visas?

A: At first it was practically impossible for an Algerian to get a visa. In recent months, the French Embassy has begun to give visas to journalists and intellectuals. We had the choice between sacrificing our families or getting killed on the spot, so we took the chance and came here.

Q: Are there any journalists' organizations that could help?

A: How can they protect us?

They can protest. There are protests all the time. But they don't have an army. There are some powerful organizations, but they don't help us in our fight against the Islamist terrorists. Reporters Without Borders, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, for those organizations to help you, you must share their political ideas. You must support the Islamists to get their help. On principle, I refuse to contact those organizations. Journalists who are close to Islamists are helped by those organizations to get papers, jobs, and housing. I think this has to do with the fact that Islamist organizations have a whole lot of money. They have a whole lot of financial power.

There are all sorts of supporters of the Islamist groups. There's plenty of money coming from places like Saudi Arabia, not to mention Brunei. Brunei is sitting out there with nothing but oil wells.

Q: Tell us about the forces that have power in the country.

A: There are really two main factions or clans in power. The conservatives, who are close to the Islamists, and the progressive, democratic forces. Power varies between the two.

They're not friendly. When the conservative clan is doing well, there are calls for dialogue with the Islamists. In 1994, President Zeroual undertook a series of negotiations with the Islamists. When the others are strong, they reject every dialogue with the Islamists. Recently, it's the more progressive clan that's in charge. But this has only been in recent weeks, Zeroual was forced to announce his resignation, and there will be elections soon.

In effect, you have a situation where power is being shared, but there is no method of mediation between these forces. They fight with each other in mysterious ways. It is hard to know what is going to happen. ■

THE PINOCHET PRINCIPLE:

WHO'S NEXT?

BY MICHAEL RATNER

Many people around the world celebrated the arrest in England of Augusto Pinochet. For the families and friends of his Chilean victims it was a miracle; to those who supported the Allende government, it was an unexpected vindication. For it is a rare instance indeed, when a brutal rightwing dictator receives a measure of justice, particularly one who had risen to power on the back of the United States government, and who had been closely allied with the United Kingdom against Argentina in the war over the Malvinas. No matter what the final result is in England, and at the time of this writing the outcome is uncertain, Pinochet has been publicly branded as a barbarous murderer.

Despite the joy many felt at his arrest, there have been a number of critics, from both the left and the right, of what has been called the Pinochet principle. Under that principle, which is not, in fact, novel,¹ national courts can exercise universal jurisdiction and try individuals for genocide,² crimes against humanity,³ and war crimes, even if the acts took place outside the prosecuting country. The exercise of such jurisdiction has been recognized under international law, but its invocation has been extremely rare, and many countries' legal systems do not even provide mechanisms for such prosecutions.

Today, the perpetrators of such crimes are considered, much like pirates of old, as *hostis humanis generis*, enemies of all mankind, and can be brought to justice wherever found—even outside the country in which the atrocities were committed. It was on this basis that Pinochet was prosecuted in Spain. He was indicted there for

genocide and crimes against humanity, including torture and terrorism; Spain then requested his arrest and extradition from England.

THE LACK OF U.S. CONTROL

What is striking about the Pinochet prosecution is that it was brought in a Spanish court under Spanish law (incorporating all the relevant international principles), and not authorized in advance by the United Nations Security Council, as were the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. Those tribunals were conceptualized, lobbied for, approved, and in large part paid for by the United States. In such cases, the U.S. and the other permanent members control the establishment of any tribunal through their veto power. In the Pinochet case, the U.S. had no legal authority to prevent his indictment by Spain or his arrest, and extradition to Spain, by Britain.⁴

This lack of legal authority to prevent the prosecution explains, in part, the reluctance of the United States to support Spain's extradition request or to react favorably to Pinochet's prosecution. In addition, of course, the U.S. does not want to see a dictator it had wholeheartedly supported publicly prosecuted, and, perhaps, see exposed the U.S. role in the coup and in Operation Condor, the Southern Cone secret police apparatus, coordinated by Chile, that murdered leftists throughout the area.

The United States worries that its officials may be next. At a minimum, some of its satraps around the world could face justice. Indeed, one reason to consider the precedent helpful to the progressive side is the strident voices of outrage coming from conservatives and protectors of American supremacy. They are worried, very worried. Columnist after columnist asks whether Kissinger is next. Jeremy Rabkin, the conservative Cornell professor, asks whether Colin Powell, William Cohen, Ariel Sharon, or Shimon Peres will

follow.⁵ The *Daily Forward*, a Jewish newspaper, wonders about Netanyahu.

While some of what is said is exaggerated for use as an *ad terrorem* tactic, nonetheless Pinochet's arrest has caused alarm. Consider the message it sends: If Pinochet, installed with U.S. approval, ally of Britain and friend of Margaret Thatcher, is not safe, who is? Rabkin phrases his objections in outdated legalisms; he claims that a central tenet of international law is that states must respect each other's sovereignty absolutely and cannot interfere in the acts of a state in its own territory.⁶ But this is no longer entirely true; dictators cannot commit mass killings of their own citizens free from international scrutiny. This is a lesson of Nuremberg, embodied in numerous subsequent treaties and conventions. These conservative critics understand that prosecutions against the Pinochets of the world might occur without the prior approval of the United States. They are most concerned that American officials, not just their foreign accomplices, might face prosecution in some other country.⁷

This is the primary reason the U.S. has refused even to consider ratification of the treaty establishing an International Criminal Court. Washington wanted a provision that only permitted prosecutions with approval of the Security Council (subject, of course, to its veto) and was opposed to universal jurisdiction; it wanted nothing to do with an independent prosecutor. U.S. officials feared such a court would indict

Michael Ratner is an attorney who works with the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York City and is the author, most recently, of *International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts* (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1997).

1. Consider the Israeli trial of Adolf Eichmann.
2. Genocide is generally taken to refer to the killing of people because they belong to a certain national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. In Pinochet's case, the Spanish judge has added political viewpoint to the list, an extension that has been criticized. The genocide accusation is particularly relevant in Pinochet's case because the 1948 international convention against genocide, to which Great Britain, Spain, and Chile are all parties, excludes any head-of-state exemption.
3. Crimes against humanity include, among others, systematic murder, torture, rape, and disappearances.

5. Jeremy Rabkin, "First They Came for Pinochet," *The Weekly Standard*, Nov. 23, 1998.

6. Of course, for Pinochet this statement is irrelevant. He was responsible for crimes throughout the world including the murders of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt on the streets of Washington, D.C.

7. In an effort to get the U.S. government to support the Pinochet principle and the International Criminal Court, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has tried to allay U.S. concerns that its officials could be next. Kenneth Roth, HRW's executive director, whitewashes U.S. complicity: "Because it is not U.S. policy to commit genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, that fear is overblown." Kenneth Roth, "No Defense of Pinochet," *The Weekly Standard*, Dec. 14, 1998. He also wrote, in an Op-Ed piece: "Clearly it is not U.S. policy to commit these horrendous crimes... But will the concept [crimes of universal jurisdiction] be used to harass democratic leaders who have at worst a few human rights peccadilloes to their record? No. Universal jurisdiction does not extend that far, and there is no prospect that it will." "Justice for Tyrants," *Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 1998, p. A31.

4. Nor is the Pinochet case similar to the Nuremberg trials. Those were initiated by the victors in World War II against the leaders of the vanquished. Moreover, the prosecuting powers at Nuremberg represented the then legal government of the territory that had been the Third Reich, prosecuting, in effect, their own citizens.

American soldiers and politicians. Senator Jesse Helms said that a court with jurisdiction over American citizens would be "dead on arrival."

As a practical matter, such concerns may be overstated, to say the least. With respect to extradition proceedings, there are political gatekeepers at every stage. The Spanish judge could not ask the British government for Pinochet; the Spanish government had to approve the judge's request. And the British court could not even rule on Pinochet's extradition unless and until the Home Secretary approved. While there may be a few countries on earth that would, for example, indict Henry Kissinger (not that these are countries he would visit without a grant of diplomatic immunity), is there any country that would arrest a visiting Kissinger and extradite him? What chance is there that Henry Kissinger will ever face a trial for crimes against humanity? Imagine the consequences for a country that arrested him for his responsibility for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor, the coup in Chile, or the Christmas bombing of Vietnam. The U.S. is just too powerful for such an arrest to occur; it is the only superpower.

Both Noam Chomsky and Fidel Castro have made the point that powerful nations will never allow their officials to be subjected to arrest and trial. In other words, a fair system should get the puppeteers and not just the puppets. As Fidel Castro said:

Well, then, let him [Pinochet] be arrested in London; but let all of the guilty parties be arrested as well. ...there are a lot of people who participated in all of that, and I think that from the moral point of view, they would all have to be taken to trial in Madrid, in London, or anywhere else.... We'll have to see what Pinochet's Godfathers say....⁸

They are right. The international justice system is unfair—outrageously so. U.S. officials who aided or abetted the contras in Nicaragua, who toppled the elected Arbenz government in Guatemala, who supported Mobutu in Zaire, who helped Suharto murder well over a million, who bomb Iraq, Libya, and Sudan, and who continue to commit crimes against humanity throughout the world, will not stand trial.

CONCERNS ON THE LEFT

Is the Pinochet principle then irrelevant to U.S. control of international justice, or is it possibly an opening for victims, rights ad-



vocates, and progressive people to undercut, in a small way, U.S. control and the consequent bias in international human rights prosecutions? Is a mechanism that might ensnare some puppets wrong simply because it does not also get the puppeteers? Or is it more dangerous to those who seek to undercut U.S. dominance?

Some fear that the principle will be employed by large, powerful countries, particularly the United States, to reach across national borders to extradite and prosecute those leaders it has demonized. They are afraid that the precedent will be a weapon in the hands of the U.S. to further its imperialist and hegemonic aims. Fidel Castro might be next, or Laurent Kabila, or Muammar Qaddafi.

It is conceivable that some leaders demonized by the U.S. may face additional risk, but as the U.S. is so opposed to the principle, this is unlikely. The U.S. already gets its way, international law notwithstanding. It kidnaps those it doesn't like, such as Noriega; it bombs the homes of those who threaten its domination, like Qaddafi; it assassinate or foments coups; and it embar-

goes whole countries. The U.S. hardly needs the Pinochet precedent, does not support it,⁹ and will not rely upon it.

Without making light of the many attempts over the years to assassinate him, Fidel Castro is at no greater risk after the Pinochet arrest than he was before it. He is not at risk because he has not committed

9. "Chile's opposition to the extradition to Spain deserves significant respect," the U.S. Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, said last night. *Irish Times*, Dec. 1, 1998, p. 12. "We believe that in Chile the citizens of a democratic state are wrestling with a very difficult problem of how to balance the need for justice with the requirements of reconciliation." Madeleine Albright, State Department briefing, Nov. 30, 1998 (Federal News Service). "This is a legal matter between Spain, the U.K., and Chile." Undersecretary of State James P. Rubin, quoted in the *Baltimore Sun*, Oct. 31, 1998, p. 1A. At an Oct. 26, 1998, State Department press briefing, the spokesman was asked: "An American citizen [Ronni Moffitt, killed along with Orlando Letelier] was killed in Washington in a terrorist attack. Responsibility was linked to Mr. Pinochet. Why is the United States not considering his extradition?" The reply: "That would be a subject to address to the Justice Department." (Federal News Service.) Yet, when the Italian government refused to extradite Kurdish guerrilla leader, Abdallah Ocalan to Turkey, Rubin stated, "We believe he should be extradited and brought to justice, and we hope a way will be found to extradite him." Jim Lobe, "Ocalan and Pinochet: A Tale of Two Terrorists," *InterPress Service*, Nov. 22, 1998.

8. Fidel Castro, interview in Merida, Spain, *Granma* (electronic edition), Oct. 20, 1998.

crimes against humanity. An attempt by the Cuban American National Foundation, shortly after the Pinochet arrest, to bring such charges against him in Spain was dismissed by the Spanish court without even opening an investigation. He is not at risk from the Pinochet principle because he is a respected world leader and because his main enemy, the United States, does not support that principle anyway. Fidel clearly does not think himself at risk: "I go where I am granted a visa, and, in addition, I have ethics, dignity, and I'd like to know what would happen if they take it into their heads to do that."¹⁰

Furthermore, there are other aspects of international law, universally recognized, that limit some of these concerns. Fidel Castro, like any other traveling leader of a nation, would have head-of-state immunity and could not be arrested or prosecuted. Accredited diplomats have diplomatic immunity, and many foreign officials would not travel to another country without prior accreditation. Pinochet was not in England as an accredited diplomat.

WHAT REALLY HAPPENS

While it is unlikely we will soon see present or former U.S. officials in the dock, the question is, does the Pinochet principle make the international justice system more unfair than it already is? Or does it provide at least a possibility that additional Pinochets—the dictators and mercenaries the U.S. employs—might face justice? Except for prosecutions under the Pinochet principle, the current system of international justice is controlled by the United States. Ad hoc tribunals such as those set up for former Yugoslavia or Rwanda are authorized by the U.N. Security Council with U.S. approval. The United States brags about its role: The Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is considered to be one of Madeleine Albright's great achievements; U.S. financial and logistical support has been second to none; it has aided in the arrest of alleged suspects and provided lawyers, investigators and analysts.¹¹ It is likewise with the Rwanda Tribunal: U.S. contributions, as David J. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, states, "have underpinned the Rwanda Tribunal's operations."¹²

A number of commentators have criticized the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as focused more on the crimes of Serbs,

and less on identical crimes of the Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Former *New York Times* reporter David Binder wrote that the tribunal "indicted more and more Serbs on allegations of mass murder, but seemed uninterested in identical crimes by Croats or Bosnian Muslims in the three sided civil war."¹³ This is, of course, in line with U.S. interests: it is opposed to the Serbs and their government. A prominent Yugoslav professor, Dusan Cotic, points out that in the creation of the court, "the discussions focused almost entirely on crimes allegedly committed by Serbs...and their leadership" and "that there has been manipulation of even the most influential world media, as well as biased reporting."¹⁴ As Binder noted, "The press also continues to be selective, rushing almost like ghouls to sites where Muslims were killed, but studiously ignoring those of murdered Serbs."¹⁵

Raymond K. Kent, a professor at the University of California, sees the Tribunal as a "political instrument directed against a single party to the conflicts: the Serbs." As he says, "Like the media, the Tribunal ignored the Croatian attacks on Serbs in Western Slavonia which initiated the rounds of ethnic cleansing producing

criminals and victims among all population groups."¹⁶ The clear point is that U.S. domination of the Tribunal reflects U.S. interests, not any desire for an evenhanded, unbiased justice system. It is possible that a system of national prosecutions freed from overt U.S. domination and control, might, in some way, give a modicum of evenhandedness to international justice.

That the United States is opposed to the Pinochet principle does not mean use of the precedent will necessarily lead to a fairer world system of justice. But it is possible. The prosecution of Pinochet took work and luck. Since the coup in 1973, for more than 25 years, Chileans have organized for justice. Grassroots groups and lawyers worked full time on efforts to gather the evidence and find the appropriate forum to initiate the case. They were lucky with the judges, lucky Pinochet came to England, and lucky that certain countries in Europe are currently governed by social democratic parties. This is an indication of how hard it may be to make this precedent work for us. But there are many other Pinochets at home and in exile around the world. Perhaps some of them can be brought to justice.¹⁷ ■

13. David Binder, "War Crimes: All's Not Fair," *Legal Times* (Washington, D.C.), Apr. 22, 1996.

14. Dusan Cotic, introduction to Roger S. Clark and Madeleine Sann, eds., *The Prosecution of International Crimes* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), pp. 10-11.

15. *Op. cit.*, n. 13.

16. Raymond K. Kent, "Contextualizing Hate: The Hague Tribunal, the Clinton Administration and the Serbs," *Dialogue* (Paris), v. 5, no. 20, Dec. 1996.

17. The Center for Constitutional Rights is interested in considering the pursuit of similar cases. If you have information, or want to assist, please e-mail the author at mrstner@igc.org.

ANNOUNCING OUR NEW BOOK . . .

"A spectacular resource for activists!" KIT GAGE

Coordinator, National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom
Washington, D.C. Representative, NCARL

ORDER NOW!

Suggested Contribution: \$10 + 1.50 postage

SUPPORT OUR EDUCATIONAL WORK
FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT!!

Make Checks Payable to the
FIRST AMENDMENT FOUNDATION

Approved: Internal Revenue Service
Tax Exemption Sec. 501 (c) (3) I.D. 95-3922815

Chauncey A. Alexander, President
Frank Wilkinson, Executive Director
1313 W. 8th Street, Suite 313
Los Angeles, CA 90017
213-484-6661 / Fax: 213-484-6266
E-Mail: NCARL@aol.com or
[see www.firstamend.com](http://www.firstamend.com)

Terrorism and the Constitution

How the Government Abuses
Your Constitutional Rights in
the Name of National Security

James X. Dempsey
and
David Cole

First Amendment Foundation

10. *Op. cit.*, n. 8.

11. David Scheffer, Remarks on Human Rights and International Justice, Oct. 23, 1998 (Federal News Service).

12. *Ibid.*

PROTECTING NEW FRIENDS: *The PA Clamps Down (Again) on the Press*

BY KHALID AMAYREH

After signing the hapless Wye Memorandum on October 23, the Palestinian Authority (PA) stepped up its suppression of the media on the pretext (in Wyespeak) of "combating incitement." PA police chief Ghazi Jabali stated, "Israel was our enemy before the signing at Wye. Now this has changed. Israel has become our peace-partner. We shall not allow anyone to instigate or incite against our partner."

On October 23, accordingly, Sheikh Hamed al-Bettawi, an Islamist leader and high-ranking judge in the Shari'a courts of Nablus, was whisked from his home to solitary confinement in a prison outside the town. His "crime" had taken place on a satellite TV station called al-Jazira, which is based in Qatar. He had criticized the Wye agreement as "a sell-out, placing Palestinian society under CIA supervision in the service of Israeli security's whims and demands." At the same time, the PA sought to keep journalists and cameramen from meeting with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas founder and spiritual leader.

The PA Criminal Investigation Squad arrested and harassed eleven reporters and cameramen for "interviewing an objectionable person without first receiving official permission." When all efforts failed—one week after al-Bettawi's imprisonment—the PA put Sheikh Yassin under tight house-arrest. It cut his telephone line and barred him from receiving visitors, nor was he allowed to attend the Friday prayer at his neighborhood mosque. The arrest, said Ghazi Jabali, was aimed at "protecting the Palestinian people and Yassin himself from his own evils." Yasser Arafat, however, as well as his secretary, Tayeb Abdul Rahim, said on several occasions that Sheikh Yassin's arrest was for his own protection, hinting that Israeli agents were seeking to kill him.

Their mendacity became apparent on December 23: Arafat canceled the arrest as a "gesture of good will" on the advent of

Ramadan. The real reason was not Ramadan. It was the chief's [Arafat's] displeasure with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who by that time had unilaterally suspended the Wye agreement.

ATTACK ON THE PRESS

Throughout all this, the PA's Ministry of Information remained publicly silent. Its private whispers on behalf of the journalists fell on deaf ears in the security agencies and met further rebuff in the General Information Department (GID), a new security-oriented body which has been set up



Netanyahu, Clinton, and Arafat at Gaza, December 1998.

to deal with journalists. The GID issued a decree on November 5, requiring that all foreign journalists obtain a special permit before entering the self-rule areas. Strangely, the Ministry of Information denied that such a decision had been made.

The PA's harassment of the press was flagrant from the start of Clinton's visit through the Anglo-American bombing of Iraq (December 16-19). When demonstrations broke out, the PA did not want the world to witness the torching of American flags. Several officials unashamedly claimed that "the United States has become the Palestinians' premier friend" and that "Whoever sets the American flag on fire undermines Palestinian national interests." Ghazi Jabali stated, "Only traitors would demonstrate against the United States."

BRUTAL ASSAULT

On December 18, PA police, on orders from Jabali, brutally attacked a group of journalists covering an anti-American demonstration in downtown Gaza. According to Najib Abu al-Jabin, who works for Associated Press, the police "attacked, beat and dragged us to a local lockup, where drug addicts and other criminals are kept." Zakariya Talamas, who heads the Gaza chapter of the Palestinian Journalists Union, was also beaten up and briefly detained. He said: "I'm very sad to say that the law of the jungle prevails here." (The Gaza-based weekly, *al-Risala* December 24.)

In addition to abusing and mistreating journalists, PA police also shut down several press offices, accusing the proprietors of "covering an illegal demonstration" and "endangering relations with a friendly country." Abdul Salam Abu Askar, one of those whose office was closed, testified as follows: "Several secret-police agents besieged my office after nightfall and asked me if I had disseminated films of the protests. Before I could answer, they dragged me to the police station, where I found eight other photojournalists whose cameras, films, and pictures had all been confiscated."

Abu Askar went on to say: "There I met Colonel Talal Abu Zeid, head of the Investigations Department, who demanded that I refrain from disseminating any press materials undermining the PA's image." In addition, the PA shut down six private television and radio stations for "over-covering" the anti-American protests. Included were "TV Bethlehem" and "TV al-Watan" (in Ramallah), whose audiences exceed those of the official PA station. As for those stations which it allowed to remain open, the PA told them to confine their coverage to "local news," i.e., to events within the confines of the town where each station is based. After the Americans ended their attack on Iraq, the stations were allowed to reopen.

In the age of internet, there is no hiding dirty laundry. At most, the PA can try to intimidate its journalists and foster an atmosphere of terror. But it is swimming against the current. The word will find a way. ■

Khalid Amayreh is a Palestinian free-lance journalist in Hebron. This article is reprinted, with permission, from *Challenge* (Number 53, Jan-Feb. 1999). *Challenge* is a bimonthly journal which offers investigative reporting and in-depth analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Oslo process, with articles about specific events as well as analyses of political, economic, cultural, and social trends. To subscribe, send a check for \$30, \$20, DM55, or NIS75 to Box 41199, Jaffa 61411, Israel. For a sample copy, send your name and address by e-mail to oda@netvision.net.il.

TO USE A WAR

BY DIANA JOHNSTONE

Richard Holbrooke, *TO END A WAR* (New York: Random House, 1998); 408 pages, \$27.95.

Throughout three years of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States showed less interest in ending the war than in denouncing any possible European-brokered compromise settlement¹ as "appeasing aggression" or betraying "multicultural" Sarajevo. Then in mid-1995, the Clinton administration was faced with having to keep a promise to help its NATO allies withdraw their troops from the United Nations Protection Force stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This would have meant engaging U.S. forces there, a move strongly opposed in both Congress and the Pentagon. In danger of being caught between a hostile Congress and disgruntled European allies, with the risk of discrediting the U.S. commitment to NATO, the Clinton administration dispatched Richard Holbrooke to make the very sort of compromise deal that the U.S. had previously scorned.

Ostensibly, Holbrooke's assignment in 1995 was "to end a war." It was also, and especially, to use a war to further U.S. policy aims in Europe. Before ending it (for how long?), the United States used the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina to reassert its supremacy in Europe and further the conversion of NATO into a global instrument of power projection.

Three years later, the United States has been using the Kosovo conflict in Serbia to confirm and expand the NATO role.² Far

from achieving lasting peace and reconciliation, this instrumentalization of conflicts has actually made them more intractable than ever. Especially in Kosovo, outside interference is a main cause of the killing that took place in recent months. More war is virtually certain.



Holbrooke with Serbian police officer at checkpoint.

in an enterprise that may become more controversial as events direct public attention to what was wrong with the peace agreement that Holbrooke imposed on the rival Yugoslav leaders in Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995. Sharing responsibility for what he knows was a perilously flawed diplomatic result, and incidentally countering frequent charges of being an uncooperative egotist, Holbrooke stresses the excellent teamwork he achieved as head of the U.S. mission. Otherwise, he makes a special point of his vigorous role in getting NATO to bomb and re-bomb the Bosnian Serbs prior to negotiations.

Zeal for bombing would be a novel boast in a peacemaker. Holbrooke, however, does not belong to the category of peacemakers, but of war-enders, the big birds of prey who come in to sort out and pick the bones on the battlefield.

"Let's Win This One FOR THE GIPPER"

Although he scarcely puts it this way, Holbrooke's double mission was to strengthen U.S. leadership of NATO and at the same time appease the Bosnia³ lobby in the U.S., which included not only Senators such as Bob Dole and Joe Biden, but also important members of the Clinton administration such as Al Gore and Madeleine Albright. This required a great show of "getting tough with the Serbs."

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic had long been anxious to settle the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina at almost any price, in order to get international sanctions lifted.⁴ For

Understandably, Holbrooke has not written a book to explain the real nature and aims of U.S. policy, but to justify his own role

1998, as "Washington's New Vision for NATO Could Be Divisive." Excerpts: "The Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement on Kosovo in October was accurately described by Richard Holbrooke as an unprecedented event. NATO had intervened in an internal conflict inside a sovereign non-NATO state, not to defend its own members but to force that other state to halt repression of a rebellious ethnic minority.... Washington sees this as a precedent for a new NATO that would deal with a variety of existing and future problems inside and outside Europe. This goes beyond Italian unrest to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as in Iraq, Iran, and South Asia, other troublemaking by rogue states' international terrorism and even the drug trade.... Zbigniew Brzezinski, in his latest book (*The Grand Chessboard*), sees the alliance as the instrument of an 'integrated, comprehensive and long-term geostrategy for all of Eurasia,' in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, where another American-led alliance would link Pacific and Southeast Asian states."

3. Holbrooke never speaks of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the country's full name, but of "Bosnia," and uses the term "Bosnian" for the Bosnian Muslims alone, a usage implying that the Muslims are somehow more "Bosnian" than the Serbs or Croats living there. This usage, although in contradiction with the notion of "Bosnia" as an ideal multicultural society, is common among its supporters. In this regard, little attention is paid to the fact that President Alija Izetbegovic's ruling Islamic political party, the Democratic Action Party, has from the start included Muslims who live outside Bosnia, notably in the Novi Pazar region of Serbia, and thus are not "Bosnians" at all. 4. On June 1, 1992, United Nations Security Resolution 757 imposed on Yugoslavia what the *New York Times* called "the most sweeping economic and other sanctions

Diana Johnstone is currently working on a book on former Yugoslavia. She was the European editor of *the Green group* in the European Parliament from 1990 to 1996. She is the author of *The Politics of Eurosclerosis: Europe in America's World* (London/New York: Verso/Shooken, 1984).

1. See the numerous index references to the United States in: David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1995).

2. See the very clear summary of U.S. policy in William Pfaff's column carried by the *Los Angeles Times* Syndicate, published in the *International Herald Tribune*, Dec. 5,



AP / Wide World Photos

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, November 1995. Left to right: Presidents Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, and Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia.

months, the Clinton administration had been rejecting a peace settlement that was within reach of Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Robert Frasure, who had been holding talks with Milosevic. Now, however, Holbrooke was sent in to end the war on the basis of the talks already held between Frasure and Milosevic.

On August 19, the U.S. negotiating team including Holbrooke and Frasure was being driven into Sarajevo from a helicopter base on Mount Igman when a piece of the road broke off under the weight of one of the two armored vehicles carrying the Americans. The vehicle plummeted down the steep mountainside and burst into flames. Frasure and two other high-ranking Americans were killed.

This shocking accident, rather than the fate of Bosnia, provides Holbrooke with his opening chapter and the "tragic leitmotif" that runs through his book. The loss of these American colleagues emerges as the overriding Bosnian tragedy. As sacrificed martyr, Frasure no doubt considerably helped Holbrooke "sell" his deal to the divided Clinton administration. It was necessary to "win this one for the Gipper."

It has ever imposed, including a trade embargo, a ban on oil sales to the Belgrade government and an end to all sports and cultural links.⁵ These extraordinarily severe sanctions not only caused hardship to the population while offering smugglers opportunities for enrichment; they severely restricted normal communication between Serbia and the outside world, making it that much easier to portray the Serbs as monsters.

"BOMBING THE SERBS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE"

Frasure had recommended negotiating the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina not with the Bosnian Serbs themselves, who were directly involved, but with Milosevic. Frasure knew that Milosevic was fed up with the Bosnian Serb leaders and was ready to do almost anything to overcome Serbia's international isolation. The way to sideline Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic was provided by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) set up by the U.N. Security Council in The Hague to judge "war crimes in the former Yugoslavia." The ICT made a great point of placing Karadzic at the top of its "wanted" list, although the case against him was no stronger than cases that could be—but never are—made against Croatian President Franjo Tudjman or President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina himself. Holbrooke declared that he would not negotiate with "indicted war criminals," thus making sure that the Bosnian Serbs had to delegate authority to the President of Serbia.

With the help of the Serbian Orthodox Church, Milosevic gave Holbrooke his trump card: an agreement by the Bosnian Serb leaders to allow the Serbian President to negotiate on their behalf.

Still, before undertaking peace talks with the three Presidents, Milosevic, Izetbegovic,

and Tudjman (who had no trouble representing the Bosnian Croats, since it was his own Croatian army that had been fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina on their behalf⁶), Holbrooke was eager for NATO to bomb.

NATO was all prepared. However, it "took an outrageous Bosnian Serb action to trigger Operation Deliberate Force," recalls Holbrooke.

This happened right on time. On August 28, Holbrooke arrived in Paris to work out a negotiating position with Izetbegovic and his foreign minister, Muhamed Sacirbey. That day, CNN reported a particularly gruesome bomb massacre in downtown Sarajevo, with scores of civilian victims. The timing was perfect. Later that day, at his second meeting with Holbrooke, Izetbegovic had "changed into a sort of paramilitary outfit, complete with loose khakis, a scarf, and a beret bearing a Bosnian insignia." Thus "dressed like an aging Left Bank revolutionary," Izetbegovic "demanded that NATO launch strikes against

5. The 1992 U.N. sanctions against Serbs were imposed as punishment for a supposed invasion, which had not taken place. Rather, Yugoslav army units stationed there had withdrawn by the time the sanctions were imposed. Before the Yugoslav army withdrew, it had lost soldiers to the opposing new armies and indeed left most of its heavy equipment to the Bosnian Serbs, who benefited from Serbian financial support. In contrast, Croatia actually did send its own armed forces into Bosnia-Herzegovina to carve out an ethnically pure Croatian territory known as "Herceg-Bosna," and has never been punished with more than half-hearted reprimands.



Madeleine Albright saluting Bosnian flag in Sarajevo, 1994.

AP / Wide World Photos

the Bosnian Serbs immediately. Sacirbey went further, saying his President would not see us again until NATO began bombing..." (p. 96). Iztbegovic was exclusively "focused on the necessity for immediate NATO bombing, and wary of negotiations..."

"From Pale the Bosnian Serbs accused the Bosnian Muslims of staging the incident to draw NATO into the war," Holbrooke recalls. Within NATO, experts disagreed, and U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for an investigation. "None of this mattered much," according to Holbrooke. "What counted was whether the United States would act decisively and persuade its NATO allies to join in the sort of massive air campaign that we had so often talked about but never even come close to undertaking," (pp. 91-92). The opportunity was too good to miss. American "experts" instantly attributed the massacre to the Serbs.

Holbrooke fails to mention that British ammunition experts serving with the U.N. in Sarajevo said they found no evidence that Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal mortar round and suspected the Bosnian government army might have been responsible.⁶

6. "Serbs 'not guilty' of massacre: Experts warned US that mortar was Bosnian," *The Sunday Times* (London), Oct. 1, 1995, p. 15. The Times defense correspondent Hugh Manners reported that the British experts said "French

Whoever was responsible, everything was ready for bombing the Serbs.

The following evening was chronicled by the fashionable Paris writer Bernard-Henri Lévy (BHL), who arrived with Sacirbey at the American Ambassador's residence for a dinner hosted by "the lovely Pamela Harriman." Holbrooke kept leaving the party for the telephone, which struck BHL as rude, until he saw Iztbegovic in his strange costume sitting in an adjoining room, and realized that the American negotiator was working out final details of the major air strikes that began at 2:00 a.m. the next morning. Bombing the Serbs was the social event of the season.

The "Operation Deliberate Force" air strikes on Bosnian Serb targets gave rise to a useful and oft-repeated falsehood: that NATO air strikes were necessary to "bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table."

analysts who also examined the scene agreed with them. But they were overruled by a senior American officer, and the U.N. issued a statement saying it was beyond any doubt that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for the blast, in which 37 people were killed and 90 wounded. "The carnage was used as a pretext for NATO's huge air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs, which was followed by extensive battlefield losses, and forced the Serbs to the negotiating table....The British experts were in a U.N. crater-analysis team that reached the Trnava market in Sarajevo 40 minutes after the mortar attack on the morning of August 28..."

In reality, the Serbs were eager to negotiate and to make peace. Iztbegovic, on the contrary, wanted to continue the war. Even when the Serbs lifted the siege of Sarajevo, Iztbegovic was not satisfied. "He would prefer to let the people of Sarajevo live under Serb guns for a while longer if it also meant that the NATO bombing would continue," Holbrooke observed. Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic "showed even greater fury" in demanding more bombing.

In short, it was never a matter of "bombing the Serbs to the negotiating table." Rather, NATO had to bomb the Serbs in order to get the Muslims to the negotiating table.

"BOMBS FOR PEACE"

The air raids ended on September 1, and Holbrooke began to look for a new pretext to get them started again. In the absence of a massacre, some Serbian hyperbole had to do. In an angry letter to the French U.N. forces commander in Bosnia, Bosnian Serb commander General Ratko Mladic called NATO bombing "more brutal" than Nazi bombing of Belgrade, because NATO had targeted churches and cemeteries during funerals of victims. "When we saw Mladic's letter, we assumed it resolved any question about resuming the bombing," writes Holbrooke. "What answer other than a

resumption of the bombing was appropriate under the circumstances?"⁷

Holbrooke rushed to the Turkish capital, Ankara, where Izetbegovic had many friends in high places, to persuade Izetbegovic to accept the U.S. draft for negotiations about to begin in Geneva. As usual, Izetbegovic balked. "The Bosnians are barely on board," Holbrooke warned, in an urgent call to the White House from Ankara, "...and when we see Izetbegovic again in the morning for a last review of the draft, the bombing must have resumed." He concluded dramatically: "Give us bombs for peace" (p. 132).

Thus a second and more deadly wave of NATO "bombing for peace" began on September 5. Tomahawk cruise missiles and F-117s came into play. Once the decision to bomb was taken, "the Navy and the Air Force both wanted to publicize, especially to Congress, the value of their new weaponry. For the Navy, this meant the Tomahawks, which were launched from naval vessels in the Adriatic. For the Air Force, it meant the expensive and controversial F-117, whose value had been questioned by some Pentagon critics" (p. 145).

This bombing campaign was stopped only when Pentagon officers informed the State Department that NATO was running out of authorized targets. Meanwhile, the bombing had knocked out Serb communications and enabled forces of the U.S.-contrived "Bosnian-Croatian Federation"—an extremely uneasy alliance between Tudjman's Croatian Army and Izetbegovic's forces—to conquer large swathes of territory in Western Bosnia inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs. According to Holbrooke, this generated "at least one hundred thousand Serb refugees" (p. 154), in addition to about double that many who only a few weeks earlier had been driven out of their homes in the Croatian Krajina region by Tudjman's army, with German arms and U.S. approval. All this time, Holbrooke was urging Tudjman to take more Serb towns in Western Bosnia, but to stop short of capturing Banja Luka.

Holbrooke explains this restraint by the fact that capturing Banja Luka would generate over two hundred thousand additional refugees, and he "did not think the United States should encourage an action that would create so many more refugees." (p. 160) Holbrooke was aware that "we could be accused of applying a double standard."

"Using a provocative phrase normally applied only to the Serbs, I told Tudjman that current Croatian behavior might be viewed as

a milder form of ethnic cleansing." Aside from this rare burst of humanitarian concern, ending the Federation offensive was necessary because the Serbs were recovering from the bombing and mending their defenses, and even more because the Croat and Muslim forces in the region were starting to turn on each other. At the top, this was reflected in Tudjman's "deep hatred of the Muslims" and the "intense personal animosity" between Tudjman and Izetbegovic that came out when they were brought together.

GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS

The basic reason for the NATO bombing goes to the heart of U.S. foreign policy:

As Holbrooke tells it, the roots of Bosnia policy go back to Clinton's first election campaign in 1992, when his advisers were aware that his weak point in relation to Bush was foreign policy. They concluded that Bosnia would make an excellent election campaign issue (p. 41), one on which the Democratic candidate could attack Bush and appear more forward-looking. Thus on August 14, 1992, Clinton gave a speech promising to "make the United States the catalyst for a collective stand against aggression." This was the traditional "world leadership" stand of the United States, now shifting into a "collective" stand of the "international community."

In order to take such a stand against aggression, there is need for "aggression" to fit traditional "world leadership" rhetoric. Only in the face of "aggression," preferably by an "evil" adversary who "refuses to negotiate," can it become clear why it takes the United States to be the "catalyst": its overwhelming military power. It is essential to illustrate that diplomacy can succeed only in conjunction with the overwhelming military force represented by U.S. air power.

Otherwise, one might as well turn the whole problem over to a bunch of Scandinavians.

For bombing to be used, however, "outrage" is necessary ("It took an outrageous Bosnian Serb action to trigger Operation Deliberate Force") against a single "bad guy," the villain, the aggressor. And once there is a single "bad guy," his adversaries are automatically promoted into "good guys"...who proceed to exploit their position shamelessly.

So it was that as Milosevic was transformed into Satan, Tudjman and Izetbegovic were increasingly able to blackmail the United States to get what they wanted. This pattern is repeating itself today, with potentially even more disastrous consequences, with the Albanians in Kosovo.

Whatever the difficulties in taming Izetbegovic or Tudjman, the United States succeeded in the more important task of putting

the European Allies in their place. At the end of his adventure, Holbrooke could find satisfaction in the fact that NATO had for the first time acted "out of area," and that even the French had acknowledged that "America is back."

When the irritable Bosnian Muslims finally came to Dayton, they constantly obstructed the negotiations and each other. After a fortnight in Dayton, Holbrooke reported to Undersecretary of State Warren Christopher that the most disturbing problem he faced was the "immense difficulty of engaging the Bosnian government in a serious negotiation." Bitter personal rivalry divided Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic and Muhamed Sacirbey, while the dour Izetbegovic never showed any interest whatsoever in making peace.

"Any form of compromise, even minor gestures of reconciliation to those Serbs who had not wanted war and were ready to re-establish some form of multiethnic community, was not easy for Izetbegovic. His eyes had a cold and distant gaze; after so much suffering, they seemed dead to anyone else's pain.... although he paid lip service to the principles of a multi-ethnic state, he was not the democrat that some supporters in the West saw," recounts Holbrooke (p. 97).

Although Silajdzic, on the other hand, spoke with passion about the need to recreate a multiethnic country, "he referred to the Croats with such animosity that I did not see how he could ever cooperate with them" (p. 97). Silajdzic and Sacirbey both occasionally flew into rages against Holbrooke and shouted that the Muslims would never give in to U.S. threats or blackmail.

Holbrooke, on the other hand, more than once gave into Muslim blackmail, notably by agreeing to "equip and train" Muslim forces after the peace accords.

As the Dayton talks were at the eleventh hour, Holbrooke was deeply concerned "that even if Milosevic makes more concessions, the Bosnians will simply raise the ante." Western officials were wondering: Does Izetbegovic even want a deal? And Holbrooke wasn't sure: "Sometimes he seems to want revenge more than peace...." And Holbrooke's colleague Chris Hill complained that: "These people are impossible to help."

Clearly, Dayton would never have produced any agreement at all without the unflagging help of the one participant who really seemed anxious for peace: Slobodan Milosevic.

From start to finish, Milosevic is described as cheerful, alert, quick to understand, and above all, ready to make concession after concession. He spoke excellent English and loved the United States, even Dayton and Packy's Sports Bar. He looked back nostalgically

7. In contrast, the French commander to whom Mladic had addressed his letter, General Bernard Janvier, was insisting that it was possible to start negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs (p. 128).

cally on his trips to New York when he was a banker in Tito's Yugoslavia, he sang along with a trio of American black women sergeants singing "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" (while Iztetbegovic sat sullenly), he was the life of the party. "Watching Milosevic turn on the charm, Warren Christopher observed that had fate dealt him a different birthplace and education, he would have been a successful politician in a democratic system." In fact, Milosevic was a successful politician (although a disastrous statesman) in a "transitional" system that was at least as democratic as those run by Tudjman or Iztetbegovic, and probably more so.

Dayton is a chronicle of concessions made by Milosevic. Indeed, many of the concessions were *invented* by Milosevic to get the talks out of an impasse. At the very end, it was, typically, Milosevic who saved Dayton from total failure, when once again, Iztetbegovic had rejected what everyone else thought was an agreement.

Volunteering to "walk the final mile for peace," Milosevic offered to agree to arbitration for Brcko in a year. This was a huge and perhaps fatal concession. When he heard that Iztetbegovic had finally, if reluctantly, accepted his offer, Milosevic had tears in his eyes.

UNREQUITED LOVE

Milosevic again and again saved the negotiations by giving up something. He got next to nothing in return. On December 14, 1995, President Clinton joined the three Balkan presidents in Paris for the ceremonial signing of the agreement reached in Dayton.

"Finally came the President's first discussion with Milosevic. The White House had taken care to ensure that there would be no photographs of the encounter. Still, this was a meeting Milosevic had long wanted; it put him on a plane with other world leaders after years of isolation. 'I know this agreement would not have been possible without you,' President Clinton said, cool and slightly distant. 'You made Dayton possible. Now you must help make it work.'

"Milosevic said that the key to peace lay in strict implementation of the Dayton agreements. Then he requested full normalization of U.S.-Yugoslav (i.e., Serbian) relations. We swiftly ended the discussion." (p. 322)

The sanctions were "suspended," but not lifted, as Milosevic had hoped. And what the United States calls the "outer wall" of sanctions—the exclusion of Serbia/Yugoslavia from international institutions such as the United Nations and its agencies, the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank, etc.—remains in place. Thus Belgrade's diplomatic isolation, its inability to speak for

itself in international forums, has been maintained.⁸


The Holbrooke-Milosevic encounter created a mutual dependency. Each man has needed the other to produce "results," even though the results produced may eventually turn out to be disappointing, even disastrous.

The Dayton Accords do not lay the groundwork of a lasting peace, and contain the seeds of renewed war. To bribe Iztetbegovic, the United States agreed to arm and train the Bosnian Muslims. As Holbrooke himself acknowledged in his book, this was "the most controversial" of all programs. The U.S. military "hated the idea," so did the Europeans, and finally, it made no sense to sign a peace agreement for a single Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then arm one faction of it. In an ideal world, admits Holbrooke, all the armies should have been sharply reduced and merged into a single force. But NATO refused to accept the job of implementing a disarmament program. This "Equip and Train" program, largely farmed out to Turkey, was supported by "a powerful group of Senators led by Republican Majority Leader Bob Dole and two senior Democrats, Joe Lieberman of Connecticut and Joe Biden of Delaware." It was defended in congressional hearings by none other than the Reagan administration's "Prince of Darkness," former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, a notorious arms buildup enthusiast, who represented the Muslim side in military negotiations at Dayton.

The other major failure at Dayton was the absence of any agreement on the status of the town of Brcko, which connects the two parts of Serbian Bosnia, "Republika Srpska." Together, these two factors mean that only prolonged outside military occupation can prevent the rearmament Muslim forces from renewing the war against the Serbs.

Meanwhile, supposedly "multicultural" Sarajevo has been transformed by Iztetbegovic's ruling party, the Democratic Action Party (SDA), into an increasingly exclusive Muslim city. The Croats retain tight and exclusive control of their territory. The Serbs have always been more divided among themselves, but ostentatious "international community" support for the "moderates" led by Biljana Plavsic, including NATO action (recommended by Holbrooke) to shut down Bosnian Serb "nationalist" television, led to Plavsic's defeat in elections last December. This political defeat was such a blow to the "international

8. The United States never normalized relations, and early in 1998, just as economic relations between Yugoslavia and the European Union were starting to be normalized, the Kosovo crisis brought a new round of sanctions against Belgrade—including a ban on its civilian airline, JAT, whose business is being picked up by European carriers.



Sarajevans demanding more NATO bombing

community" officials actually running Bosnia-Herzegovina that it took them several days to pull themselves together and announce the results. Whatever else one can say for them, the September 1998 elections showed that neither television nor money from the "international community" determined the way Bosnian Serbs vote.

Resentment of "international community" control, as instituted by the Dayton Accords, is by now the one thing that Muslims, Serbs and Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina can agree on.

But Holbrooke himself and the whole "international community" chorus of officials and media keep repeating their standard excuse for any and all failures of Dayton: It is all because "Serbian war criminals" have not been arrested. This pursues the Manichean myth of moralistic power politics: The world would be a fine place, with everybody going about their business, if it weren't disrupted from time to time by "bad guys." The solution to all world political problems is thus a court to punish the "criminals."

The same pattern is reproducing itself over Kosovo. Milosevic still has only one ambition: to end his country's isolation. He is still looking to the United States and his "friend" Holbrooke to get him out of the Kosovo trap. And Holbrooke needs the pliable Milosevic to give him another "success."

Prior to Dayton, Holbrooke obtained what he called "something of a diplomatic innovation—a document drafted by us but signed only by the Serbs as a unilateral undertaking." None of us was aware of diplomatic

9. The unilateral undertaking called for the Serbs to



inghids, February 1994.

AP / Wide World Photos

precedent for this, but it fit our needs perfectly."

This was the same formula used recently by Holbrooke for Kosovo, by which Milosevic unilaterally agreed to remove Yugoslav security forces from a section of their own country, and to let international "verifiers" wander around the country to make sure they had really left. This in return for nothing. As a result, the armed ethnic Albanian rebels are more convinced than ever that they have the support of the United States and NATO, and are readying their spring offensive.

Milosevic, who set out to bring unity and prosperity to Yugoslavia, is a dramatic failure as a leader. Unlike the media propaganda, he is neither a dictator nor a racist nor a bloodthirsty tyrant. He is a vain, clever, manipulative political leader who drastically misjudged the situation of Yugoslavia in the post-communist transition period, and who keeps masking his failures with unreal optimism. Although recent events have inevitably given them second thoughts, most Serbs want to think of America as their friend. They retain memories of alliance in two World Wars, their educated children emigrate en masse to Canada and the United States. Milosevic has kept hoping to be accepted by America. This feeling was, by all accounts, enforced by conviction that European leaders could not be relied upon as partners, and that only the United States has the power to make a deal stick.

remove all their heavy weapons from the Sarajevo area, essentially surrendering their positions there. The parallel with the recent Kosovo agreement is obvious.

All this has made Milosevic an indispensably weak and accommodating partner for Holbrooke.

In Serbia, very many people are convinced that Milosevic is kept in power solely by the Americans, who need him to give away Yugoslavia bit by bit. There is even a widespread belief that Milosevic wants NATO to force him to give up Kosovo, since he doesn't know what else to do with it, and that military offensives against ethnic Albanian separatists are only part of the scenario of turning the territory over to NATO.

Many Serbs believe that after Kosovo, the "international community" will step up its encouragement of separatism in Montenegro, the Vojvodina and the Novi Pazar region (called "the Sanjak"), using Milosevic simultaneously as pretext and broker for ongoing disintegration, until there is nothing left of Serbia but the Sumadija forest region where "Black George" led his peasant revolt against Ottoman oppression nearly two hundred years ago.¹⁰ And when they've used him to establish a NATO protectorate in the Balkans, it is predicted, the Americans will throw Milosevic away like a squeezed out lemon peel. Instead of retirement in New York, or even Dayton, Milosevic may be sent to The Hague for a show trial.

IGNORANCE, IMAGES, AND ANALOGY CONSTRUCTION

"Washington is well known as a city where social events can have policy consequences," observes Holbrooke. Supporting "Bosnia" meaning the Muslims, early became both politically correct and socially acceptable in Washington.

Holbrooke describes how he first joined the cause. "In the spring of 1992, I saw the Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, Muhamed Sacirbey, on television calling on the world to save his nation. Impressed with his passion and eloquence, I phoned him, introducing myself as an admirer of his cause, and offered my support. Sacirbey thus became my first Bosnian friend." The fact that this "first Bosnian friend" was an American no doubt made the matter easier. Sacirbey came from a "distinguished" family and had played first-string football at Tulane University "Mo" Sacirbey "was tough, strong, and fit." Good material for the fraternity.

The "bey" in the name Sacirbey, like the "beg" in Izetbegovic, is a trace of the Ottoman "beyes," the aristocracy that monopolized property and power under Turkish rule. Their Democratic Action Party (SDA) repre-

10. I have heard this belief expressed in numerous private conversations with Serbs, notably during a trip to Serbia in June 1998.

sents descendants of the ruling class that was overthrown by egalitarian peasant revolts in the 19th century. To many Bosnian Serbs (who, until only twenty years ago, were the majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina), creation of a Muslim-led Bosnia inevitably looked like an attempt to restore the *ancien régime*, dominated by those professing the Muslim faith. SDA leaders maintain close ties with Turkey. Through NATO, Turkey is being brought back into Balkan lands it ruled for 500 years.

Such historical background was of no concern to Holbrooke. Like so many others, he excuses his ignorance of history by dismissing it as inconsequential. The perfect rationalization for this ignorance was provided by the writings of Noel Malcolm, whose books on Bosnia and Kosovo have come along just in time to provide rationalization for anti-Serb positions.¹¹ "Malcolm undermined the conventional wisdom that the war was the inevitable result of ancient hatreds," notes Holbrooke gratefully. Thus Holbrooke, "executive summary" style, replaces one reductionism with another: if the war wasn't "inevitable" on account of "ancient hatreds," it must all be the fault of the Serbs.

With history out of the way, the conflict was judged by images and analogies. Holbrooke's account confirms the crucial importance in forming U.S. policy of the famous "barbed wire" photo exposed by German journalist Thomas Deichmann as deceptive.¹² In August 1992, Holbrooke went on a fact-finding mission to Sarajevo to find out about "the death camps that have gotten so much publicity." Like other Western "fact finders" of the period, Holbrooke was apparently totally unaware of the equally dreadful prison camps run by Muslims in and around Sarajevo itself.¹³ Holbrooke noted in his diary that "television pictures rouse the world" and are "the reason we are here." (p. 36) As a U.N. official observed, "a few pictures of people being held behind barbed wire and the world goes crazy."

11. *Bosnia: A Short History*, 1994, and *Kosovo: A Short History*. See Aleksa Djilas, "Imagining Kosovo: A Biased New Account Fails Western Confusion," *Foreign Affairs*, Sept./Oct. 1998, pp. 124-31.

12. See *CoverAction Quarterly*, No. 65, Autumn 1998. Deichmann shows that a British TV photographer filmed Muslims from within a barbed wire enclosure, thus creating the illusion that the Muslims were imprisoned behind a barbed wire fence, which was not the case.

13. Documentation sent to the Hague Tribunal on crimes against humanity in Muslim camps for Serbs in Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zenica, Dretelj near Mostar, Tarcin, etc., has been ignored. Only the case of the Celebici camp was taken up by the Tribunal thanks to a chance encounter between a Serbian-American woman and the Hague prosecutor at the time, Richard Goldstone, at a U.S. cocktail party. Another indication of the importance of "social relations." This documentation has been collected by a number of women, including Marissa Matei, who lives in Paris and has visited the Tribunal on several occasions.

The term "death camps" is part of the analogy construction which served to identify Serbs with Nazis. As Holbrooke puts it, "...in the summer of 1992, the world began to see shocking film of emaciated prisoners in northern Bosnia, looking at the unblinking camera through barbed-wire fences, scenes straight out of World War II—yet happening now."

The Nazi analogy dispenses the outsider from even attempting to understand the causes of a conflict and the viewpoints of the various parties, and to search for solutions on that basis. The problem is reduced to the existence of "evil" which needs to be eradicated. Holbrooke readily concludes that "the search for explanations failed. One simply had to recognize that there was pure evil in the world."

But where was this "pure evil"? Not, apparently, on the Muslim side, even after U.N. troops in Bosnia unearthed a stash of terrorist weapons, including anti-personnel explosive devices disguised as toys, in the possession of Islamic Mujahidin under command of Izetbegovic's SDA.¹⁴

At one point, Holbrooke's Hungarian-born wife Kati Marton worried that her husband might be killed by the " Hamas wing of the Serbs." This is pure fantasy, all the more surprising coming from a woman who has published books on political matters. There has never been anything like a " Hamas wing of the Serbs."

On the other hand, the fact that Izetbegovic's Bosnia actually had become a Mecca for Islamist *Mujahidin* from all over the Middle East, many of them veterans of Afghanistan, linked to terrorist networks in several countries and violently anti-Western, only provided another motive for the United States to support Izetbegovic, supposedly to weaken his dependence on Iran. The presence of *Mujahidin* among ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo is producing the same reaction.

In Paris for the December 14 ceremonial signing of the accords, President Clinton complained to Izetbegovic about the *Mujahidin* who were lingering on in Bosnia, in violation of their agreement. Holbrooke recalls: "Izetbegovic told the President that the

14. The Serbs have constantly claimed that the three notorious Sarajevo bomb massacres of civilians (the May 27, 1992, "headline massacre," which occurred on the eve of the U.N. vote on sanctions against Serbia; the Feb. 5, 1994, massacre of shoppers in the Sarajevo market, followed by an ultimatum demanding withdrawal of Serb heavy weapons; and the Aug. 28, 1995, slaughter referred to above) were in fact staged by Muslims to gain international support. "Black propaganda," committing atrocities to be attributed to the other side, is not unusual in Middle East conflicts, and is the reason for the question asked in such cases, Who profits from the crime? Outside professionals such as the *Mujahidin* with the toy bombs would be prime suspects for that sort of operation.



Littered Sarajevo marketplace after February 1994 bombing, which Serbia insists was a provocation by supporters of the Bosnian Muslims.

bulk of such personnel 'had already left,' a statement we knew not to be true."

But Izetbegovic can lie; he is a "good guy," the leader of the victims.

THINGS THEY SAID

In an age in which "image" is reasserting its supremacy over ideas, all the focus has been on the media image of the protagonists. Their ideas are ignored or distorted. Flagrant double standards have been employed in interpreting statements by Serb or Muslim leaders.

"I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty," Izetbegovic declared on February 27, 1991.¹⁵ At that time, there was peace but no "sovereign Bosnia Herzegovina." It was only a year later that, over protest of its Serb population, Bosnia-Herzegovina held a referendum in which a majority of voters casting ballots (but only 39% of the electorate) chose to leave Yugoslavia for a "sovereign" Bosnia-

15. Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (London: Penguin/BBC Books, 1996), p. 211.

Herzegovina...and civil war, which began at exactly the same time.

The prospect of war never deterred Izetbegovic. Once the war began, he wanted to keep it going, and even after Dayton, he continued to arm in order to be able to resume it.

Holbrooke describes the moment at Dayton when he finally lost patience with Izetbegovic. "If you want to let the fighting go on, that is your right," Holbrooke told him, "but Washington does not want you to expect the United States to be your air force. If you continue the war, you will be shooting craps with your nation's destiny." (p.195)

Aside from the inappropriate nature of the metaphor (one cannot imagine the austere Izetbegovic "shooting craps" or having any familiarity with such an activity), Holbrooke's warning echoes an earlier warning by none other than the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic.

This occurred during a heated exchange in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the night of October 14-15, 1991. Karadzic's Serb Democratic Party (SDS) wanted to

keep Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia or, short of that, create autonomous Serb regions. Iztbegovic's Democratic Action Party totally rejected such suggestions. Calling on Iztbegovic to recognize the Serbian people's desire to remain in Yugoslavia, Karadzic declared: "You want to take Bosnia-Herzegovina down the same highway of hell and suffering that Slovenia and Croatia are travelling. Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Herzegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim people disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is war—How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

These are strong words, but they could be interpreted as a warning to Iztbegovic of the dangers of war and an invitation to compromise to save the peace. Instead, they have been interpreted as announcement of intention to commit genocide, and as such constitute prime evidence in the International Criminal Tribunal indictment against Karadzic for "genocide."¹⁶

There has been no suggestion by the Tribunal and its sponsors (primarily the United States) that Iztbegovic's declared readiness to sacrifice peace for a future secession implies responsibility for the ensuing war.

Serb suggestions that Iztbegovic intended to set up an Islamic state are consistently dismissed by the Americans as far-fetched lies, tinged with typically Serb paranoia. The reaction of *New York Times* reporter Roger Cohen is typical: "Iztbegovic's devotion to his religion was evident in a tract called the 'Islamic Declaration' in 1970 that was pushed on me insistently in 1992 in Belgrade and Pale as proof of his 'fundamentalist' design for Bosnia." Cohen saw in it merely "an attempt to reconcile the precepts of the Koran with the organization of a modern state," a casual reading indeed (see following article on Iztbegovic's writings). True, as a journalist, Cohen was disturbed by "ominous" reflections implying the need to control media. ("The media should not be allowed—as so often happens—to fall into the hands of perverted and degenerate people who then transmit the aimlessness and emptiness of their own lives to others. What are we to expect if mosque and TV transmitter aim contradictory messages at the people?")

"But Iztbegovic had no army or plans for war..." concludes Cohen,¹⁷ anxious to dis-

miss Serb concerns as artificial. However, it is not true that Iztbegovic "had no army or plans for war."

In a November 1996 interview in the Bosnian Muslim newspaper *Lijanj*, Iztbegovic's deputy foreign minister Hasan Cengic recounted how, at a February 1991 SDA meeting, he proposed a three-part strategy for the future independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. This comprised (1) international promotion of Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Haris Silajdzic, (2) control of the Interior Ministry, and (3) a Muslim military organization. In May 1991, ten months before the independence that set off civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cengic gave written instructions to SDA party faithful from all over the Republic for formation of brigades under command of General Sulejman Vranja, a Yugoslav army officer still on active duty.

Thus Iztbegovic's Islamic party, the SDA, had its own armed forces, which went into action to secure Muslim areas at the same time and in much the same way as the Bosnian Serb party, the SDS. The Croatian nationalist party did the same, somewhat later and on a smaller scale, relying mainly on intervention of the Croatian army.

While perfunctorily dismissing Serb (or Croat) worries about the implications of the "Islamic Declaration," Western observers have readily accepted accusations by the various anti-Serb secessionists that Milosevic triggered the disintegration of Yugoslavia by an ultra-nationalist project to create a "Greater Serbia," expressed in the ceremonial speech delivered by Milosevic at Kosovo Polje on the 600th anniversary of the famous battle fought there in 1389. More than once, Milosevic protested to Holbrooke that his speech was not "inflammatory," to no avail.¹⁸

This is another unshakable myth of the Yugoslav disaster. Milosevic certainly bears a huge share of responsibility, not because he was "racist," or because he was planning "Greater Serbia," but because he grossly misjudged the way his efforts to reform Serbia and Yugoslavia would be interpreted, with catastrophic results. But strictly speaking, the Kosovo Polje speech was not especially "inflammatory" and certainly not "racist." Along

(New York: Random House, 1998), p. 148.

16. "When I asked Milosevic in 1995 about this famous speech, he heatedly denied that it was racist, and charged Ambassador Zimmermann with organizing a Western diplomatic boycott of the speech and the Western press with distorting it. Unfortunately for Milosevic, however, his words and their consequences are on the record," writes Holbrooke (p. 26). On another occasion, Holbrooke and Chris Hill "asked him about his famous 1989 speech at Kosovo that ignited Serb extremism. He vigorously denied that this was his intent.... Chris Hill, who knew the history in detail, defended Zimmermann and reminded Milosevic that the speech had been inflammatory by any standards."

with other samples of triumphalist rhetoric characteristic of such patriotic celebrations, it contained sentences which are never quoted, such as: "Harmony in Serbia will make possible prosperity to Serb people, to Serbia, and to each of her citizens without regard to national or religious affiliation.... Serbia was never in its history inhabited only by Serbs. Today more than ever, citizens of other nationalities and ethnic groups are living here. This is not a handicap for Serbia. Indeed, I am convinced that this is an advantage. This is the direction of change in national structure of all countries in the contemporary world, especially in the developed countries."

Cohen, who dismissed Iztbegovic's "ominous" reflections as inconsequential, comes up with an imaginatively sinister reading of the Kosovo Polje speech.¹⁹ Quoting various sentences in which Milosevic celebrated (all too prematurely, as it turned out) the restoration of "unity" (the Serbo-Croatian word *Milosevic* used was *sloga*, meaning "harmony" or "accord"), Cohen interprets this as the announcement of the goal of a "Greater Serbia" that would "unify all Serbs in one state." The word for political unity; as in "national unity" is however not *sloga* but *jedinstvo*. This far-fetched interpretation is the only proof such an able writer as Cohen (who apparently knows the language) is able to produce of the alleged "Greater Serbia" project of Milosevic.

Responsibility, both verbal and active, for the ongoing conflicts in the Balkans is shared by leaders on all sides. By identifying one national group with "pure evil," the "international community" has enormously deepened the distrust and resentment between the peoples who must continue to live side by side. Real peace and reconciliation require an effort to understand the interplay of responsibility between all parties—including outside powers, notably Germany, the European Union, and last but not least, the United States. ■

19. *Hearts Grown Brutal*, op. cit., n. 17, pp. 272-73.

ERRATA:

On the first page of Diana Johnstone's "Seeing Yugoslavia Through a Dark Glass" (No. 65, Fall 1998, p. 9), her quote from *In These Times* was dated "1984." The correct year, as noted in the footnote, was 1994. In footnote 22 to the same article (p. 18), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was inadvertently described as "Serbia and Macedonia." This should have read "Serbia and Montenegro."

16. The citation, in English, from Silber and Little, p. 215, was read into the record at the farcical "Rule 16 hearing" against Karadzic and Mladic held in The Hague on Sept. 16, 1996. The Tribunal did not allow the presence of an attorney for the defense.

17. Roger Cohen, *Hearts Grown Brutal: Slogas of Sarajevo*

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC: ISLAMIC HERO OF THE WESTERN WORLD

BY DIANA JOHNSTONE

IZETBEGOVIC, ALIJA, "ISLAMIC DECLARATION," 1970, REPUBLISHED 1990. IZETBEGOVIC, ALIJA, *ISLAM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST*, AMERICAN TRUST PUBLICATIONS, PLAINFIELD, INDIANA, 1984; THIRD EDITION, 1993, 302 PAGES

Of the local figures who emerged from the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia, the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, is by far the most respected in the world outside, and notably in the United States.¹ While younger men like Haris Silajdzic and Mohamed Sacirbey de-

begovic was a largely silent figure on television screens, the elder statesman whose serious mien expressed both worry and serenity, reflecting the martyrdom of his people. The respect accorded him has rarely taken the form of interest in the ideas on which he based his Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Muslim political movement in control of the Sarajevo government. In Europe and America, Izetbegovic is seen much more as a symbol than as a political leader with a particular program.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina aroused far more passion in the West than the earlier war in Croatia because it brought to the television screens the revelation of a European Islam that offered the ideal model for solving a current problem of vital importance in countries such as France: assimilation of Muslim immigrant populations. Sarajevo was discovered as a multicultural paradise, an oasis of civilization, populated mainly by gentle blue-eyed Muslims, practicing musical instruments and expressing sentiments of tolerance for their neighbors of other religions. The "lukewarm" Islam seen in Sarajevo seemed totally suitable for integration into any European country.

The fact that Bosnia seemed to offer a potential solution to Western Europe's own "Muslim problem" helps explain the vehement hostility that arose against the Bosnian Serbs, whose utterly peculiar rustic nationalism (the same, commentators noted, that had triggered the carnage of World War I) imbued with religious bigotry was held responsible for an unprovoked brutal assault on this exemplary society. Any "ethnic cleansing" would be outrageous, but here the crime was doubly reprehensible: a "genocide" bent on wiping out Europe's best model of a multi-ethnic society including Muslims.

This interpretation of events helps explain the extreme passion aroused, expressed in the slogan, "Europe lives or dies in

Sarajevo." Especially on the liberal left, many intellectuals were, and largely remain, convinced that multicultural Sarajevo represented a test case for the survival of European integration in the broadest sense.²

Western media, not least those newspapers and television channels (CNN, Arte) devoting the most coverage to the conflict, readily identified idealized Sarajevo with the Bosnian Muslims, and the Islam of Western dreams with the person of Alija Izetbegovic. Any suggestion that Mr. Izetbegovic might be an "Islamic fundamentalist" could only be dismissed with total incredulity and outrage as blatant Serb propaganda, invented to justify aggression and ethnic cleansing. How could the leader of the Bosnian Muslims be an "Islamic fundamentalist" when the Bosnian Muslims were obviously such a model of modern tolerance?

Acceptance of Izetbegovic as the personification of multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina obscured the fact that the President not only did not represent the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina in all its variety; he did not even represent all the Muslims.³

POLITICS AND RELIGION

That Izetbegovic could not be considered the uncontested leader of a unanimous Muslim community, much less of "multi-ethnic Bosnia," is clear from his own published writings, the "Islamic Declaration," first distributed in

2. In his passionately pro-Bosnian book, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West* (New York: Vintage, 1995), the American writer David Rieff points to the major significance he and many others saw in the war in Bosnia. He had come to Europe to write about immigration, he explains, to see whether the Old Continent would be able to cope as successfully as the United States with the mass influx of people of different cultures. It was "in search of this 'Americanization' of the European future," with the "conviction that in the twenty-first century we would all be polyglot or we would kill one another off," that he discovered the war in Bosnia, which seemed to support the second, pessimistic hypothesis.

3. The fact is noted in the influential book by Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 211: "Fikret Abdic, a local hero in the far northwestern corner of Bosnia, received 1,010,618 votes, compared to 847,386 for Izetbegovic.... In an unexplained deal, Abdic, who did not have enough support within the SDA, traded his rightful position as head of the presidency in exchange for naming his man, Alija Delimustafic, as Interior Minister." Chris Hedges, *New York Times-International Herald Tribune*, Apr. 26, 1996, called the deal "bewildering." Except for such rare references, the popularity of the Bihac businessman who favored cooperation with Serbs and Croats was quickly forgotten by Western media which accepted Izetbegovic as the unchallenged leader of his people.



AP/Wide World Photos

President Alija Izetbegovic

fended his government to the world with consummate skill and in perfect English. Izet-

1. It is indicative of his reputation that in March 1997, Izetbegovic received an award for "democracy development" from the Center for Democracy in Washington, D.C.

1970 and republished twenty years later, and *Islam Between East and West*, first published in the United States in 1984.

The "Islamic Declaration" was a manifesto, a sort of "what is to be done?" addressed to Bosnian Muslims discontented with their condition and status. For Iztbegovic, it is clear that Muslims cannot be satisfied in a secular order. "Islamic society without an Islamic government is incomplete and impotent.... A Muslim, in general, does not exist as an individual.... [T]o live and exist as a Muslim, he must create an environment, a community, a social order.... History does not know of a single truly Islamic movement which was not simultaneously a political movement."⁴

The 1970 Islamic Declaration was written in the context of a global awakening of the Muslim world, "made up of 700 million people possessing enormous natural resources and occupying a geographical area of the first importance." "The time of passivity and peace is gone forever...." The time had come to show the way to "the realization of Islam in all fields of private life of the individual, in the family and in society, by rebirth of Islamic religious thinking and creation of an Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia."

Iztbegovic singled out two currents within the Muslim community which stood in the way of the political renewal of Islam: the "conservatives" on the one hand and the "modernists" on the other.

The "conservatives" were identified with "hodjas and shayks" who, by confining Islam to a "religion," limited to spiritual concerns, kept it in the hands of the clergy, neglecting its necessary political role in the world, and accommodating a secular regime incompatible with fully developed Islamic life. "More closed to science and more open to mysticism," the "hodjas and shayks" criticized by Iztbegovic are evidently linked to the Sufi tradition of mystical Islam, which in some times and places (notably the Caucasus region and Algeria in the nineteenth century) has been the center of particularly violent resistance to the West, but which took quite tame forms in the western territories of the former Ottoman empire.

As for the "modernists," they are considered by Iztbegovic to be a veritable disaster for Islam throughout the Muslim

world. They are often influential in public life, but as they also consider Islam merely a religion that need not or cannot order the external world, they too accommodate secularism and prevent Islam from exerting its proper role in ordering all aspects of life. The "Islamic Declaration" very explicitly rejects the intellectual currents that, notably in Arab countries, have attempted to build modern secular nation-states on the Western model of separation between government and religion. For Muslims, Iztbegovic declares, secularism and nationalism are purely negative.

He illustrates this with the example of Turkey; a Muslim country ruined, in his view, by secularism and nationalism. "Turkey as an Islamic country ruled the world. Turkey as a copy of Europe is a third-rate country like a hundred others around the world."

What Iztbegovic has to say about Turkey is particularly significant, inasmuch as he is himself an heir to a Muslim elite in the Balkans which consistently opposed efforts by Istanbul to reform the Ottoman Empire in ways that would diminish the privileges traditionally monopolized by Muslims. (Under Ottoman rule, only Muslims had the right to own land, to occupy administrative posts, to enter town on horseback, or to wear green, among other things.) When Ottoman power was finally driven out of the Balkans by the Serb, Bulgarian, and Greek national liberation movements, all Orthodox Christians and a certain number of south Slav Muslims emigrated to Turkey where even today they may constitute a lobby nostalgic for the good old days, as well as a potential source of support for the growing Islamic political restoration in Turkey itself.

The country which Iztbegovic singled out in his "Declaration" as an example and inspiration, as "our great hope," is Pakistan. "Pakistan constitutes the rehearsal for introduction of Islamic order in contemporary conditions and at the present level of development." These words were written before the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which brought



AP / Wide World Photos

"Bosman"—a 1994 comic book version of Sarajevo Superman, "ready to take on the Serbs single-handed."

a new source of financial backing to Iztbegovic's project of Islamic revival in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For secular society, however, Pakistan as example is no more reassuring, considering its ongoing backing of armed Islamic groups in neighboring countries, notably the Taliban in Afghanistan.⁵

Iztbegovic's constant message is that the Koran calls for unification of religious faith and politics. There can be no "separation of church and state"—a Christian division totally unacceptable to Muslims. "The first and most important" conclusion to be drawn from the Koran is "the impossibility of any connection between Islam and other non-Islamic systems. There is neither peace nor coexistence between the 'Islamic religion' and non-Islamic social and political institutions."

5. It may be pointed out that Iztbegovic's criticism of "conservatives" and "modernists" has nothing to do with the distinction, much noted in the West since the Iranian revolution, between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims. If he rejects Sufi mysticism, that is a tendency found in both. One passage in the "Islamic Declaration" explicitly rejects a key Shi'ite tenet, the importance of Ali as direct descendant of the Prophet: "The hereditary caliphate represents the abandoning of the elective principle clearly asserted as an institution of Islam." However, this is no doubt of limited significance in light of Iztbegovic's clear advocacy of a worldwide unity of the Islamic community, regardless of the Sunni-Shi'ite distinction.

4. An oddly deceptive introduction to *Islam Between East and West* by one Dr. Balic, a Bosnian Muslim teaching in Frankfurt, states that Iztbegovic had no interest in politics. The purpose of this false assertion was no doubt to deny any grounds for the political prosecution of Iztbegovic and his colleagues. Such a claim is belied not only by the historic facts but by the book itself. The very theme running through everything Iztbegovic has written is the necessarily political nature of Islam.

"Having the right to govern its own world, Islam clearly excludes the right and possibility of putting a foreign ideology into practice on its territory. There is thus no principle of secular government and the State must express and support the moral principles of religion."

Izetbegovic's immediate concern in writing the 1970 "Islamic Declaration" was not in combating the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, which by recognizing a "Muslim nationality" had greatly facilitated the revival of a Muslim consciousness and community. Rather, he was calling for an awakening of an Islamic consciousness as the first necessary step toward eventual restoration of international Islamic unity and Islamic government wherever Muslims would constitute a majority. This is stated quite clearly.

"Emphasis on giving priority to religious and moral renewal doesn't mean that Islamic order can be realized without Islamic government.... This position means that we don't start with the conquest of power, but by the conquest of men, and that Islamic regeneration is first of all an upheaval in the field of education, and only afterwards in the political field. We must be preachers first and soldiers later."

At what moment will force accompany these educational means? "The choice of this moment is always a precise question and depends on a number of factors. One can however establish a general rule: the Islamic movement can and must take power as soon as it is normally and numerically strong enough not only to destroy the existing non-Islamic government, but also to construct a new Islamic government.... Acting too soon is as dangerous as acting too late! Seizing power...without adequate moral and psychological preparation and the indispensable minimum of strong and well-trained cadre means making a coup d'etat, not an Islamic revolution...." (Earlier, he specifies that: "An Islamic regime can be achieved only in countries where Muslims are a majority.")

The "overthrow of the state" was perhaps nearly as distant and hypothetical for Izetbegovic in Yugoslavia in 1970 as it was for Communist Parties in the noncommunist West in the mid-20th century. The precipitation with which Izetbegovic has in fact become President of a largely Muslim and potentially Islamic state is clearly due to a series of events that even a religious visionary is most unlikely to have foreseen in 1970 or

even in 1983—although by then, the Islamic Revolution in Iran had opened new prospects. Notably, a sort of competition between Teheran and Saudi Arabia has provided Islamic movements everywhere with a lucrative rivalry for influence between oil-rich sponsors. Izetbegovic's party has been notably successful in winning important political and material support from all Muslim countries regardless of rivalries between them.

ISLAM AS POLITICAL SYNTHESIS OF A DUALISTIC WORLD

Islam Between East and West was published first in English in the United States in 1984, at a time when Izetbegovic was in jail in Yugoslavia for "counter-revolutionary" activities. The book could not be published in Bosnia-Herzegovina until after he was released in a general amnesty in 1988.

The book is a lengthy attempt to elaborate the ideological underpinnings of the central political argument of the "Islamic Declaration." It is thus part of the intellectual

Izetbegovic's call for an Islamic state *once Muslims are a majority of the population*, drove large numbers of the Orthodox and Catholic Christians...into the arms of the nationalist Serb and Croat parties.

preparation which Izetbegovic considered necessary before proceeding to the next step of establishing Islamic government.

All of Izetbegovic's thinking centers on a single simple formula: Islam is the only synthesis capable of unifying mankind's essentially dualistic existence.

"There are only three integral views of the world: the religious, the materialistic, and the Islamic. They reflect three elemental possibilities (conscience, nature, and man), each of them manifesting itself as Christianity, materialism, and Islam. All ideologies...can be reduced to one of these three" (p. xxv).

The book proceeds to make these reductions. The method employed is to touch briefly on virtually every subject imaginable, citing a wide range of celebrated or obscure facts and authors, usually out of any clear context, in order to illustrate this simple

hypothesis. This assertion takes the place of logical argument, repetition the place of definition. Izetbegovic is not at all an analytical thinker, but a classifier. His approach is to attempt to fit everything—all philosophy and science, notably—into his three preconceived categories.

These categories are summarized in the book's appendix as the "table of the opposites," in three columns representing the "religious," the "materialistic," and the "Islamic" views of the world. The "Islamic" is the synthesis of the other two, which unites them, as it unites the dual aspects of man's nature. "Man" as a whole thus belongs in the "Islamic" category.

Izetbegovic devotes many pages to expressing his regard for science and attempting to recount what he takes for those of its findings that seem to support his thesis. A golden age of scientific knowledge is one of the benefits he foresees from Islamic renewal. Nevertheless, his own purely ideological approach is light years away from a modern scientific method.

Arbitrarily, Izetbegovic proclaims that "life is dual." Arbitrarily, he proclaims that only Islam overcomes this dualism. "Man experiences the world dualistically, but monism is in the essence of all human thinking," Mere "religion," by clinging to one side of the dichotomy, cannot satisfy man's need for "monism." He is saved because "Islam cannot be classified as a religion. Islam is more than a religion for it embraces life." This is a totalizing, one might say implicitly totalitarian, claim. "There is only one Islam, but like man, it has both soul and body" (*op. cit.*, p. xxxi). By equating "Islam" with "man," Izetbegovic appropriates "humanism" for Islam, giving the term an exclusive theological meaning very far from common acceptance. "Atheistic humanism is a contradiction because if there is no God, then there is no man either" (p. 39). "Everything must serve man, and man must serve God only. This is the ultimate meaning of humanism" (p. 40). "Man cannot be a Christian" because he cannot be a perfectly spiritual being, and the Koran says that "God does not charge anyone with a burden he cannot carry" (p. 227). In contrast, Islam "suits man because it recognizes the duality of his nature.... That is why man is the most obvious argument of Islam" (p. 228).

This dualism recalls the two adversaries to Islamic renewal within the Muslim community cited in the "Islamic Declaration." The "conservatives" are on the "spiritual" or "religious" side of the dichotomy, while the "progressives" are on the "materialistic" side. Both thereby fail to realize Islam in its fullness.

A passage in the chapter on "Drama and Utopia" (p. 161) well illustrates Izetbegovic's rigorous dualism. "Does evil come from inside, from the dark depths of the human soul, or does it come from outside, from the objective conditions of human life? This question divides all people into two large groups: believers and materialists. For believers all evil and good is in man.... To assert that evil is outside, that a man is evil because the conditions in which he lives are bad, that changes in these conditions would bring changes in man, to insist that man is a result of outside circumstances, is from the religious point of view the most godless and the most inhuman idea which has ever appeared in the human mind. Such an opinion degrades man to a thing, to a helpless executor of outside, mechanical, unconscious forces. Evil is in man versus evil is in the social environment. These are two mutually exclusive statements."

The mechanism of the dualistic approach can be seen here. Two extreme propositions are set against each other, and proclaimed to be irreconcilable. Their irreconcilability lies precisely in their extreme formulation, and is thus a truism. This approach automatically excludes all intermediate formulations which might combine elements of the two positions and thus render them reconcilable. This exclusion of the intermediate reasoned positions is necessary in order to arrive at the "problem"—a universe of irreconcilable opposites—which can be solved only by an extra-rational miracle: God. Or, for Izetbegovic, to be precise, submission to God's will, that is, Islam.

Only Islam can bring the virtues of religion into the real world. "Being a patriot against the use of violence, Christianity and religion in general could not directly influence anything that might improve man's social position" (p. 192). "Islam started as mysticism and ended as a state. Religion accepted the world of facts and became Islam" (p. 194). "Islam knows no specifically 'religious' literature in the European sense of the word, just as it knows no pure secular literature. Every Islamic thinker is a theologian, just as every true Islamic movement is also a political movement" (p. 197).

While the "Islamic Declaration" is concise and clear, the 300 pages of *Islam Between East and West* are replete with dubious science, dubious philosophy, erudite references, and logical fallacies, all summoned to illustrate the author's sweeping assertions.⁶ In this type of

text, abounding in truisms and circular reasoning, it is impossible not to find some statements with which one can agree, and with others one cannot accept. In short, it is *pure ideology*, a series of statements that one may accept or reject, but that cannot be proved or disproved.

THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF IZETBEGOVIC'S IDEAS

Along with a dozen co-religionists, Izetbegovic was arrested in still-communist Yugoslavia and sentenced to prison in 1983 (all were freed by a general amnesty in 1988) for "counter-revolutionary activities" and seeking to transform Bosnia-Herzegovina into an "ethnically pure Islamic state."⁷ The very fact that such charges were brought by a Communist state, and again reiterated by "nationalist" Serbs, has seemingly protected Izetbegovic's writings from critical examination.

From a democratic secular viewpoint, there is nothing, absolutely nothing, in either the "Islamic Declaration" or *Islam Between East and West* to justify arresting Mr. Izetbegovic and putting him in prison for five years. The harm done by jailing people for ideas goes beyond the personal injustice suffered. The fact that Izetbegovic was persecuted for his ideas has tended ever since to make any free criticism of those ideas "taboo," since criticism is readily equated with endorsement of communist persecution. Unfortunately, the fear of taking "the wrong side" in one way or another has stood in the way of free and open debate regarding all the main "subversive" writings that marked the ideological crisis of the Titoist regime, notably the most controversial, those of Izetbegovic, Tujman, and of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Without open debate, the prevailing tendency has been to cite such texts (often inaccurately) for polemic purposes rather than to examine them fairly and critically.

and in St. Etienne 28.5 percent. Data about crime would certainly show the inverse gradient." Would they indeed? We have no way of knowing. Izetbegovic simply asserts that this relationship exists, and that it is due to the superior "experienced aesthetics" of the countryside in comparison to the city. Aside from the lack of serious supporting data or the dubious superiority of the "experienced aesthetics" of St. Etienne over Paris, this insistence on the moral influence of urban or rural environment is in blatant contradiction to Izetbegovic's central argument, cited above (from p. 161), rejecting the "materialistic" argument that evil comes from external "conditions of human life" as "the most godless and the most inhuman idea which has ever appeared in the human mind." But Izetbegovic is immune to accusations of contradiction, since he can reply that Islam "synthesizes" every proposition and its opposite!

7. Alexandre Popovic, "Islamic Movements in Yugoslavia," in Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon, Georg Brunner and Edward Allworth, *Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia* (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 1994), p. 335.

The unquestionable right of Mr. Izetbegovic to express his ideas without being sent to prison should not preclude evaluating the impact of those ideas on the recent history of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those ideas became notorious locally as a result of two trials in the 1980s in which Muslims were accused of fomenting counter-revolution on the basis of the "Islamic Declaration." Later, supporters of the Sarajevo regime dismissed any suggestion that Mr. Izetbegovic might be considered an "Islamic fundamentalist" as grotesque Serbian nationalist propaganda. The question was not examined seriously. Insofar as "fundamentalism" can be defined as basing an entire social and political order on religion, then Mr. Izetbegovic is certainly a "fundamentalist." There is another aspect that deserves study, and that is the extent to which fear of the implications of the "Islamic Declaration," specifically the call for an Islamic state *once Muslims are a majority of the population*, drove large numbers of the Orthodox and Catholic Christians of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the arms of nationalist Serb and Croat parties. This is a legitimate question that needs to be elucidated as part of the process of clarifying the causes of the conflict and working for reconciliation between communities.⁸ ■

8. Such a question is typically dismissed out of hand, for example by Silver and Little, *op. cit.*, n. 3, p. 208. "Serb and Croat nationalists point to the *Islamic Declaration*, an esoteric document penned by Izetbegovic, in 1973, as proof that Izetbegovic planned to create a Muslim state. In fact, it was a work of scholarship, not politics, intended to promote philosophical discourse among Muslims. In it, he excluded the 'use of violence in the creation of a Muslim state, because it defiles the beauty of the name of Islam.' A more significant indicator of Izetbegovic's orientation was *Islam between East and West*, first published in the United States in 1984, and then in Yugoslavia after his release from prison four years later. This book mapped out his vision of an Islamic state in the modern world. In it he charts a course between Islamic values and material progress, arguing that the benefits of secular western civilization are without meaning unless they are accompanied by the spiritual values found predominantly in Islamic societies."

Their comments on Izetbegovic's writings are so far off the mark as to raise the question: Have they read them? Or are they quoting the author of the work cited in their two footnotes, Srecko M.Dzaja, *Bosnia i Bosnjaci u hrvatskom politickom diskursu*, Erasmus, December 1994, p. 33. This seems likely. There is in fact nothing "esoteric" about the "Islamic Declaration," nor can it reasonably be called "a work of scholarship, not politics."

To say that the 1984 book "charts a course between Islamic values and material progress" is a gross misreading. In reality, Izetbegovic presents Islamic values themselves as uniting the material and the spiritual, and this is the course he charts, not a course "between" Islamic values and anything else.

What is clear is that Izetbegovic, like, for instance, the Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, sets great value on modern technology, and sees no contradiction whatsoever between material progress and Islam. This acceptance of the technological fruits of the enlightenment, accompanied by rejection of the enlightenment's philosophical content, recalls the "revolt of the masses" forecast by Jose Ortega y Gasset. In that connection, it can be noted that contemporary American Christian fundamentalists are also highly receptive to modern technology while rejecting the philosophical heritage of the Enlightenment.

The Secrets Game

by William Blum

"He betrayed his country." Yes, perhaps he did, but who among us has not committed treason to something or someone more important than a country? In Philby's own eyes he was working for a shape of things to come from which his country would benefit.

—Graham Greene, on Kim Philby¹

At a historic, but unnoted, moment after World War Two, the American Republic was replaced by a National Security State. There thus began a subtle process in government hitherto known only in civil law—"the exception that swallows the rule." Lawyers use the phrase to describe some anomaly in the law, an exception to a general rule or norm, that becomes so large or so widely used as virtually to nullify the rule itself. This principle had not previously been thought to apply to the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. Slowly but surely, however, "national security" has become such an exception.

The people shall be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," except in cases of national security.

The accused shall enjoy the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," except in cases of national security.

"Cruel and unusual punishments" shall not be inflicted, except in cases of national security.²

The case of the United States against Theresa (Terry) Squillacote and her husband Kurt Stand ended on October 23, 1998, in Alexandria, Virginia, with the jury finding the Washington, D.C., political activist couple guilty of "conspiracy to commit espionage," "attempted espionage," and related charges having to do with classified documents. On January 22, 1999, she was sentenced to 21 years in prison, her husband to 17, although they

were not found guilty of—or were they even charged with—doing harm to a single individual on the face of the earth.

The United States government excels at these charades, leaving scarcely anything to chance. Under President Clinton, we have seen a steady drumbeat of legislation designed to give the FBI and other law enforcement agencies greater and still greater powers to climb deep inside the lives of individuals.

As it invariably does, the super-secret court created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)³ gave the FBI all the go-aheads it asked for in this case, thus making it all nice and "legal." The court was created

3. See Philip Colangelo, "The Secret FISA Court: Rubber Stamping on Rights," in *CovertAction Quarterly*, No. 53, Summer 1995, pp. 43-49.

in 1978 to authorize electronic searches for counterintelligence purposes, with its powers expanded in 1995 to authorize physical searches as well, all free from Fourth Amendment requirements of warrants being issued upon "probable cause."

The FBI carried out an investigation and surveillance of Stand and Squillacote for more than two years, most of that period spent listening around the clock to the phone conversations of the couple—conversations between the husband and wife, between the wife and her psychiatrist, between the husband and the wife's psychiatrist, between everyone and everyone, about everything; with Terry crying uncontrollably during one of her attacks of depression, and Kurt trying to comfort her; played in the courtroom, on FBI tape, forever.



Kurt Stand and Terry Squillacote.

1. From the Introduction, Kim Philby, *My Silent War* (St. Albans, U.K.: Panther Books, 1968), p. 7.

2. The preceding is adapted from an approach taken by Frank Mankiewicz in his book, *Perfidy Clear* (New York: Quadrangle, 1973). The quoted words are from the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution.

During this time the FBI secretly entered the couple's home on several occasions, planting listening devices throughout, which picked up all human sound. While in the house, they pored through every drawer, every closet, every book, every photo, every piece of paper; downloading the computer's entire store of personal files. On the outside, their trash was picked through, and there was surveillance, whenever feasible, including videos.

And what had inspired such an indecent violation of the couple's privacy in the first place? After the unification of Germany, Squillacote and Stand's names had been found on cards of the now defunct East German intelligence service, the Stasi, cards purchased secretly, along with vast amounts of other material, by the CIA. (The Agency has refused to return the material despite repeated requests by the German government.⁴) There were code names and real names, but no indication of any actual acts performed by either of them. Stand, 43, a "red-diaper baby," had worked in the American labor movement and the Democratic Socialists of America for many years. Squillacote, 40, active in the Committees of Correspondence, an offshoot of the fragmented U.S. Communist Party, is an attorney, who had had several government positions, the last one with the Pentagon in the Office of Acquisition Reform, dealing with the laws and regulations concerning Defense Department purchases. She had a Secret security clearance at the time she resigned in January 1997, nine months before the arrests.

The couple lived in the integrated North-east Washington neighborhood of Brookland with their two children, aged 14 and 12, Karl and Rosa (after Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, the noted German socialist revolutionaries murdered by the state in 1919).

After its extraordinarily prolonged and intimate investigation of the two, the FBI still had nothing to pin on them. It is highly questionable that the investigation should legally have been undertaken in the first place. The FISA law is written in the present tense, clearly referring to a *current* "foreign power or an agent of a foreign power" as the target of the proposed surveillance. Inasmuch as the foreign power in question, East Germany, had ceased to exist five years before the application to surveil Stand and Squillacote was made, the FBI application to the FISA court ought to have been held invalid at its inception. As the *Washington Post* has noted, the FISA wiretaps "are intended under the law to respond to imminent threats, not to collect evidence for criminal cases."⁵

The indictment states that after the dissolution of East Germany, the defendants



Terry Squillacote, as seen by courtroom artist.

German contact established an espionage relationship with the U.S.S.R. and then Russia, and "one or more of the defendants planned" to meet with a Russian in 1992. Whether this was secretly told to the FISA court to "satisfy" the requirement of a current foreign power as the target, i.e., Russia, in order to get the court's approval, will never be known. But in any event, the alleged planned meeting never took place and this "plan" constituted the entirety of the evidence supporting a "current" espionage operation. In fact, the warrant was obtained in 1995, three years after the meeting that never happened.

A motion on the above grounds to exclude the evidence collected by the FBI was turned down by U.S. District Court Judge Claude Hilton, who declared that it was not his job to "second guess" the FISA court. With the rarest of exceptions, when an American judge hears the mantra of "national security" invoked, his years in law school become but a dim memory.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONNECTION

The FBI's search of the couple's computer had turned up a letter Squillacote had written to Ronnie Kasrils, South African deputy defense minister, who is also a leader of the South African Communist Party. The letter to Kasrils, written after reading his political memoirs, was, except for brief opening and closing remarks, a duplicate of a paper she had written

and passed around in a study group she belonged to in Washington. It was an analysis of the world political situation and the prospects for building socialism.

The FBI also found, stuck in a book, a Christmas card that Kasrils had sent in reply, with a short note of thanks for her letter. Neither the letter nor the card even remotely hinted at any kind of espionage. Indeed, inasmuch as Squillacote had used a pseudonym and a post office box, and had made no mention of her position at the Pentagon, Kasrils could have no idea of who she was or what she might have access to.

The FBI then decided that the evidence they could not uncover would have to be created. From the voluminous detailed information compiled on Terry Squillacote, of the most intimate nature, the Bureau's team of psychologists put together a Behavioral Analysis Program (BAP), outlining her weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Now part of the permanent public record are comments like: She "has an intense dislike of her stepmother...she is unkempt and has body odor...ignores and neglects her children...suffers from cramps and depression...her mother was prone to depression; her sister committed suicide; and her brother is taking anti-depressants...totally self-centered and impulsive. She has no concern for applying logic to thought or argument about long-term issues such as ethics, loyalty or most other moral reasoning."

4. *Washington Post*, Nov. 22, 1998, p. 2.

5. *Ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1998, p. 8.

The BAP concluded "it is most likely that she will be easily persuaded if an approach is made to her that plays more to her emotions." A scenario was developed "designed to exploit her narcissistic and histrionic characteristics."

the *New York Times*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and elsewhere. One of the documents had actually been declassified before the trial began, yet it was still presented in court as evidence to condemn the defendants.



Kurt Stand during the trial.

The report added that "She will likely grieve for about one year for her 'lost' (former) East German contact [with whom she had had a romantic relationship]. This is an important time period in which it is possible to take advantage of her emotional vulnerability."⁶

It appears to have worked as the FBI envisioned. A letter was sent to Terry, supposedly from Kasils, offering a meeting between her and a member of "one of our special components" (read: intelligence service). Before long she passed this undercover FBI agent four documents: Defense Planning Guidance (FY 1996-2001) (Draft); Defense Planning Guidance (FY 1997-2001); Defense Planning Guidance Scenario Appendix (FY 1998-2003); and International Arms Trade Report September-October 1994.

In court, defense attorneys endeavored to show that the bulk of the significant information in these documents was already in the public record-congressional hearings,

EXPERT TESTIMONY

The prosecution, for its part, presented two "experts": William H. McNair of the CIA and Admiral Dennis Blair of the Pentagon, formerly the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. The two men were straight out of Central Casting, extremely arrogant, tightly-wound, and doctrinaire. Both insisted repeatedly that the fact that "secret" information was in the public domain did not change the fact that it was still a "secret"; that the "authoritative" version locked in a Pentagon file was more valuable to a potential enemy than what appeared in the media, even if the two versions were entirely identical.

During one exchange, McNair was asked to read a passage aloud to show the similarity between the "secret" and public versions of one of the documents. He refused, on the grounds of, yes, national security. At another point, Blair said that the release of the documents had caused serious damage. He was not challenged by the defense attorneys to explain in any way the nature of this damage. Except for a rare

moment or two, the attorneys treated the two men with considerable deference, frequently apologizing to them for any possible misunderstanding, or imagined offense.

Again and again, when they were obliged to give an answer that they thought might benefit the defense case, the two government witnesses quickly editorialized how this was not necessarily what it appeared to be. Neither the defense attorneys nor the judge ever cautioned either witness to limit himself to answering the question at hand.

The two men testified under a legal doctrine that says such witnesses, if appropriately qualified, are "expert witnesses," and that what they declare in court is to be regarded as "expert evidence" or "expert testimony," due to their special knowledge, skill, or experience in the subject about which they are to testify. And the opposing side—in this case the defense—states (when it knows it will lose a motion to disqualify the witnesses) that it is in agreement as to their expertise. The fact that such witnesses can be—and in this case were—terminally biased seems to have been completely lost in the process. If either of the "expert witnesses" had been part of the jury panel, the defense would undoubtedly have challenged their selection without a moment's hesitation.

ROMANTIC REVOLUTIONARY

It remains obscure why Theresa Squillacote thought that such documents could be of any help to the government of South Africa, or to Cuba or Vietnam (she asked the FBI agent whether South Africa passed such information to those countries, and was assured that it did). It also seems puzzling that she would talk exceedingly openly to someone she had just met, who simply claimed to be a South African intelligence officer.⁷ But she has pointed out that her thinking was influenced by her experience with the East Germans. Some of them, she feels, were truly anti-fascist, socialist reformers, and internationalists.

From this and other testimony at the trial, it appears that Squillacote had a highly romanticized view of revolution and her role in it. She had long fancied herself as an adventurous spy, with close ties to the East Germans during the 1980s, including the romantic connection. Part of her saw her job at the Pentagon, from 1991 to 1997, as a means somehow to further the cause, yet she received "highest outstanding performance" ratings on her job during three of those years, and a "reinventing government" award in 1996.

Another apparent contradiction lies in the fact that after exchanging the-totally-in-

7. Ironically, the FBI agent, Douglas Gregory, testified that apartheid was only "occasionally" brutal to Blacks; that he believed Nelson Mandela to be a communist; and that South Africa "is a member of the Communist Bloc."

6. FBI document, National Security Division, "Behavioral Analysis Program Team Report," June 20, 1996.

nocuous letter and card with Kasrls, and then receiving his supposed letter to arrange a meeting with a South African intelligence agent, she was taped telling her brother, with great excitement: "I did it! I did it!" And then telling the undercover FBI agent: "I was kind of hoping he [Kasrls] would read between the lines and he *did* read between the lines. And that's why we're here." These remarks undoubtedly hurt her entrapment defense seriously.

There is no evidence, however, that she ever passed to the Stasi any classified documents during the life of that organization; indeed, during that period she never held a position which gave her access to such material. She and her husband did, however, pass unclassified material to the East Germans, things they came across in the public domain that they thought would be of interest to them, including items on Jesse Jackson's presidential campaign and the 1984 reelection of Ronald Reagan.

Kurt Stand, whose ties to East Germany went back to his German father, never had access to classified documents. The only overt acts he was charged with were having made photocopies of the Pentagon documents his wife obtained and having whitened out the word "secret" from them.

Why, the prosecution kept asking, would the two defendants have undertaken secret travel to meet their German handlers, received special espionage paraphernalia and training, used code names, etc., if all they were passing to the Stasi was unclassified material?

Could the defense make the jury understand that during the Cold War, an American could not have open contact with East Germany without risking heavy-handed scrutiny and harassment from U.S. authorities? In the 1950s, Kurt's father, a refugee from Nazism, had been fired or blacklisted from several jobs in the United States because of his politics, and after the FBI's informing at least one of his employers that he supported leftist causes.

In her meetings with the phony South African, Terry appeared to be offering more of the same non-secret material. At their first meeting, in fact, she gave him an unclassified Defense Department document on "MOD Interaction with the Republic of South Africa."

From numerous phone taps, and from things said by Terry to the agent, it was evident that she was looking to leave her Pentagon position in the very near future. The FBI knew that it had to make her take the fatal step as soon as possible. While she was of a mind to offer political analysis/policy material, the agent made it clear to her that he wanted more "practical" material, "information not otherwise available to the public"; "scoops" is a word he used. Thus it was that she took

copies of the four documents from the Pentagon. In five previous years at that job, she had not done any such thing. And six months had elapsed since she had received the card from Kasrls and had not written back to him. The FBI had built a crime where none had existed before. Her lawyer called it "entrapment." The prosecution said that she was clearly "predisposed" to commit such an act.

THE THIRD MAN

There had been a third person arrested in October 1997—James Clark, 50, who had in fact passed classified documents to the East Germans and had blabbed about it to an FBI agent pretending, in his case, to be a Russian intelligence agent. He entered into a plea agreement before the trial began. Clark had obtained the documents from two friends who worked at the State Department, telling them he needed such material about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for a graduate class he was taking. After Clark's plea agreement, his attorney stated, "We have spent hundreds of hours investigating...and I've not spoken to one person who indicated that Jim did anything to harm the national defense."⁸

Clark's sentencing was delayed until he testified for the prosecution at the Squillacote/Stand trial. The three of them had met at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee in the early 1970s. Clark testified with full knowledge that the degree of severity of his sentence would be influenced by his testimony. Yet he stated that he had never conspired with them for any espionage purpose and knew of no classified material that either one had ever passed to the East Germans.

Those in the national security establishment who play "the secrets game" for a living, are usually much more upset by the act of—the very idea of—someone not taking the game seriously, than by the disclosure of the secrets themselves, which, in their moments of self-honesty, they know to be trifling matters in the larger world of Realpolitik. During the Cold War, can it be imagined that there were secrets which, if known by the Soviet Union or the United States, could have tipped the balance of power and terror to any significant degree at all? Much of foreign policy secrecy is maintained only to avoid embarrassment over the exposure of unethical actions or government disinformation, not because of any danger to national security.

And the harshness of the punishment for "treason" is proportional to the fear of the act.

The two individuals who passed the documents to Clark have not been charged with a crime. One lost his security clearance and job, the other is on leave with pay. It is very

difficult to explain the gulf between the government's treatment of these two and the treatment of Clark, Stand, and Squillacote, except that the latter three are all self-described "communists." Did they fall victim to the U.S. government's never-ending need for "enemies," particularly of the red-devil kind?

In the end, the defense had to contend with America's state religion, patriotism, a phenomenon which has convinced many of the citizenry that "treason" is morally worse than murder or rape, even if it is a victimless crime. The jury lived in Northern Virginia, home of the CIA, the Pentagon, and a host of other national security institutions. Several of them had had, or still had, security clearances. Almost certainly, the same was true of people close to them. The chief prosecutor, in his opening remarks, made it a point to tell the jury that Terry and Kurt "hated the United States. They were dedicated communists."

It was absolutely vital—*sine qua non*—for the defense attorneys to pierce this American frame of mind that comes with mother's milk, that penetrates every ganglion of the American nervous system. Patriotism, like religion, meets people's need for something greater to which their individual lives can be anchored. But the lawyers—from a liberal corporate law firm, acting largely *pro bona*—were not up to the task. It was a radical task—nothing that law school prepares one for very well—and they were not radicals. Instead of challenging the jury's mindset, they catered to it.

Their unquestioning deference to the CIA and Pentagon witnesses, referred to above, is a case in point. Moreover, on at least two occasions, one of the defense attorneys, in citing a document, made it apologetically clear that he wasn't going to mention certain information in it, like numbers. He was thus reinforcing the mystique of "classified information" and "national security." And instead of flaunting their clients' social and political idealism—their fighting for a better world—as a wonderful thing, they apologized for it, telling the jury things like, "You may think they've acted stupid or foolish, and we may think so too, but it's not illegal to act stupid or foolish."

And no mention that in a world of murderers, rapists, torturers, and robbers, Theresa Squillacote and Kurt Stand had not hurt anyone. The United States government has made sure that they will pay dearly for that.

As will their young children, bringing to mind the plight of the Rosenberg children. Ironically, the children of Stand and Squillacote have received some aid from the Rosenberg Fund for Children, set up by Robert Meeropol, one of the sons of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, to help the children of progressive parents who have been imprisoned or otherwise persecuted because of their politics. ■

⁸ Washington Post, June 4, 1998.

Could the Nazi holocaust have happened
without anyone knowing about it?

The American holocaust has.

For the detailed story, read: *Killing
Hope: U.S. Military and CIA
Interventions Since World War II*
by William Blum.

Armed aggression...destabilizing
governments...suppressing movements
for social change...assassinating
political leaders...perverting elections
...manipulating labor unions
...manufacturing "news"....
teaching torture...death squads...
biological warfare...drug-trafficking...
mercenaries...working with Nazis
and their collaborators...

Arranged country by country, year by year,
from China, Italy, and Greece in the 1940s
to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti in the 1990s.



"Far and away
the best book on
the topic."

Noam Chomsky

"I enjoyed it
immensely"

Gore Vidal

Copies signed by the author can be purchased from *CovertAction Quarterly* for \$25.
Order now using the coupon below or e-mail us at info@covertaction.org.

ALL PAYMENTS IN U.S. DOLLARS ONLY, PLEASE.

BACK ISSUES:

Airmail: Can./Mex. add \$1 each issue, other foreign add \$2 each issue.
☐ \$8/copy each for up to four back issues # _____
☐ \$35 for five back issues # _____
☐ \$65 for ten back issues # _____
☐ \$320 Complete set; plus \$15 postage U.S.; \$40 Can/Mex; \$75 other.

SPECIAL OFFERS:

☐ \$7 *CovertAction Quarterly* Mug "Don't let the bastards grind you down."
☐ \$9 Audio tape, Noam Chomsky talk, *CAQ* 15th anniversary, Dec. 1993.
☐ \$9 Audio tape, Noam Chomsky Washington *CAQ* talk, Dec. 1995.
☐ \$25 Video, Noam Chomsky Washington *CAQ* talk, Dec. 1995.

BOOKS:

Add \$10 outside U.S.
☐ \$25 *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*,
(signed), William Blum (1995).
☐ \$25 *Mad Cow U.S.A.*, Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber (1997, hardback).
☐ \$35 *Dirty Work 2: CIA in Africa*, Ellen Ray, et al. (1979, hardback).
☐ \$15 *Lyndon LaRouche/New Fascism*, Dennis King (1989, hardback).

☐ **GIFT:** I'd like to give a gift subscription at \$ _____ to:

NAME: _____

ADDRESS: _____

PHONE: _____

SUBSCRIPTIONS (4 issues/year) U.S. currency only

U.S.	\$22 one year	\$38 two years
Canada/Mexico	\$25 one year	\$44 two years
Other Areas	\$35 one year	\$63 two years

☐ \$25/year additional charge for institutions
☐ \$17/year discounted price for U.S. prisoners

To pay by credit card: ☐ VISA ☐ MASTERCARD
Add \$1.00 to all credit card orders. Total order: \$ _____

Card # _____

Signature: _____

Name: _____ Phone: () _____

Address: _____

E-mail: _____

E-mail your credit card order to: info@covertaction.org (attn: subs)
Fax your credit card order to 202-331-9751

☐ I am mailing U.S.\$ _____ check or money order to:
CovertAction, 1500 Massachusetts Ave. #732, NW, Washington, DC 20005

☐ I am adding a donation of \$ _____ to support *CovertAction Quarterly*.

CAQ CovertAction Quarterly

BACK ISSUES

No. 1 (July 1978) Philip Agee on CIA, Cuban exile trial; Consumer research in Jamaica.*
 No. 2 (Oct. 1978) How the CIA recruits diplomats; Researching undercover officers; Ten years as double agent in the CIA.*
 No. 3 (Jan. 1979) CIA attacks CAIR; Secret Army manual; Spying on host countries.*
 No. 4 (Apr.-May 1979) U.S. spies in Italian services; CIA in Spain; CIA recruiting for Africa; Subversive academics in Africa; Angola.*
 No. 5 (Aug. 1979) U.S. intelligence in Asia; CIA in Denmark, Sweden; Grenada; AIFLD.*
 No. 6 (Oct. 1979) U.S. in Caribbean; Cuban exile terrorists; Philip Agee on CIA plots for Nicaragua; CIA's secret Perspectives for Intelligence.*
 No. 7 (Dec. 1979-Jan. 1980) Media destabilization in Jamaica; CIA uses cockroaches; Robert Moss; CIA propaganda budget; Media operations; UNITA; Iran.*
 No. 8 (Mar.-Apr. 1980) Attacks on Philip Agee; U.S. intelligence legislation; CAIB statement to Congress; Zimbabwe; Northern Ireland.
 No. 9 (June 1980) NSA in Norway; Glomar Explorer; Mind control; NSA.
 No. 10 (Aug.-Sept. 1980) Caribbean overview; Destabilization in Jamaica; Guyana; Grenada bombing; The Spiler; CIA Deep Cover Manual.*
 No. 11 (Dec. 1980) Rightwing terrorism; South Korea; KCIA; Portugal; Guyana; Caribbean; APO; NSA intercepts.
 No. 12 (Apr. 1981) U.S. in El Salvador & Guatemala; New Right; William Casey; CIA in Mozambique; Mail surveillance.*
 No. 13 (July-Aug. 1981) S. Africa documents; BOSS; Namibia; mercenaries; Gbhe Anet; Angola; CIA in Mozambique; Central America; Klan in Caribbean; Max Hugel; Mail surveillance.
 No. 14-15 (Oct. 1981) Index to Nos. 1-12; Review of intelligence legislation; CAIB plan; Extended Naming Names.
 No. 16 (Mar. 1982) Green Beret torture in El Salvador; Argentine death squads; CIA media operations; Seychelles; Angola; Mozambique; Constantine Merges; Klan in Caribbean; Nagan Hand.*
 No. 17 (Summer 1982) CBW history; DoD nerve gas sales pitch; Cuban dengue epidemic; Scott Barnes & "yellow rain" lies; Mystery death in Bangkok; CIA assassinations.*
 No. 18 (Winter 1982) CIA & religion. "Secret" war in Nicaragua; Mokitos; Opus Dei; Evangelicals in Guatemala; Summer Institute of Linguistics; World Medical Relief; CIA & BOSS; South African torture; NSA; Vietnam defoliation.*
 No. 19 (Spring-Summer 1983) CIA & media; History of disinformation; "Plot" against the Pope; Grenada airport—Raggen's big lie; George Anne Geyer.
 No. 20 (Winter 1984) Invasion of Grenada; War in Nicaragua; Ft. Huachuca buildup; Israel & South Korea connections in Central America; Montes; KAL Flight 007; CIA assassinations.
 No. 21 (Spring 1984) New York Times & the Salvadorean election; Time & Newsweek distortions; Accuracy in Media; Nicaragua; CIA occult research.
 No. 22 (Fall 1984) Mercenaries & terrorism; *Soldier of Fortune*; CAIB investigates Special Forces camps; Jonathan Institute; "Privatizing" war in Nicaragua; CIA terror manual; U.S.-South African terror; Italian fascists.
 No. 23 (Spring 1985) "Plot" to kill the Pope/Bulgarian Connector"; St. Peter's Sq. photo manipulation; CIA ties to Turkish & Italian neo-fascists; Paul Hester on human rights; Claire Sterling.
 No. 24 (Summer 1985) State repression; FEMA infiltrators; provocateurs; sectuary movement; American Indian Movement; Leonard Peltier; NASCO strike; Arnold de Borchgrave; Rev. Moon & Robert Moss; Tetra Tech.
 No. 25 (Winter 1986) U.S., Nazis, and Vatican; Klaus Barbie; "Project Paperclip" & J. Peter Grace; James Angleton & Roger Pearson; Nuremberg prosecutor interview; Specialized torture in Brazil; Knights of Malta; Greek civil war"Klan"; WACL.
 No. 26 (Summer 1986) Index to Nos. 12-25; U.S. state terrorism; Noam Chomsky; Vernon Walters; Libya bombing; contra agents; Israel & South Africa Duarte; media manipulation in Costa Rica; Jonathan Pollard; Democracy in Nicaragua.*
 No. 27 (Spring 1987) Special—Religious Right: Christian underground; Christian Right & African Americans; New York Times and Pope Plot; Frank Carlucci; Rev. Moon's law; Southern Air Transport; Oliver North & Michael Ledeen.*
 No. 28 (Spring 1987) Special—CIA & drugs: S.E. Asia, Afghanistan, Central America; Iran-Contra documents; Nagan Hand; William Casey; Canada MKULTRA; Delta Force; AIDS theories & CBW.*
 No. 29 (Winter 1988) Special—Pacific: Philippines counterinsurgency & Religious Right; Fiji; New Zealand, Reins, Vietnam; Atom testing; Media/Nicaragua; CIA in Cuba; Tibet; CIA & Reader's Digest; AIDS.*
 No. 30 (Summer 1988) Special—Middle East: Intifada, Abu Jihad's assassination, Israeli arms sales & nuclear arsenal, Israel & Contras in Africa, Libya disinformation, CIA's William Buckley; Afghan arms pipeline & contra lobby; CIA "role models".
 No. 31 (Winter 1989) Special—Domestic surveillance: The "new" FBI; CIA on campus; Off. of Pub. Diplomacy; Vigilante repression; Geronimo Pratt; Lexington Prison; Puerto Rico; State defense forces; World War Council; International Freedom Foundation; New York Times disinformation.
 No. 32 (Summer 1989) Tenth Year Anniversary Issue: Best of CAIB & Naming Names; CIA at home, abroad, & in the media. Eleven-year perspective by Philip Agee.
 No. 33 (Winter 1990) Bush issue: CIA agents for Bush; Terrorism Task Force; 8 years of covert action; NED in Nicaragua; El Salvador election & state terror; Bush & Noriega; Skull & Bones; Republican Party & fascists; FEMA & NSC; Cuba & drugs disinformation; Chile.
 No. 34 (Summer 1990) FBICIA Role in Martin Luther King Jr. Assassination; Nicaraguan election & NED; CIA in Costa Rica; El Salvador; Noriega & CIA; South African death squads; U.S. & Pol Pot; Marcos & murder; Taiwan; Council for National Policy; Operation CHAOS.
 No. 35 (Fall 1990) Special—Eastern Europe: Destabilization of USSR; CIA's prospects; NED in Lithuania, Balkan Nazis, Free Congress Foundation; C.D. Jackson; Cuba; Other Iran-Contra Cases; CIA and Banks; CIA and Indonesian Massacres.
 No. 36 (Spring 1991) Special—Racism & National Security: FBI vs. ~~A~~ American & Black Officials, Drentha bin-Wahad, Mumia Abu-Jamal, Destabilizing Africa—Chad, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Zaire; Haiti; Panama; Gulf War; CONTELPRO "rac"; Natl. Security "Humor".
 No. 37 (Summer 1991) Special—Gulf War: Media, "Clean War," CIA's Iraq Radio, Evangelicals for nuclear war.

UN, Libya; Iran; Domestic costs; N. Korea next?; Illegal arms deals; George Anne Geyer.
 No. 38 (Fall 1991) Special—DoD, CIA recruitment of U.S. & international students; Militarian campus guide; Arif Durran's Iran-Contra case; South African state terror; Rev. Moon & Academia; Targeting environmentalists; CIA/Bose database.
 No. 39 (Winter 1991-92) Special—The "Good" Agencies: NED, Peace Corps, USAID & AIDS in Africa, National Cancer Institute, Population Control; Cassiani; FBI & Supreme Court; Robert Gates; USSR destabilization; BCCI.
 No. 40 (Spring 1992) Special—Indigenous Peoples: North America, toxic waste dumps, Leonard Peltier interview; Guatemala; East Timor massacre; U.S. in Pacific; Cambodia; GATT; David Duke.
 No. 41 (Summer 1992) Special—Next Enemies: L.A. Uprising; George Bush & CIA; Bush Family; Eghal Ahmad; UN; U.S. cool; Nuclear proliferation; Environmentalist attacked; U.S. economic decline; Dissent as subversion.
 No. 42 (Fall 1992) Philip Agee on covert operations; Peru; Fluoride; V.P. Bush & CIA/NSC; Nicaragua; SOLIC; Militarizing the drug war; CIA targets Henry Gonzalez; Bush Inaugural talk; Rev. Moon boys university; Inside the L.A. police.
 No. 43 (Winter 1992-93) Chemical and Biological war; Zimbabwe, South Africa and anthrax, Gulf War Syndrome, Agent Orange, "Yellow Rain" & Wall Street Journal; Scientific racism; Yugoslavian destabilization; Somalia; U.S. Religious Right.
 No. 44 (Spring 1993) Special—Public relations, buying influence, Hill & Knowlton, Burson-Marsteller; Clinton Cabinet; Somalia: "humanitarian" intervention; Rio Summit greenwash; BCCI/CIA; Clinton & National Security Act; Anti-Gay plan.
 No. 45 (Summer 1993) South Africa Right's links; German Neo-Nazi; HIV Haitians; Interview: Fred Weir in Russia; Police Target black youth; AID, spying; Pelican Bay Prison; Island's youth; Angola profilers.
 No. 46 (Fall 1993) Economic intelligence; CIA's hit list; Israel & Iran; NSA; School of the Americas; Ex-adviser reveals El Salvador coverup; Private prisons; Delta justice & Death Row; Savannah River; French Bull; NSA's Clutter Chip; CIA sites banks.
 No. 47 (Winter 1993-94) CAIB 10th Anniversary; FBI vs. Bari; Russian October coup; Rocky Flats jury; NAFTA Trilateralists; Zinn on FBI; Dellinger on '90s; Cold War quiz; Ginsberg on CIA; Mumia Abu-Jamal; World Bank/IMF; Evergreen Air UNCTA proprietary.
 No. 48 (Spring 1994) Chiapas Uprising; CIA & NAFTA; U.S. sells out Haiti; Iran-Contra report; L.A. Eight; U.S. mercenaries in Azerbaijan; Council for National Policy; Guatemala's drug generals.
 No. 49 (Summer 1994) Peru—Fujimori and CIA's Montesinos; Turbidity/Sudan; Operation Gladio; U.S. atom tests on humans; Amman & Afghanistan; South Africa's left; El Salvador's elections.
 No. 50 (Fall 1994) Operation Condo; Clinton's crime bill; Cato's Liberty Lobby; Monfort's muckpuckers; Low-intensity democracy; NRO & the intelligence budget.
 No. 51 (Winter 1994-95) A.I.D.ing U.S. interests in Haiti; Canadian intelligence abets Neo-Nazi; Brookhaven Laboratory and cancer; U.S. in Bulgaria; Repackaging population; Asylum rights for women; The CIA budget; Penitentiary vacations; Bud McFarlane book review.
 No. 52 (Spring 1995) Rwandan genocide; Population 187; Rise of militia; Neo-Nazi/Anti-abortion links; Groom Lake; Wall Street pressures Mexico; Human radiation update; Corporations fund research; NSA in cyberspace; Internet resources; Warren Anderson located.
 No. 53 (Summer 1995) Gulf War Syndrome coverage; Militia and the military; Frank Donner; Arab bashing; Hiroshima; Cold War bomb; Iraqi embargo; Guatemala; DeVine murder; Bhopal; FISA Court; Omnibus Antiterrorism Act; Kaulster on Fourth Amendment violation.
 No. 54 (Fall 1995) Noam Chomsky on corporate propaganda; Bosnia forum; U.S. in Kurdistan; obit for Sasakawa; Labor now; NAFTA layoffs; Prison labor; AFL-CIO in Russia; Private security guards; Walter Reuther.
 No. 55 (Winter 1995-96) Police vs. citizen review; Corporate assault on FDA; Public relations industry wars on activists; Colin Powell; UN at SUCastro speech; Spain's GAL scandal; East Timor—UK arms Indonesia; Bosnia forum continued.
 No. 56 (Spring 1996) Chomsky on "enduring truth"; High-tech surveillance; Militarizing U.S./Mexico border; Pepper gas; Guyana mining disaster; Economics behind Yugoslavia fall; Russian nationalism; U.S./Korea alliance & Kwangju; La Belle bombing.
 No. 57 (Summer 1996) Six-pack of lies: Racism in the ranks; White-collar crime; Common law courts; INS detention; Buying the Russian elections; Noam Chomsky on the U.S. and Haiti; U.S.-Israeli cooperation; Anonymous remailers; Nukes in space.
 No. 58 (Fall 1996) Burmese galag; Estrogen mimickers and Endocrine disrupters; Globalization of crime and capital. "Counterterrorism" documents; Black church burnings; AID and the environment; Brookhaven Laboratory whistleblowers; AIDS conspiracy debunked.
 No. 59 (Winter 1996-97) Special—New Age of Surveillance: Hager on ECHELON; Spooks in cyberspace and on the Internet; Canadian spy world; NSA's plan; and NIMA: Also Privatizing welfare; Mexico and School of Americas; Afghanistan; CIA-drugs connection.*
 No. 60 (Spring 1997) Space probe's plutonium mission; Peru: MRTA, Gorrilla U., and Japan: prison labor; unobscuring: University-business links; U.S. military and Colombia; FBI-CIA collaboration; Sudan; Slavery and social engineering.
 No. 61 (Summer 1997) Turkey's state-linked killers; Privatizing Manafort maker; Policing activists; U.S. torture manuals; U.S. arms Mexico's drug war; NATO expands; Spooks in Congress.
 No. 62 (Fall 1997) Cambodia: U.S. and Pol Pot; U.S. and election interference; Paramilitary policing; Mercenary armies; Che & the CIA; Vaclov Havel; Free radio; Mad cow disease.
 No. 63 (Winter 1997-98) Rightwing think tanks/foundations; South Africa: Mind of torture; Chemical/biowar; Croyne AG and the NSA.
 No. 64 (Spring 1998) Vietnam—The Final Battle; Iraq—Sanctions; U.S. near war; "Useless Algeria"; Political control technology; Jihad International, Inc.; Pincchet's autism; Drug war fungus; Burma-Singapore global heroin trade.
 No. 65 (Fall 1998) Philip Agee & Ramsey Clark: 20-year retrospective; Mumia Abu-Jamal; Afghanistan/Sudan radio; Yugoslavia; NGOs; Visit to CIA; Cuba's counterrevolution museum; Recent bombings/unattempted Castro hit; U.S. & Cuba democracy; Amna Shukur; Russia "Reform"; Media evasion; Bosnia TV disinformation; Ron Ridehouse; CIA vs. Daniel Tsang; CIA mistakes identities.
 No. 66 (Winter 1999) Pinochet: Who's Next?; Wye River Palestinian Pullout; Sudan Bombing; Tomahawks, Technology, and Terror; PanAm 103-Ten Years Later; Laurent Kabila Interview; D.C. "Espionage" Trial; Algeria's Fundamentalist Terror; Richard Holbrooke Uses A War; West's Bosnian Islamic Heres; Beyond NATO.

* Available in photocopy only.



Krajina: The Forgotten Ethnic Cleansing

600,000 Serbs Driven
Out of Croatia,
1991-1995

CovertAction Quarterly

1500 Massachusetts Avenue NW #732
Washington, DC 20005

Subscribers: Number
in corner of label is the last
issue of your subscription